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The aim of this dissertation is to show how gene regulatory network (GRN) theory can 
be integrated into evolutionary theory. GRN theory, which lies at the core of evolution-
ary-developmental biology (evo-devo), concerns the role of gene regulation in driving 
developmental processes, covering both how these networks function and how they 
evolve. Evolutionary and developmental biology, however, have long had an uneasy re-
lationship. Developmental biology played little role in the establishment of a genetic the-
ory evolution during the modern synthesis of the early to mid 20th century. As a result, 
the body of evolutionary theory that descends from the synthesis period largely lacks 
obvious loci for integrating the information provided by GRN theory. Indeed, the rela-
tionship between the two has commonly been perceived, by both scientists and philoso-
phers, as one of conflict. By combining historical and philosophical analysis, I consider 
four sources of tension between evo-devo and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing 
in order to show how those tensions can be resolved. I present a picture of the conceptual 
foundations of evo-devo that reveals the potential for integrating it with existing evolu-
tionary theorizing. In chapter two, I argue that a major historical source of tension be-
tween evolutionary and developmental biology was the debates, in the first half of the 
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20th century, about the possibility of explaining development in terms of gene action. I 
show that the successes of GRN theory put these worries to bed. In chapter three, I argue 
that, rather than conceive of evo-devo as typological, we should see it as resting on Cu-
vieran functionalism. I argue that Cuvieran functionalism complements the Darwinian 
functionalism of the modern synthesis. In chapter four, I present a picture of the fine 
structure of the concept ‘homology’. This picture shows how accounts of homology that 
have traditionally been taken to conflict are in fact compatible and complementary. In 
chapter five, I analyze the nature of structure/function disputes in terms of types of an-
swers to contrastive why-questions. On the basis of this analysis, I show how the struc-
ture of evolutionary theory requires both structuralist and functionalist approaches. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 FIRST THOUGHTS 
 
Evolutionary developmental biology, or evo-devo, is a flourishing and multifaceted field 
of research, but its place in the broader landscape of evolutionary theorizing is difficult 
to determine precisely, for a number of reasons. For one, the organizational structure of 
many biology departments separates ecology and evolution from molecular biology, 
with evo-devo falling on the molecular side. Institutionally, then, evo-devo is separate 
from most evolutionary theorizing. A second reason, reinforcing the first, is that evolu-
tionary theory today descends from the modern synthesis period of the 1930s-1960s, dur-
ing which a number of biological subfields coalesced around a genetic approach to solv-
ing evolutionary problems (Jepsen 1963; Mayr and Provine 1981; Dobzhansky 1982; Mayr 
1982; Simpson 1982). Somewhat notoriously, however, developmental biology was ex-
cluded from the synthesis, though what exactly caused this exclusion remains a subject 
of debate (Amundson 2005; Davis, Dietrich, and Jacobs 2009; Love 2009b). Third, evo-
devo is itself a complex science, and these complexities can be seen both diachronically 
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(evo-devo has changed dramatically since its inception in the late 1970s) and synchroni-
cally (multiple traditions within evo-devo co-exist and sometimes come in conflict). 
My aim in this dissertation is twofold: (i) to analyze the conceptual foundations of 
evo-devo and (ii) to clarify its relationship to other kinds of evolutionary theorizing. The 
upshot, if I have succeeded, is an account of evo-devo’s place within evolutionary theory 
that minimizes its tensions and maximizes its harmony with other evolutionary research 
programs.  
I focus on one particular strain of evo-devo: that centered around developmental ge-
netics. Developmental genetics has been a central part of evo-devo since the latter’s in-
ception (a crucial early discovery was of the deep conservation and developmental role 
of hox genes), but it is especially in the 21st century that it has come to be the dominant 
strand, with the flourishing of gene regulatory network (GRN) theory (Prud’homme, 
Gompel, and Carroll 2007; Wray 2007; Carroll 2008; Peter and Davidson 2015). It is my 
sense—which I try to substantiate in the chapters that follow—that many philosophical 
analyses of evo-devo have failed to adequately grapple with the central role of GRN the-
ory in the field. 
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1.2 WHY EVO-DEVO? WHY GRN THEORY? 
 
Why be worried about the place of evo-devo within the broader landscape of evolution-
ary theorizing? The most basic reason is that it seems to continuously come into conflict 
with older traditions in evolutionary biology. These conflicts span the gamut, from diffi-
culties with interpersonal communication to large-scale theoretical disagreements. 
At the small scale, practitioners of evo-devo often have a difficult time talking to pop-
ulation geneticists: their explanatory aims and strategies diverge widely, and accordingly 
it’s difficult for either to see how the other is engaged in a common project (Mark Rebeiz, 
personal communication). While such difficulties may simply reflect a difference in in-
terests, there is reason to think that the conflict lies deeper. While some practitioners of 
evo-devo take a conciliatory stance toward evolutionary theorizing that derives from the 
synthesis (Wray 2007; Carroll 2008), others see the two approaches as fundamentally in 
conflict (Davidson 2011). At a still larger scale, evo-devo is often lumped in with other 
new approaches to thinking about evolution as part of a package known as the “extended 
evolutionary synthesis,” which claims to be a more adequate approach to evolution than 
the gene-centric approach derived from the synthesis (Pigliucci 2007; Pigliucci and Müller 
2010; Pigliucci and Finkelman 2014; Laland et al. 2014, 2015; Müller 2017). On the flip side, 
many biologists have questioned the relevance of developmental biology to evolutionary 
theory and have challenged evo-devo’s core claims (Wallace 1986; Reeve and Sherman 
1993; Hoekstra and Coyne 2007). 
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In consequence of these conflicts, a great deal of philosophical attention has been fo-
cused on evo-devo and the possibility of integrating it into evolutionary theorizing more 
broadly (e.g., Burian 1986; Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996; Amundson 1998; Gilbert 2003b; 
Lewens 2009b; Brigandt and Love 2010; Walsh 2013; Winther 2015). While many of these 
approaches are conciliatory, emphasizing the potential for fruitful integration and cross-
talk between evo-devo and other approaches to evolution, the most detailed, developed, 
and thoroughgoing analysis of evo-devo concludes that evo-devo is incommensurable 
with the population-genetic-centric evolutionary theorizing that descended from the syn-
thesis (Amundson 2005). On Amundson’s view, the exclusion of development from the 
synthesis was not an accident but a conceptual necessity: the structure of synthetic theo-
rizing rendered developmental biology irrelevant to answering questions about evolu-
tionary causes. The relationship between evo-devo and population genetics, Amundson 
(2005, chap. 11) claims, possesses all the hallmarks of Kuhnian incommensurability: dif-
ferent (and competing) ontologies, different exemplars, different explanatory aims, and 
different explanatory standards. Thus far, Amundson’s arguments stand largely unchal-
lenged. 
But, while the philosophical outlook may seem rather grim, the facts on the ground 
are somewhat more encouraging, and suggest that integration should be possible. First, 
there is the simple fact that, for over three decades now, both fields have co-existed and 
flourished. That suggests that neither is going to give way to the other: whatever the end 
result will be, it probably won’t be a classic Kuhnian case of replacement of one paradigm 
by another. Both are here to stay. Second, there is some evidence that the exclusion of 
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development from the synthesis was less severe than it is often portrayed (Waisbren 1988; 
Smocovitis 2008; Davis, Dietrich, and Jacobs 2009). 
Third, one of the barriers to integration concerns time scale. Evo-devo tends to focus 
on deeply conserved body plans (Raff 1996; Davidson and Erwin 2006) and on evolution-
ary novelties that arose in the distant past (Moczek 2009; Shubin, Tabin, and Carroll 
2009)—on macroevolutionary phenomena. Population genetics, by contrast, focuses on 
microevolutionary phenomena: changes in the genetic composition of interbreeding pop-
ulations (Cheverud 1984). While the architects of the modern synthesis argued that mac-
roevolutionary phenomena can be explained by extrapolating microevolutionary causes 
(Dobzhansky 1982; Mayr 1982; Simpson 1982), actually making the connection is difficult, 
simply because it is hard to get information about microevolutionary causes in the deep 
past. However, recent work in evo-devo has investigated the evolution of development 
at smaller time scales, where population genetic resources can be applied (Nunes et al. 
2013; Glassford et al. 2015). It remains to be seen how the subfield of micro-evo-devo will 
contribute to the integration of the two fields, but the prospects are promising. 
My aim is to present a picture of the conceptual foundations of evo-devo that makes 
room for such integration. To do so, I focus on the role of GRN theory in evo-devo. GRN 
theory is a theory of animal development that focuses on the role of gene regulatory net-
works in driving developmental differentiation (Peter and Davidson 2015). The basic idea 
is that genes are not automatically expressed. Each gene contains, in addition to its pro-
tein-coding regions, regulatory regions called enhancers. A special class of proteins (tran-
scription factors) bind to specific DNA sequences within these enhancers and either drive 
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or repress expression. Transcription factor genes are regulated in the same way as other 
genes, and so the genome encodes deep, hierarchical networks of transcription factors 
regulating the expression of other transcription factors (finally bottoming out in genes 
that carry out non-regulatory functions). These networks allow for the precise control of 
gene expression in space and time, which is essential for coordinating the precisely spa-
tiotemporally localized events that characterize normal development. Evo-devo based on 
GRN theory studies how these networks evolve (or fail to evolve) to generate evolution-
ary change and evolutionary stasis (Davidson and Erwin 2006; Carroll 2008; Davidson 
and Erwin 2010; Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 7; Glassford et al. 2015). 
Why give GRN theory pride of place? Two reasons. First, much of the philosophical 
literature on evo-devo has focused on its structuralist, typological aspects (Amundson 
1998; Brigandt 2007; Lewens 2009a; Love 2009a). This is especially true of Amundson’s 
(2005) treatment. Structuralist tendencies have indeed been present in evo-devo from the 
beginning and are still present today (Webster and Goodwin 1982; Alberch 1989; 
Kauffman 1993; Newman 2014b). However, emphasizing them to the exclusion of all 
other tendencies misses out on the diversity of approaches present in evo-devo. Much of 
evo-devo, as I argue in my third chapter, adopts a functionalist approach, though one 
distinct from standard neo-Darwinian functionalism (Davidson and Erwin 2006; Wray 
2007; Carroll 2008). Understanding the divisions within evo-devo, rather than treating it 
as a unified field, can help to understand how it can be integrated with evolutionary the-
orizing. It can also help us to understand disputes within the field (Carroll 2008; Newman 
and Bhat 2008). Second, and relatedly, I argue (especially in my second chapter) that GRN 
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theory’s central role in evo-devo actually helps to resolve some of the historical sources 
of tension between evolutionary and developmental biology. When GRN theory-based 
work in evo-devo is lumped in with the structuralist approaches, the conflicts come to 
seem more than they are. When the two are separated, the possibility of integrating both 
strands of evo-devo into evolutionary theory is easier to see. 
 
 
 
1.3 METHODS AND BACKGROUND 
 
My aim in this dissertation is to understand the conceptual foundations of evo-devo and, 
in doing so, to show how it can be integrated with other aspects of evolutionary theory. 
Each chapter takes on a particular locus of conflict discussed in the philosophical litera-
ture surrounding evo-devo and attempts to show how it can be resolved. Chapter 2 fo-
cuses on the exclusion of development from the synthesis (Wallace 1986; Amundson 2005; 
Love 2009b) and its ramifications for understanding the place of evo-devo today. Chapter 
3 considers the claim that evo-devo is perniciously typological (Amundson 1998; Ghiselin 
2005a; Jenner 2006; Lewens 2009b; Love 2009a; Ereshefsky 2010; Rieppel 2010). Chapter 4 
discusses developmental approaches to the ‘homology’ concept, which have come under 
intense criticism from multiple camps (Wagner 1989; Cracraft 2005; Ramsey and Peterson 
2012; Currie 2014; Wagner 2014). Finally, chapter 5 considers the relationship between 
 8 
structuralist and functionalist approaches to evolution, both within and beyond evo-devo 
(Rieppel 1990; Amundson 2005; Boucher 2015). 
Finding these points of tension is easy (they’re all widely discussed in the literature); 
resolving them is more of a challenge. Here, I adopt the phylogenetic approach to history 
and philosophy of science, as described by James Lennox (2001). The basic premise un-
derlying the phylogenetic approach to history and philosophy of science is that problems 
that vex contemporary science and philosophy of science can often be understood and 
resolved by studying their historical origins. As Lennox notes, even well-confirmed the-
ories can be formulated and revised in many different ways, and which of these possible 
ways are actualized shapes the further development of the theory. By understanding 
these contingent features of theories within the broader space of possibilities, we can 
come to see cases where problems are a product of features that the theory might easily 
do without.  
For instance, we will see in chapter two that the exclusion of development from the 
synthesis was a product, in part, of two key factors: the immature state of developmental 
genetics in the first half of the 20th century, and the skepticism on the part of many devel-
opmental biologists that any genetic theory could explain the main phenomena of devel-
opment. The theorizing of the synthesis coalesced in this context, and the absence of de-
velopmental biology from that theorizing reflects the antagonism between developmen-
tal biologists and Mendelian geneticists more than it reflects any principled irrelevance 
of development to evolution. By understanding the bases of that antagonism, we can see 
that GRN theory provides us the resources to resolve them. Insofar as the history of 
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exclusion continues to generate conflict between evo-devo and synthesis-derived ap-
proaches to evolution, it doesn’t need to do so. Evo-devo has developed in a way that 
puts those issues to rest. 
The phylogenetic approach to history and philosophy of science runs throughout my 
dissertation. In three of the chapters, it is on the surface. We have already seen its role in 
chapter two. In chapter three, I address the charge that evo-devo is perniciously typolog-
ical by breaking down Ernst Mayr’s unprincipled notion into two more respectable no-
tions: natural state thinking and Cuvieran functionalism. Only the latter, I argue, plays a 
role in evo-devo. Here, it’s crucial that it’s Cuvieran functionalism, as opposed to Dar-
winian functionalism. By understanding the nuances of functionalist reasoning across the 
history of biology, we can understand how evo-devo fits into a functionalist tradition, 
though not the same functionalist tradition that informed the modern synthesis. Placed 
in this historical context, the problem to be solved changes: not how structuralist, typo-
logical evo-devo fits in with synthetic theorizing, but rather how the varieties of function-
alist reasoning interrelate. Similarly, in chapter five, I try to understand both the struc-
turalist and functionalist traditions in evo-devo in the context of the long history of struc-
ture/function disputes in biology. In trying to capture what is common to structuralist 
(or functionalist) positions widely separated by both time and theoretical commitment, I 
aim to show both why such disputes continuously arise and how structuralist and func-
tionalist approaches to evolutionary theory can and must be integrated. 
Only chapter four is an outlier. There, I aim to detail the fine structure of the ‘homol-
ogy’ concept. My contention is that, when this fine structure is understood, the 
 10 
interminable debate between genealogical and developmental approaches to under-
standing homology can be dissolved. This is the most thoroughly “contemporary” of the 
chapters: history plays little role in the argumentation (though historical research played 
a key role in shaping my understanding of the issues). 
My approach in chapter four owes much to Mark Wilson’s (1982, 1994, 2006, 2015, 
2018) work on the complex behaviors of scientific (and other) concepts. Wilson argues 
that scientific concepts are very often not characterized by an essential “core” that binds 
together all proper uses of the term. Instead, concepts have a patchwork structure, with 
local threads tying together various patches. For instance, temperature cannot simply be 
defined as mean kinetic energy per degrees freedom, since such a definition would be 
inapplicable to many of the materials whose temperature we aim to measure (rubber 
bands, for instance). Instead, localized patches of application develop and are coordi-
nated at their points of overlap. Thus, predicates often do not “meet” properties in a sim-
ple, one-to-one fashion (Wilson 1982). The same, I argue, is true of ‘homology’. Disputes 
arise when a single account of homology is asked to do the work of multiple accounts, 
which must be stitched together in the right way. 
The emphasis of my dissertation is fundamentally integrative: we need multiple ap-
proaches to evolutionary theory that can coexist and complement one another. Rather 
than ask for a single, unified evolutionary theory—which in this context means asking 
whether evo-devo or synthesis-derived theorizing is “right”—we should ask how differ-
ent regions of evolutionary theory (including both population genetics and evo-devo) 
interrelate. In this, I see my work as addressing issues raised by Sandra Mitchell’s (2002, 
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2003; Mitchell and Gronenborn 2017) work on integrative pluralism. As Mitchell argues, 
new theories or modes of representation often co-exist for surprisingly long periods of 
time, even though one initially seemed to promise to replace the other (Mitchell and 
Gronenborn 2017). The key question to ask, then, is how these co-existing resources are 
integrated to provide scientific explanations (Mitchell 2002). That question lies in the 
background of much of this dissertation. In chapter three, for instance, I look at the role 
of Cuvieran functionalism in explaining deep conservation and show how this explana-
tion of evolutionary stasis complements neo-Darwinian explanations of evolutionary 
change. Similarly, in chapter five, my aim is to develop a framework for understanding 
not just what’s at stake in structure/function disputes, but how structuralist and func-
tionalist approaches can both help to explain the evolution of a single part. 
My work also owes much to James Woodward’s (2013) careful disentangling of the 
types of causal claims that scientists make. In chapter two, for instance, it turns out that 
one of the issues leading developmental biologists to mistrust genetic research was the 
two fields’ divergence over the kinds of causal claims they sought (Amundson 2005, chap. 
7). Where the developmental biologists wanted “connecting process” type causal stories 
that showed how developmental stages arose from prior stages and gave rise to future 
stages, Mendelian geneticists offered “difference-making” (Waters 2007) causal stories 
that explained phenotypic differences in terms of genetic differences. With the help of 
Woodward’s work, we can see that these two types of explanation are both legitimate, 
and that providing one does not preclude providing the other. In the terms of chapter 
two, providing a transmission genetic account (difference-making) does not preclude 
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providing a developmental genetic account (connecting process). Woodward’s influence 
is also seen in my attempt to disentangle the precise causal questions at issue in struc-
ture/function disputes (chapter five). Here, again, needless disputes may arise if multiple 
distinct causal questions are condensed into a single question. 
In each case, these philosophers’ work has pushed me to analyze the conflicts between 
evo-devo and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing at a local level. I began this pro-
ject thinking to tell a story about how to resolve the large-scale theoretical conflict be-
tween the central theory of the modern synthesis and the central theory of evo-devo—the 
two entities I took to be potentially incommensurable on the basis of Amundson’s (2005) 
work. But this proved to be fruitless: that is not the scale at which actual disputes arise. 
On both sides, there is no central theory to be found. In the case of the modern synthesis, 
there is a broadly genetic approach to evolutionary theory shared by its proponents (but 
also by the figures it marginalized; see Waddington 1957; Goldschmidt 1982), but the 
details of how this worked out varied widely from theorist to theorist. There are shared 
themes running through the work characteristic of the synthesis (Lennox 2015), but what 
resulted was not so much a theory as a cluster of theories in partial harmony and partial 
tension (for a sample, see the papers collected in Jepsen, Mayr, and Simpson 1963). More-
over, these theories have undergone more or less constant revision over the six decades 
since the “hardening” of the synthesis (Gould 1983; Ishida 2017), despite recent claims to 
the contrary (Pigliucci 2016). For this reason, I speak throughout of “synthesis-derived 
evolutionary theorizing” (or similarly ugly descriptive phrases) rather than of “the syn-
thetic theory”, which does not exist. 
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The same is true of evo-devo: it’s a multifarious research program with many parts 
that, while they generally complement each other, give rise to internal disputes. In trying 
to compare evo-devo with synthesis-derived evolutionary research programs, then, look-
ing for the paradigm or theory that underlies each program and then trying to under-
stand how these paradigms/theories relate proved to be a misleading and unhelpful 
strategy. How, then, are we to compare these complex research programs? 
What I have done is attempt, in each chapter, to take a conflict that has been attributed 
to disagreements between the evo-devo position on the one side and the synthesis-de-
rived position on the other side and to identify the relevant, smaller units between which 
the tension actually arises. Usually, these units are a particular type of explanatory strat-
egy. In chapter two, for instance, I focus on a historical dispute over the relationship be-
tween genetics and development and show how this interacts with the different ontolo-
gies of two sorts of evolutionary explanation (one common in evo-devo, the other in pop-
ulation genetics). I argue that when we understand how GRN theory resolves the histor-
ical dispute, we can see how the two explanatory strategies can be related. In chapter 
three, the focus is once again on competing explanatory strategies, this time concerning 
deep conservation and the problem of evolutionary stasis (Wake, Roth, and Wake 1983; 
Rieppel 2010). In chapter four, I focus on different accounts of homology and the partic-
ular purposes for which they are used. In this case, the dispute turns out not to be be-
tween evo-devo and synthesis-derived theorizing, but between evo-devo and particular 
traditions in phylogenetic systematics (Hennig 1966; Wiley and Lieberman 2011). In chap-
ter five, my focus is once again on explanatory strategies, in this case strategies for 
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explaining the evolution of form. Here my direct target is a view that we should under-
stand these disputes as between philosophical stances, which are even more abstract and 
tenuous than theories (Boucher 2015). Instead, I argue that the dispute becomes more 
comprehensible the more we focus in on local explanations of the evolution of particular 
forms. 
One of the virtues of this approach is that local integration within particular explana-
tions often cuts across large-scale theoretical differences. Beckett Sterner and Scott Lid-
gard (2018) have recently furnished a very nice example of this in their study of the sys-
tematics wars that rocked systematic biology in the latter half of the 20th century. In that 
case, they show that, even as cladists and numerical taxonomists fought bitterly over the 
theoretical foundations of the discipline, systematists on both sides of the dispute fruit-
fully shared key aspects of their daily workflow. Even as theoretical conflict raged above, 
practical integration occurred below. A similar moral—or so I hope to show—applies to 
evo-devo in relation to synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing. 
 
 
 
1.4 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE: OVERVIEW 
 
In presenting the aims and methods of my dissertation, I’ve said a fair amount about the 
content of particular chapters, but only in scattered form, picking details relevant to the 
point at hand. I’d like to end these introductory remarks with an overview of the 
 15 
argumentative structure of each chapter of the dissertation. In each chapter, I get into the 
weeds (historical and contemporary); here I hope to provide the skeletal frame of each 
chapter, into which the details can be fit. First, however, a few more general remarks on 
how the whole thing hangs together. 
As noted above, the most thorough treatment of the conceptual foundations of evo-
devo and of its conflict with synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing is Ron Amund-
son’s The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought (Amundson 2005). In that 
work, Amundson tells two stories about the sources of the conflict, in terms of two exclu-
sions of developmental biology from the modern synthesis. The first exclusion 
(Amundson 2005, chaps. 7–9) occurred during the early years of the synthesis, and largely 
stemmed from the split between heredity and development that occurred with the rise of 
Mendelian genetics (this narrative of how the split arose has been challenged, see 
Meunier 2016). The second exclusion occurred later, in the aftermath of the Darwin cen-
tennial in 1959. Around this time, Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the synthesis, re-
wrote the philosophy of the synthesis in terms of a set of distinctions, most notably be-
tween population thinking and typological thinking and between proximate and ultimate 
causation (Mayr 1959, 1976). Though not initially designed to exclude developmental bi-
ology from evolutionary relevance, they came to be used in that way in the early days of 
evo-devo (Scholl and Pigliucci 2014). 
The second and third chapters of my dissertation take up these two exclusions in turn. 
The second chapter revisits the split between heredity and development, arguing that the 
split existed from two perspectives (developmentalist and synthetic). Only the 
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developmentalist perspective generates an incommensurability between population ge-
netic and evo-devo approaches to evolution. Happily, however, evo-devo vindicates the 
synthetic perspective. And so the first exclusion proves not to be a barrier to integrating 
evo-devo with synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing.  
The third chapter addresses the second split, focusing on the proper way to under-
stand (a) the common claim that evo-devo is typological and (b) Amundson’s claim that 
synthesis-derived theorizing rests on what he calls “exclusive population thinking”. I ar-
gue that evo-devo’s use of Cuvieran functionalist reasoning accounts for many of its al-
legedly “typological” characteristics and that Cuvieran functionalism is compatible with 
a defensible interpretation of what exclusive population thinking actually excludes. 
In chapter five, I expand outward to consider the nature of structure/function dis-
putes more generally. It is common to see evo-devo as a structuralist alternative to the 
functionalist synthesis (Resnik 1994; Amundson 2005; Wagner 2014; Boucher 2015). The 
conclusion reached in chapter three—that evo-devo relies on Cuvieran functionalism—
should already suggest that this is too simplistic an approach. My aim in this chapter is 
thus to make sense of functionalism and structuralism as explanatory strategies in order 
to understand both (a) why both approaches to evolutionary theory are required and (b) 
why structure/function disputes nonetheless persistently arise (and can be expected to 
continue to do so), including within evo-devo. 
I skipped over chapter four (on the ‘homology’ concept) in that brief overview because 
chapter four fits somewhat awkwardly with the other chapters. On the one hand, it shares 
a few key themes with the other chapters. Most notably, my aim is to understand the role 
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of developmental genetic approaches to understanding homology in relation to other ap-
proaches to understanding homology. In that regard, it fits with the dissertation’s em-
phasis on how GRN theory helps us to understand the status of evo-devo. Moreover, my 
aim in this chapter, like in the others, is integrative: I aim to show how developmental 
genetic approaches to homology can be integrated with genealogical approaches. 
But there is a glaring difference: the conflict I discuss is not between evo-devo and 
synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing. Rather, it is between evo-devo and phyloge-
netic systematics, itself a field with a tumultuous relationship to the synthesis (the work 
of Hennig 1966 directly conflicted with the evolutionary taxonomy approach favored by 
Ernst Mayr; see Sterner and Lidgard 2018). When I first envisioned the chapter, I saw it 
as involving a conflict between approaches that treat homologs as the causally ineffica-
cious residue of shared history and approaches that treat homologs as causal agents that 
shape evolutionary history (Amundson 2005, 238–44). But it turns out that the arguments 
I offer in chapter three resolve that issue, which is in any event not the main source of 
conflict between the different approaches to understanding homology. In following out 
those sources of conflict, this chapter was dragged somewhat away from the main line of 
the dissertation. It is more substantive for the departure. 
I turn now to brief overviews of each of the four chapters. 
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1.5 CHAPTER TWO 
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to reconsider the nature of the historical exclusion 
of developmental biology from the modern synthesis, showing that this exclusion looked 
quite different from the different perspectives available at the time, and (2) to place evo-
devo in relation to this historical conflict in order to show how evo-devo gives us the 
resources (GRN theory) to resolve it. 
Regarding the first point, my central contention is that the split between heredity and 
development existed from two perspectives: that of developmental biologists and that of 
the proponents of the modern synthesis. From the perspective of developmental biolo-
gists, Mendelian genetics had severed the problems of heredity (transmission of traits 
between generations) from the problems of development (how traits are actually pro-
duced in an individual organism (Morgan 1923, 1926). Mendelian genetics concerned it-
self solely with transmission/heredity, ignoring development. 
Moreover, developmental biologists argued that the Mendelian approach could not 
be used to explain the central phenomenon of development: the precisely spatiotempo-
rally localized differentiation of the embryo (Lillie 1927; Russell 1930; Just 1936). One of 
the main reasons for pessimism was the fact that each cell in the embryo was known to 
possess the same genetic material (the Mendelians themselves showed this). How could 
a cause that was the same everywhere explain local differentiation? This problem, known 
as the developmental paradox (or Lillie’s paradox), suggested that the genetic material 
 19 
did not have the requisite properties to explain development, and thus that a genetic the-
ory of development was an impossibility. 
In consequence, many developmental biologists looked to the cytoplasm for the fac-
tors responsible for key developmental processes (Sapp 1987). Thus, from the develop-
mentalist perspective, the split was ontological: the factors that explain heredity (the 
genes) lie in the nucleus, while the factors that explain development lie in the cytoplasm.  
By contrast, from the synthetic perspective the split was merely methodological. This 
can be clearly seen in the case of Theodosius Dobzhansky (1982). Dobzhansky distin-
guished three types of genetic study: transmission genetics, developmental genetics, and 
population genetics. Transmission genetics studied the passing of traits between genera-
tions, correlating genetic differences (localizable to chromosomes) with phenotypic dif-
ferences. However, transmission genetics said nothing about the developmental pro-
cesses that produced these effects. That was the task of developmental genetics. Devel-
opmental genetics would study the same entities as transmission genetics, but, by using 
different methods, would reveal different aspects of their function. In this way, the split 
was only methodological, not ontological. 
What does this tell us about the relationships between evo-devo and synthesis-de-
rived theorizing? Amundson (2005, chap. 11) characterizes the incommensurability be-
tween them in terms of their divergent evolutionary ontologies. Where evo-devo sees 
evolution as a process of modifications of ontogeny, and thus sees ontogenies as the units 
of evolutionary change, synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing sees evolution as a 
process of modification of the genetic composition of populations. Now, if the 
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developmentalists were right, this would generate a serious incommensurability. With-
out a genetic theory of development, such population processes could not be connected 
to the evolution of ontogeny. 
Evo-devo, and in particular GRN theory-based evo-devo, however, vindicates the 
synthetic perspective as against the developmentalist perspective. GRN theory is pre-
cisely a developmental genetic theory of development—one that, moreover, explains 
how a globally constant genetic material can have locally specific effects (and so resolves 
the developmental paradox). It thus provides a bridge that allows for the integration of 
studies of the evolution of development with studies of the evolution of populations. That 
is not to say that such studies always arrive at compatible conclusions (they don’t; see 
Hoekstra and Coyne 2007; Peter and Davidson 2011), but it does mean that those differ-
ences don’t rest on incompatible ontologies. 
 
 
 
1.6 CHAPTER THREE 
 
This chapter addresses the concern that evo-devo is perniciously typological. This project 
runs into an immediate difficulty: the notion of typological thinking was developed by 
Ernst Mayr (1959), but Mayr’s understanding of it was notoriously unprincipled 
(Witteveen 2015, 2016). As a result, when one surveys the range of discussions of evo-
devo that attribute to it typological thinking, one finds a striking diversity of ways of 
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understanding the notion (Amundson 1998; Jenner 2006; Brigandt 2007; Lewens 2009a, 
2009b; Love 2009a; Riegner 2013). 
Accordingly, the first aim of this chapter is to understand in a principled way what it 
might mean for evo-devo to be typological. I argue that one of the functions of Mayr’s 
notion of typological thinking was to understand what was common to all critics of grad-
ualistic evolutionary theories. Typology, for Mayr, was closely connected to anti-gradu-
alism: a typologist could only be either a saltationist or against evolutionary theory alto-
gether. Moreover, one of the reasons that evo-devo is often considered typological is its 
central concern with the deep conservation of animal body plans. But the problem of ex-
plaining deep conservation is precisely that of explaining why something has failed to 
evolve. It’s thus a promising place to look for “typological” thinking in evo-devo. 
Mayr’s project, however, was a failure: there is no one strand of thought common to 
all anti-gradualists. In the chapter, I distinguish two distinct threads: natural state think-
ing (given a precise account by Sober 1980) and Cuvieran functionalism. Natural state 
thinking involves modeling systems as having a natural state from which they can be 
deflected by an interfering force, but to which they will tend to revert when the force is 
removed. Many early critics of Darwin opposed his theory on such grounds (Jenkin 1867; 
Mivart 2009). 
Georges Cuvier, by contrast, opposed gradualistic evolutionary theories on other 
grounds (Coleman 1964; Burkhardt 1977; Russell 1982). His argument had three steps: (1) 
show that organisms are highly functionally integrated, (2) argue on that basis that inter-
mediates between existing forms would lack such integration and therefore be non-viable, 
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and (3) conclude that gradual evolution was therefore impossible. Though functionalist 
(it emphasizes the functional integration of organisms), this argument is not functionalist 
in the same sense that Darwin’s reasoning was functionalist (Russell 1982). Specifically, 
where Darwin focused on organism-environment relations, Cuvier emphasized relations 
between parts internal to the organism. Cuvieran functionalism marks a second path to 
anti-gradualism, distinct from natural state thinking. 
The second aim of this chapter is to show that Cuvieran functionalism plays an im-
portant role in evo-devo’s explanation of the deep conservation of animal body plans. 
The task of explaining deep conservation is challenging: it requires explaining why parts 
that have (a) varied and (b) been exposed to numerous distinct environments have none-
theless failed to undergo evolutionary change. Evo-devo does this by applying a localized 
form of Cuvieran functionalism. According to this localized Cuvieran functionalism, 
there are certain regions of the genome, called GRN “kernels”, that (a) underlie the de-
velopment of deeply conserved elements of body plans, (b) are themselves deeply con-
served (their topology is identical or nearly so in widely diverged taxa), and (c) are char-
acterized by extensive positive feedback (Davidson and Erwin 2006; Peter and Davidson 
2015, chap. 7). They are integrated in the sense that any disruption of the linkages in the 
kernel destroys overall kernel function, leading to the production of organisms that lack, 
e.g., a heart. This combination of functional integration and essential developmental role 
explains why they (and their associated body plan elements) have failed to evolve for 
hundreds of millions of years. 
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The third and final aim of this chapter is to show that Cuvieran functionalism is com-
patible with exclusive population thinking. The basic idea behind exclusive population 
thinking is that evolutionary causes are fundamentally causes that occur within inter-
breeding populations (there are exceptions to this, e.g., Erwin 2000, 2011; Doolittle 2017, 
but they do not help to vindicate Cuvieran functionalism). Once populations diverge 
(once gene flow ceases), they pursue independent evolutionary trajectories. Exclusive 
population thinking, on this basis, forbids invoking evolutionary causes that transcend 
populations. I argue that exclusive population thinking has a strong and a weak interpre-
tation, based on how one understands “transcends”. On the strong interpretation, exclu-
sive population thinking forbids any explanation that unifies what is going on in inde-
pendently evolving lineages. Each population requires its own, unique explanation. But 
this, I argue, rules out explanations well beyond evo-devo, such as explanations of eco-
logical trends (which by definition transcend the single species). Such explanations unify 
by showing how independently evolving populations are responding similarly to similar 
causes. A weaker, more defensible understanding of exclusive population thinking 
should permit such explanations, which respect that populations without gene flow are 
following independent (but similar) evolutionary trajectories. 
This weaker understanding of exclusive population thinking allows for Cuvieran 
functionalist explanations. Precisely because GRN kernels are preserved, and because 
disruption of them leads to developmental catastrophes that are fatal in all naturally oc-
curring environments, they will give rise to similar selection pressures in all members of 
a lineage. Shared ontogeny can thus explain the similar trajectories of these different 
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lineages, but only because the same causes is repeated within each individual lineage. 
Exclusive population thinking does not forbid Cuvieran functionalist explanations. Re-
casting the role of typological thinking in evo-devo as the role of Cuvieran functionalism 
in evo-devo thus allows us to see how evo-devo can complement, rather than conflict 
with, synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing. 
 
 
 
1.7 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a detailed account of the fine structure of the ‘homol-
ogy’ concept. By “fine structure” I mean a picture of how different accounts of homology 
relate to each other, showing their regions of overlap and non-overlap. On the view I 
defend, understanding homology requires two types of accounts: (1) an abstract, formal 
genealogical account that unifies the application of the term to all kinds of characters, and 
(2) a number of locally enriched accounts that specify how the genealogical account ap-
plies to particular kinds of characters. I argue that enriched accounts overlap with, but 
are not nested within, the genealogical account. 
Why think that ‘homology’ has a fine structure? Richard Owen’s classic definition of 
‘homologue’ sets out the key problem that accounts of homology should solve. Owen 
(1843, 379) defined homologs as “the same organ in different animals under every variety 
of form and function.” That is, homologous parts (such as the bat’s wing and the 
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dugong’s front fin) are in some sense the same, despite being potentially quite dissimilar. 
An account of homology should explain this sameness. 
There are two major traditions for understanding homological sameness: genealogical 
and developmental. Genealogical accounts, based on Darwinian evolutionary theory, say 
that homologous parts are the same in virtue of descending from the same part in a com-
mon ancestor (Darwin 1964; Hennig 1966; Cracraft 2005; Ramsey and Peterson 2012; 
Currie 2014). Developmental accounts, by contrast, understand homological sameness as 
the result of shared developmental processes or constraints (Roth 1984; Wagner 1989; 
Roth 1991; Owen 2007; Wagner 2014). This basic disagreement over the nature of homo-
logical sameness leads to further points of tension between, discussed in detail in the 
chapter.  
As a result of these disagreements, many biologists and philosophers treat the two 
accounts as competing accounts of the same phenomenon (Amundson 2005, 238–44; 
Cracraft 2005; Ramsey and Peterson 2012; Currie 2014). A number of philosophers, how-
ever, have argued that the accounts are compatible, and simply serve different functions 
(Jamniczky 2005; Brigandt 2007; Griffiths 2007; Laublichler 2014). 
I agree with the compatibilists, broadly speaking, but it’s a tricky position to defend. 
Given the disagreements and apparent contradictions between the two accounts, how 
can they be both (a) accounts of a single phenomenon and (b) nonetheless compatible? It 
would be easy to render the accounts compatible by accepting that the two types of ac-
count are simply talking about different things—then we have a case of mere polysemy. 
Compatibilists, however, have correctly recognized that there is a deep relationship 
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between the phenomena described by the two types of account, and thus this easy solu-
tion cannot work. My attempt to delineate the fine structure of ‘homology’ is intended as 
a compatibilist position that satisfies both desiderata. 
The basic view is this. Genealogical accounts of homology play a unifying role: they 
show how all different kinds of biological entity can be homologous. They are able to do 
so in virtue of their abstract, formal character. They are formal in that they define homol-
ogy in terms of the topology of phylogenetic trees: two parts are homologous if they can 
be traced back, via a continuous path, to an ancestor that also had that part. They are 
abstract in that they ignore the details of how it is that parts can be inherited. Thus they 
can apply to different kinds of characters, despite differences in the mechanisms that al-
low them to be mapped onto phylogenetic trees. 
Although the abstract, formal character of genealogical accounts is a boon in allowing 
them to apply widely, it leaves them importantly incomplete. Specifically, they presup-
pose the very sameness relation they were supposed to explain. Parts in different species 
are homologous if they can be traced back to the same part in a common ancestor. Now 
the problem is to understand what makes parts the same in ancestors and descendants. 
In the limiting case, this becomes the problem of understanding what makes parts the 
same in parents and offspring. 
To address this issue and complete the genealogical account, we need enriched ac-
counts that explain parent-offspring sameness. This requires looking at how parts are 
inherited. But parts are inherited in different ways (in the chapter, I give details for body 
parts and genes). Thus, multiple enriched accounts are needed, each of which completes 
 27 
the genealogical account in a particular domain. I further show that, once we have these 
enriched accounts, we can see that they cover phenomena that fall outside the genealog-
ical account (such as serial homology and paralogy—the repetition of body parts and 
genes, respectively, within a single organism). Enriched accounts thus overlap with, but 
are not nested within, the genealogical account. 
This view, I argue, resolves the tensions between the two kinds of accounts with 
which we began. Developmental accounts, on my view, should be understood as en-
riched accounts of body part homology. In their regions of overlap, genealogical and de-
velopmental accounts provide compatible descriptions at different levels of abstraction. 
The developmental account elucidates the mechanisms that make it possible to apply the 
genealogical account to body parts. In their regions of non-overlap, they are simply talk-
ing about different things and so do not conflict with one another. 
 
 
 
1.8 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an account the nature of structure/function disputes 
that satisfies three desiderata. First, it should help make sense of why structure/function 
disputes have been a persistent feature of biological science across multiple rounds of 
radical theory change. Second, it should show how structuralist and functionalist 
 28 
explanatory strategies can be fruitfully integrated. Third, it should capture the diversity 
of approaches to evo-devo, which includes both structuralist and functionalist traditions. 
A natural strategy for understanding the nature of structuralism and functionalism, 
given their persistence across hundreds (arguably thousands) of years of biological in-
quiry and radical theory change, is to treat them as abstract enough to avoid commitment 
to any particular belief. Often, this involves characterizing them in terms of views about 
explanatory priority: structuralists say structure is explanatorily prior to function, and 
vice-versa for functionalists (Russell 1982; Asma 1996; Amundson 2005). The details of 
how structure explains function (or vice-versa) may then change dramatically over time, 
while structuralism and functionalism are still recognizable views. Sandy Boucher (2015) 
has taken this approach to its extreme, arguing that structuralism and functionalism are 
philosophical stances sensu van Fraassen (2002). 
In this chapter, I advocate a different approach. I argue that more concrete content can 
be given to structuralism and functionalism if, instead of focusing on them as supra-the-
oretical positions, background commitments, or stances, we understand them as explan-
atory strategies. That is, rather than talk about structuralism and functionalism, we 
should talk about structuralist and functionalist explanations. Relatedly, rather than fo-
cus on conflicts between structuralism and functionalism as abstract commitments, we 
should focus on local structure/function disputes, where structuralist and functionalist 
explanations provide competing answers to different contrastive why-questions. 
Because my interest is in understanding evo-devo, my focus in this chapter is on un-
derstanding structure/function disputes in the context of evolutionary theory (though I 
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do sketch some arguments to show how my analysis could be extended to pre-Darwinian 
structure/function disputes—first desideratum). The starting point for my analysis is the 
two-part structure of evolutionary theory: evolutionary change requires both (i) the gen-
eration of novel variants by mutation or other processes and (ii) the spread of variants 
through a population by selection or drift. Analyzing several examples of classic struc-
ture/function disputes in an evolutionary context, I show that the structuralists in each 
case explain structure by invoking limits to the variants that are actually generated. By 
contrast, the functionalists in each case explain structure by assuming that variation is 
relatively unlimited (in pragmatically limited respects), and that the processes of spread 
therefore play a key role in explaining structure. 
On this basis, I develop a view according to which structuralists and functionalists 
can be distinguished by the kinds of answer they give to particular contrastive why-ques-
tions, of the form, “why did form X evolve rather than form Y.” Structuralist explanations 
explain this in terms of limits to the generation of variation (variants in the direction of Y 
were not generated), while functionalist explanations explain this in terms of selection 
favoring the spread of one variant over another (variants were produced in both X and Y 
directions, with selection favoring those in the direction of X). 
This view shows how structuralist and functionalist explanations can be integrated 
(second desideratum). In any case of evolutionary change, processes of generation and 
spread must both be involved. A complete explanation of any particular bit of organic 
form (were such a thing possible) would therefore require both structuralist and func-
tionalist aspects. Contrastive why-questions, however, can take pure structuralist or pure 
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functionalist answers (among other possibilities, discussed in the chapter). Struc-
ture/function disputes arise when competing structuralist and functionalist answers are 
given to particular contrastive why-questions. 
Finally, this view accounts for the internal complexity of evo-devo (third desidera-
tum). In contrast to accounts that treat evo-devo monolithically as a structuralist chal-
lenge to functionalist neo-Darwinism (most notably Amundson 2005), my view does jus-
tice to the substantial functionalist strain in evo-devo (discussed in chapter three). In do-
ing so, it helps make sense of evo-devo’s internal complexity. Structure/function dis-
putes arise entirely within evo-devo (e.g., Carroll 2008; Newman and Bhat 2008), pre-
cisely because evo-devo has always mixed structuralist and functionalist approaches. 
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2.0 THE PRODIGAL GENETICS RETURNS 
 
 
 
The progress of genetics and of physiology of development can only result 
in a sharper definition of the two fields, and any expectation of their reun-
ion (in a Weismannian sense) is in my opinion doomed to disappointment. 
(Lillie 1927, 367)  
 
Although a large amount of work still remains to be done in this field, it is 
indeed fair to say that the genetics of the transmission of hereditary charac-
ters is, by and large, understood now. But the problem of heredity is much 
wider. (Dobzhansky 1982, 10) 
 
 
 
2.1 DEVELOPMENTAL GENETICS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN TENSION 
 
The modern synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s provided the foundation of contemporary 
evolutionary theorizing. It ranks as one of the major accomplishments of 20th century bi-
ology. Yet, in a recent article, Eric Davidson (2011, 35–36) had this to say about a particu-
lar “Neo-Darwinian” (i.e. synthesis-derived; cf. Hoekstra and Coyne 2007) approach to 
evolution: 
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Mechanistic developmental biology has shown that its fundamental con-
cepts are largely irrelevant to the process by which the body plan is formed 
in ontogeny. In addition it gives rise to lethal errors in respect to evolution-
ary process. Neo-Darwinian evolution is uniformitarian in that it assumes 
that all process works the same way, so that evolution of enzymes or flower 
colors can be used as current proxies for study of evolution of the body plan. 
It erroneously assumes that change in protein coding sequence is the basic 
cause of change in developmental program; and it erroneously assumes 
that evolutionary change in body plan morphology occurs by a continuous 
process. All of these assumptions are basically counterfactual. 
 
Davidson is a partisan of gene regulatory network (GRN) theory.1 Animal develop-
ment begins with a relatively undifferentiated embryo and ends with a fully differenti-
ated adult organism. GRN theory states that differentiation results from the precise spa-
tiotemporal localization of gene expression, controlled by regulatory architecture en-
coded in the genome. For Davidson, the study of this regulatory architecture has revealed 
the falsity of many of the assumptions of the modern synthesis.2 For instance, he sees in 
the synthesis a uniformitarian commitment to the belief that body plan evolution is a 
continuous process. According to GRN theory, however, the process is discontinuous in 
fundamental ways. 
How are we to understand the tensions between GRN theory and synthesis-derived 
evolutionary theorizing? On one view, their conflicts are merely empirical, to be decided 
by the weight of the evidence. But from another vantage, the tension lies at a deeper, 
                                               
1 For a comprehensive review of GRN theory, see (Peter and Davidson 2015). I provide a 
brief summary of some of the key points below (Section 2.7). It bears mention that GRN 
theory primarily concerns animal development. How well its insights apply to plant de-
velopment remains an open question. GRN theory was first articulated by Britten and 
Davidson (Britten and Davidson 1969). 
2 Davidson is not the only biologist to have been struck by a seeming tension between 
developmental genetics and the modern synthesis. Others include John Gerhart and Marc 
Kirschner (2007), Gerd Mülller (2010), and Stuart Newman (2014a). 
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conceptual level. Ron Amundson (2005, chap. 11) has argued that evolutionary-develop-
mental biology (including GRN theory) is “incommensurable” with synthesis-derived 
evolutionary theorizing. On this view, the conceptual framework of evolutionary theory, 
as descended from the modern synthesis, renders developmental biology irrelevant to 
evolutionary theorizing. If so, then GRN theory, which draws evolutionary implications 
from the findings of developmental biology, conflicts with the synthetic theory at the 
level of this basic conceptual framework. 
I aim to show that there is no incommensurability between synthesis-derived evolu-
tionary theorizing and GRN theory, and thereby to illuminate the shared ground that 
makes their empirical conflicts possible. Amundson traces the conceptual exclusion of 
development from the synthesis to the split between heredity and development that 
emerged from the Morgan school. While Amundson is right to connect the two, their 
relations are more complicated than he recognizes. 
The argument to follow can be summarized: 
1. The split between heredity and development looked very different to develop-
mental biologists than to proponents of the modern synthesis (Section 2.2, Sec-
tion 2.4). 
2. From the developmentalist perspective, the split was ontological: genes play a 
crucial role in determining hereditary phenomena, but not in determining de-
velopmental phenomena. Developmentalists offered two primary arguments 
for this view (Section 2.2). 
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3. From the synthetic perspective, the split was methodological: transmission ge-
netics studies the role of genes in heredity, developmental genetics the role of 
genes in development. The two disciplines accordingly have distinct method-
ologies (Section 2.4). 
4. Amundson’s incommensurability arises only if one adopts the developmental-
ist’s perspective on the split between heredity and development (Section 2.3). 
5. Of the two arguments for the existence of an ontological split between heredity 
and development, one is based on a misunderstanding of the Mendelian ge-
netic research program and its relationship to developmental genetics (Section 
2.5). This misunderstanding persists in Amundson’s account (Section 2.6). 
6. GRN theory provides the resources to address the other argument favoring the 
developmentalist perspective. GRN theory thus vindicates the synthesis per-
spective and heals the split between heredity and development (Section 2.7). 
In consequence, there is no incommensurability between evo-devo (at least those 
parts based on GRN theory) and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing. The tensions 
between them are not so deep and intractable as has been thought (Section 2.7). 
 
 
 
  
 35 
2.2 LILLIE’S DOUBTS 
 
In “The Gene and the Ontogenetic Process,” the embryologist Frank Lillie asserted the 
existence of a split between development and heredity and pessimistically assessed the 
prospects for a reunion. Lillie (1927, 361) noted that, in 19th century theories like those of 
Charles Darwin and August Weismann, “the theory of development included the theory 
of heredity.” Since that time, however, “physiology of development and genetics have 
pursued separate and independent courses.” Lillie argued that the split was the result of 
Mendelian geneticists isolating the problems of development from those of heredity, ad-
dressing only the latter, and that Mendelian genetics lacked the resources to explain de-
velopment. The split could therefore be expected to be permanent.  
Lillie’s paper is worth investigating in detail, for several reasons. The arguments he 
made concerning the limited scope of genetic explanations were accepted by a number 
of developmental biologists.3 These arguments characterize the developmentalist posi-
tion that Amundson claims is incommensurable with the synthetic position. In order to 
understand the nature of this purported exclusion, we thus need to understand the nature 
                                               
3 Lillie was not alone in his views. For instance, E. S. Russell levied similar criticisms of 
Mendelian genetics (Russell 1930, ch. 5). Unlike Lillie, however, Russell insisted that he-
redity was a subsidiary problem to the larger problem of development. Thus the Mende-
lians could not, in his view, even explain heredity. This difference between Lillie and 
Russell is, in my view, at least partially semantic. To utilize a distinction defended below 
(Section 2.4 and Section 2.5), Russell and Lillie both allowed for genetic explanations of 
transmission but not of development. They differed in that Russell rejected, while Lillie 
accepted, the equation of heredity with transmission. This is not meant, however, to deny 
the possibility that there are further disagreements between them that explain this se-
mantic disagreement. See also Just (1936). 
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of the split between heredity and development. Furthermore, Theodosius Dobzhansky 
(1982, chap. 1) explicitly denied Lillie’s claims. Dobzhansky’s rejection of Lillie’s claims 
is closely tied to the role that he expected developmental biology could play in evolution-
ary theory. Finally, Lillie’s arguments are worth considering because they establish clear 
criteria as to what would count as a reunion of heredity and development. Lillie believed 
that no genetic theory could meet these criteria, but, as I will argue below (Section 2.7), 
GRN theory does meet them.  
In Lillie’s view, the disciplinary split between heredity and development rested upon 
a physical split: the factors relevant for understanding development were located in the 
cytoplasm of the fertilized egg, while the factors relevant for understanding heredity 
were located in the nucleus.4 This immediately suggests two strategies for healing the 
split: get heredity into the cytoplasm or get development into the nucleus. Lillie’s gloomy 
assessment of the prospects of reunion was due to his belief that neither strategy could 
succeed. The first had been pursued by proponents of cytoplasmic inheritance and op-
posed by the Mendelians (Morgan et al. 1915, 235–39; Dobzhansky 1982, 68–72). The rea-
sons for the failure of this program do not concern us here (see Sapp 1987). Lillie’s argu-
ments in his 1927 paper, if sound, showed that nuclear (i.e. genetic) factors could not 
explain development. 
Lillie proposed two criteria that any unified theory of heredity and development must 
satisfy: 
                                               
4 “The radical distinction between Mendelian segregation and embryonic segregation is, 
I believe, that the former is an affair of the nucleus, the latter of the cytoplasm” (Lillie 
1929, 515). 
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First criterion: The theory must be able to explain the differentiation of the em-
bryo over the course of development. 
Second criterion: The theory must be able to recognize the distinction between 
“open” (pluripotent) and “closed” (fated) terms in develop-
ment. 
Lillie argued that a genetic theory of heredity and development could satisfy neither 
criterion. Therefore “any expectation of their reunion (in a Weismannian sense) is in my 
opinion doomed to disappointment” (Lillie 1927, 367). I take up his reasons for pessimism 
about each criterion in turn.  
Lillie’s first criterion is based on the fact that development is a process of differentia-
tion.5 During development, a relatively undifferentiated germ (the fertilized egg) pro-
duces a fully differentiated organism (Lillie 1927, 362). The “essential problem” that a 
theory of development must solve is to determine the cause of this increase in differenti-
ation over time (Lillie 1927, 367). 
This requirement can be clarified further. Lillie (1927, 362–63) distinguished two sorts 
of differentiation. The first, “embryonic segregation”, involves the “progressive genetic 
restriction” of developmental potencies (i.e. the possible end states into which any par-
ticular part of the embryo can develop) in a definite, precisely controlled sequence in 
                                               
5 Lillie’s focus was on animal development. GRN theory is likewise primarily a theory of 
animal development, though GRNs play a role in plant development as well. Develop-
mental phenomena also occur in the microbial world (O’Malley 2014, chap. 4), but they 
fall outside the scope of this debate. 
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space and time.6 Once segregation is complete, a second form of differentiation follows, 
which involves “the realization of the potencies isolated in the final terms of the segrega-
tion process, thus involving histogenesis and definitive functional development.” I will 
call this second process “realization.” 
Lillie’s first criterion requires that a unified theory of development must explain both 
embryonic segregation and realization. Lillie (1927, 366) allowed for a genetic explanation 
of realization: 
Geneticists have, however, brilliantly demonstrated that genes are con-
cerned in phenotypical realization at different stages of the life history, and 
it is therefore a reasonable postulate that this is true of all phenotypic reali-
zation.  
 
Regarding embryonic segregation, however, Lillie argued that a genetic explanation 
was impossible. The source of this impossibility was the fact, accepted by the geneticists 
themselves, that each cell possessed the same complement of genes. The problem is that, 
if each cell of the embryo is genetically identical, there cannot be a genetic explanation of 
embryonic segregation. Such an explanation would require explaining regional differ-
ences in the embryo in terms of something constant across all regions. But that is impos-
sible. Thus, as Lillie (1927, 366) put it, “so long as the theory of the integrity of the entire 
gene system in all cells is maintained [...] the phenomena of embryonic segregation must, 
                                               
6 E. E. Just (1936) criticized Lillie’s notion of “embryonic segregation” because he thought 
“segregation” implied a particular (incorrect) mechanism by which the restriction of de-
velopmental potencies occurred. However, as I read him, Lillie clearly intended ‘embry-
onic segregation’ to refer to an experimentally determined developmental phenomenon 
without presupposing any particular mechanism by which the phenomenon was pro-
duced (see especially Lillie 1929, sec. VIII). 
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I think, lie beyond the range of genetics.” This is known as the “developmental paradox” 
(Amundson 2005, 177–80). 
Turning to the second criterion, Lillie pointed to a fundamental limitation of genetic 
analysis that, in his view, scuttled any attempt to develop a genetic theory of develop-
ment. Lillie’s distinction between embryonic segregation and realization implicated a fur-
ther distinction between open and closed terms in development (Lillie 1927, 363).7 Open 
terms are pluripotent, i.e. they have multiple potential fates that remain open to them, 
depending on the conditions under which they develop, while closed terms are limited 
to a single fate, regardless of developmental context (Lillie 1927, 364). The process of em-
bryonic segregation involves taking wholly open (totipotent) terms and progressively re-
stricting their potencies until they become closed terms, at which point all that remains 
is realization. 
Any adequate theory of development must preserve this distinction. But, Lillie (1927, 
367) argued, genetic analysis inherently treated all developmental stages as if they were 
closed terms: 
At whatever stage of development a character may be selected for exami-
nation, and whatever the nature of the character, it must always, so far as 
genetic method is concerned, be treated as a finality. It has no past, except 
the genes postulated as a result of their appearance in previous genera-
tions—and no future. The genetic method reveals, alpha, the gene, and 
omega, the final term.  
 
                                               
7 A “term,” for Lillie, is a stage of the ontogenetic process. Because different regions of the 
embryo develop at different rates, terms are local and not global: “final terms are scat-
tered all along the life history from a very early stage indeed” (Lillie 1927, 364). 
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Even if one can show that genetic changes impact developmental processes, genetic 
methods (i.e. crossing experiments) only establish correlations between genetic changes 
and changes in particular aspects of development considered outside the context of the 
entire developmental stream. Genetic analysis thus could not distinguish between open 
and closed terms. For the purposes of genetic analysis, all terms were closed. Crossing 
experiments treated the gene as “alpha” and the trait as “omega,” skipping over the entire 
intervening process. The consequence, for Lillie, was that any genetic theory of develop-
ment must in principle fail the second criterion of adequacy. 
In sum, Lillie viewed the disciplinary split between heredity and development as the 
product of an ontological split between the nuclear, genetic processes responsible for real-
ization and the cytoplasmic, non-genetic processes responsible for embryonic segregation. 
Because of this ontological split, no unified genetic theory of heredity and development 
was possible. Lillie proposed two criteria any such theory must meet—it must explain 
embryonic segregation, and it must recognize the distinction between open and closed 
terms—but he raised powerful arguments against the possibility of a genetic theory meet-
ing these criteria. 
 
 
 
  
 41 
2.3 AMUNDSON ON THE CONCEPTUAL EXCLUSION OF DEVELOPMENT FROM 
THE SYNTHESIS 
 
Lillie’s diagnosis of a split between heredity and development underlies Amundson’s 
claim that the modern synthetic theory of evolution treated development as irrelevant to 
evolution. Here we must be careful, for Amundson actually provides an account of not 
one but two exclusions of development from the synthesis. The first exclusion was based 
on the Mendelian separation of heredity and development. This exclusion characterized 
the synthesis from its inception in the late 1930s to the “hardening” (Gould 1983) of the 
synthesis during the 1940s and 1950s (Amundson 2005, chaps. 7–9). The second exclusion 
rested on conceptual distinctions (typology versus population thinking; proximate ver-
sus ultimate causation) developed by Ernst Mayr and others. These distinctions crystal-
lized around the Origin centennial of 1959 and played a major role in debates (beginning 
in the 1970s) about the relevance of development to evolution (Amundson 2005, chaps. 
10–11). 
Only the first exclusion is relevant here, for it is this exclusion that purportedly rests 
on the divergent conceptual framework of the synthetic theorists and their developmen-
talist opponents. The second exclusion is the product of conceptual distinctions superim-
posed on the synthesis after the fact. They are, moreover, additions of dubious cogency 
(Scholl and Pigliucci 2014; Witteveen 2015, 2016). While historically important for under-
standing post-1959 disputes in biology, they are irrelevant to my concerns here. 
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Taking his cue from Lillie, Amundson argues that Mendelian genetics gave rise to a 
split between heredity and development. The Mendelians explained parent-offspring re-
semblances in a manner that entirely skipped over ontogenetic processes. Amundson 
(2005, 139) argues that two contemporary “truisms” about heredity are in fact stipulations 
that grew out of Mendelian genetics: 
Truism 1. “Heredity is the passing of traits (or representatives of traits, such as 
genes) between generations.” 
Truism 2. “Heredity is independent of development.”  
 It is easy enough to see how both truisms relate to classical Mendelian genetics, un-
derstood as the study of heredity. Mendelian genetics uses crossing experiments to trace 
parent-offspring resemblances (the passing of traits) back to genes transmitted from the 
parents to the offspring. Thus we get the first truism: Mendelian genetics explains the 
passing of traits between generations in terms of the passing of genes between genera-
tions. Moreover, Mendelian genetics furnishes this explanation by entirely bypassing de-
velopment. It relies solely on correlations between genes and traits, saying nothing about 
how genes produce those traits. From this we get the second truism: Mendelian genetics 
can explain heredity without recourse to development. 
From here, it is a short step to the exclusion of development from the synthesis. The 
synthetic theory is fundamentally a genetic theory of evolution. As Dobzhansky put it, 
“evolution is a change in the genetic composition of populations” (Dobzhansky 1982, 11–
12). Thus “the mechanisms of evolution constitute problems of population genetics.” 
Population genetics is based on classical Mendelian genetics. Mathematical population 
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genetic models of the early 1930s, which helped lay the groundwork for the modern syn-
thetic theory, showed how natural selection could act on Mendelian genes to accumulate 
phenotypic change. As Mendelian genetics ignored development, so did population ge-
netics, which equally required only gene-trait and parent-offspring correlations, skipping 
over the intervening ontogenetic processes. In short, the synthesis furnished a genetic 
theory of evolution, development is irrelevant to genetics, and so development is irrele-
vant to the synthetic theory. Importantly, this exclusion was conceptual. It is not merely 
that the synthetic theory failed to include input from developmental biology, but that it 
in principle could not include such input. 
On this picture, the architects of the synthesis disagreed with their critics (e.g. Lillie) 
not only about empirical questions, but also about the very criteria of adequacy for evo-
lutionary explanations. Amundson argues that developmental biologists accepted, while 
the synthesis rejected, what he calls the “causal completeness principle” (Amundson 2005, 
175–89). According to the causal completeness principle, understanding evolution re-
quires understanding development, on the grounds that evolution can only modify adult 
form by modifying the ontogenetic processes that produce that form. Because the modern 
synthetic theory excluded development, its proponents were committed to rejecting the 
causal completeness principle. It is this disagreement that is the basis for Amundson’s 
claim that evolutionary developmental biology and the modern synthetic theory are in-
commensurable. 
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Amundson (2005, 255) summarizes the incommensurability between evo-devo and 
the synthesis, including their respective positions on the causal completeness principle, 
as follows: 
[Synthesis]: Individuals don’t evolve. Populations do. Populations evolve by nat-
ural selection. 
[Evo-Devo]: Individuals don’t evolve. Ontogenies do. Ontogenies evolve by 
modifications of ontogeny.8 
Lillie’s position on the split between heredity and development generates incommen-
surability between these views. The evolution of populations is (by definition) a change 
in their genetic composition. If a genetic theory of development is impossible, then in 
principle the evolution of populations cannot be connected to the evolution of ontogenies. 
Moreover, this hypothetical incommensurability between the synthesis and evo-devo 
was in fact actualized between the sciences of genetics and embryology at the time of the 
synthesis. As Gilbert (1998, 174) notes: 
By the 1930s, genetics and embryology had their own rules of evidence, 
their own paradigmatic experiments, their own favored organisms, their 
own professors, their own journals, and, most importantly, their own vo-
cabulary. 
 
At the same time, this way of characterizing the incommensurability makes clear how 
it can be overcome. A genetic theory of development would allow biologists to connect 
                                               
8 Amundson describes this as a broader conflict between adaptationists and structuralists. 
Since I do not here concern myself with the broader structure/function dispute Amund-
son discusses (I discuss it in chapters 2 and 4), I have changed the names of the positions 
to represent my narrower concerns. This change is not unfair to Amundson, for the syn-
thesis is for him an adaptationist program, while evo-devo is a structuralist program. 
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the evolution of populations to the evolution of ontogenies, and so would bring the two 
perspectives together. This, I will argue below (Section 2.7), is precisely what has hap-
pened. 
Thus far, I have explored the issue of the exclusion of development from the synthesis 
from the perspective of the developmentalist critics (old and new) of the synthesis and 
its genetic foundations. How does the matter appear from the other side? As we have 
seen, Amundson’s argument for the incommensurability of evo-devo (and a fortiori GRN 
theory) and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing rests on Lillie’s ontological read-
ing of the split between heredity and development. Lillie’s defended this reading by ar-
guing that no genetic theory of development could meet his criteria of adequacy. But 
what if a genetic theory satisfying those criteria were possible? The architects of the syn-
thesis certainly believed him to be wrong. As we will see, their optimistic view about the 
relationship between genetics and development leads to a very different picture of the 
conceptual exclusion of development from the synthesis: from the synthetic perspective, 
the exclusion does not exist at all. 
 
 
 
2.4 DOBZHANSKY’S THREE GENETICS 
 
The publication of Theodosius Dobhzansky’s Genetics and the Origin of Species in 1937 was 
a pivotal moment in the early history of the modern synthesis. Drawing upon work in 
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classical Mendelian genetics and important results obtained by mathematical population 
geneticists (especially Ronald Fisher and Sewall Wright), Dobzhansky attempted to pro-
vide a genetic analysis of evolutionary problems, most notably the problem of the origin 
of discontinuity in nature. In doing so, he helped to articulate the theoretical framework 
around which disparate biological disciplines could be unified. 
Dobzhansky’s accomplishments were conceptual as much as empirical. Though he 
provided important answers to many of the questions he raised, the real novelty of his 
book lies in the way he framed those questions, drawing on the resources of Mendelian 
and population genetics. For present purposes, the most important conceptual division 
of the work was a threefold division of the science of genetics into transmission, devel-
opmental, and population genetics (Dobzhansky 1982, 8–12). Dobzhansky placed this di-
vision within a larger framework that is worth presenting briefly. 
Genetics and the Origin of Species begins by establishing the central problem Dobzhan-
sky wished to solve: “the nature and the origin of the discrete groups into which the liv-
ing world is differentiated” (Dobzhansky 1982, p. 5).9 The diversity of life is not a contin-
uous array; rather, it forms nested clusters. Dobzhansky’s goal was to provide a causal 
analysis of the origin of these clusters that could explain why they were clusters at all, 
rather than a continuous array. Dobzhansky differentiated between causal and 
                                               
9 Treating this as the most pressing problem in evolutionary biology was not at all a trivial 
move on Dobzhansky’s part. Two decades earlier, Henry Fairfield Osborn (1916, p. 504) 
had argued that the problem of the origin of species had become “an incidental issue” 
and that the central problem was “the origin and history of single characters.” Dobzhan-
sky’s position marks a complete reversal of this: the problem of the origin of individual 
characters gets no discussion in his book. 
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descriptive approaches to evolution. Descriptive disciplines such as systematics and mor-
phology were tasked with illuminating the historical course of life (Dobzhansky 1982, p. 
6). By contrast, genetics was an experimental, “nomothetic” science. A genetic study of 
evolution promised to provide “an analysis of the conflicting forces tending to increase 
or to level off the differences between organisms,” and in doing so would furnish an ex-
planation of organic diversity (Dobzhansky 1982, p. 7).10  
Each of the three types of genetic study had a role to play in this analysis. The first 
subdivision, transmission genetics, studied “the mechanisms of transmission of hereditary 
characteristics from parents to offspring, that is, on the architectonics of the germ plasm 
of the sex cells.” Transmission genetics offered a genetic theory of heredity, showing how 
“the character of organisms are determined by the genes carried in the sex cells” 
(Dobzhansky 1982, 9). By 1937, Dobzhansky could confidently state that “the genetics of 
the transmission of hereditary characters is, by and large, understood now” (Dobzhansky 
1982, 10). 
Dobzhansky explicitly admitted, however, that transmission genetics was limited. It 
did not explain “the mechanisms of gene action in development” (Dobzhansky 1982, 10). 
This formed the subject matter of developmental genetics, also called “physiological genet-
ics” (Goldschmidt 1938). Transmission genetics established correlations between 
                                               
10 It is worth noting that this distinction between causal and descriptive sciences, with 
morphology falling on the descriptive side, contributes to what Scott Gilbert (1998) has 
called the “supersessionist” rhetoric with which geneticists portrayed their science as the 
completion and perfection of the allegedly dead-end science of embryology. I do not 
mean to deny that there was a rhetorical exclusion of developmental biology from the 
synthesis. I mean to deny only that a conceptual exclusion underlay this rhetorical exclu-
sion. 
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particular genetic mutations and particular phenotypic effects. Developmental genetics 
sought to explain the complex process by which the genes produced these effects. In stark 
contrast to his happy assessment of transmission genetics, Dobzhansky lamented that 
developmental genetic study had thus far furnished little by way of established 
knowledge and, even worse, that “no reliable methods have been devised for investiga-
tions in this field” (Dobzhansky 1982, 10–11). This pessimism was widely shared (Morgan 
1926, 290; Sinnott 1937, 62; Goldschmidt 1938, v–vi). 
Both transmission and developmental genetics were “concerned with individuals as 
units” (Dobzhansky 1982, 11). By contrast, population genetics studied how the genetic 
composition of a population changes over time. Population genetics, as its name suggests, 
concerned itself with genetic phenomena at the population level, in particular the dy-
namics of changes in allele frequencies. Mathematical models of these dynamics eluci-
dated the forces (selection, drift, mutation, migration) that drove these changes, though 
population genetics was not, for Dobzhansky, limited to these models. 
Relying on this threefold division of genetics, Dobhzansky (1982, 11–12) defined evo-
lution as “a change in the genetic composition of populations,” with the result that the 
problems of evolution—in particular the problem of organic diversity—were population 
genetic problems. Dobzhansky (1982, 13) recognized three basic types of population ge-
netic problem: (a) the problem of how mutations enter a population (mutation, gene flow); 
(b) the problem of how mutations spread or fail to spread once present in a population; 
and (c) the problem of how the diversity “attained on the preceding two levels” is fixed. 
This last level concerned itself with the processes that create barriers between populations, 
 49 
barriers that cause two populations to proceed upon independent evolutionary trajecto-
ries. Whereas the first two levels dealt with phenomena occurring within given popula-
tions, the third level explained how those populations became units in the first place. 
Such was the conceptual framework of Dobzhansky’s evolutionary theorizing. Noth-
ing in this framework precludes the inclusion of developmental genetic discoveries into 
evolutionary theorizing. Dobzhansky conceived developmental genetics as an important 
but unfortunately immature part of the broader science of genetics. And it was genetics 
as a whole, not specifically transmission genetics or population genetics, that was to in-
form evolutionary theorizing. 
Lying in the background of Dobzhansky’s inclusive attitude toward developmental 
genetics is his conception of the split between heredity and development, which differed 
in essential features from Lillie’s.11 For Lillie, as we saw, there was an ontological split 
between genetics (heredity) and development. For Dobzhansky, in stark contrast, there was 
no such ontological split. Instead, there was a methodological split between transmission 
genetics and developmental genetics.12 They were different subfields of genetics, with differ-
ent methods (which, by 1937, had reached markedly different stages of development). 
There was, however, no principled barrier to incorporating their findings into unified 
explanations, including explanations of evolutionary phenomena.  
                                               
11 This issue is discussed further below (Section 2.5). 
12 R. A. Brink (1927, 280) drew the even stronger conclusion that the demonstration that 
genes were the hereditary material entailed that they must control developmental pro-
cesses—that an ontological split such as Lillie imagined was impossible. 
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It is nonetheless true that Genetics and the Origin of Species incorporates very little de-
velopmental genetics in its explanations of evolutionary phenomena. Dobzhansky him-
self offered a perfectly innocuous reason for this: there was little to include. Later works 
of the synthesis did begin to include developmental genetic theories in their evolutionary 
theorizing. For instance, Julian Huxley (2010, 73–74) incorporated some of Goldschmidt’s 
developmental genetic conclusions in his explanation for why wild type characters are 
less modifiable by environmental changes than mutant characters. Similarly, Curt Stern 
(1963, 19–20), in his contribution to a volume edited by Mayr and Simpson, offered a 
speculative explanation of the evolution of sibling species in terms of the phenotypically 
silent remodeling of genetic reaction networks. G. Ledyard Stebbins, the foremost plant 
biologist of the synthesis, developed an entire research program in plant developmental 
genetics (Smocovitis 2008). Finally, it is worth noting that, after Britten and Davidson 
(1969) published their landmark paper introducing an early form of GRN theory, both 
Mayr (1970, 183) and Dobzhansky (1970, 413–14) cited the paper (in particular its evolu-
tionary implications) sympathetically: Mayr with considerable enthusiasm, Dobzhansky 
rather more cautiously but still hopefully. For Mayr, understanding the structure of the 
“complex epigenetic systems” of organisms was important for understanding the 
amount and kind of genetic variability they could tolerate (Mayr 1969b, 316). Britten and 
Davidson’s proposal promised to help elucidate this problem. Mayr thus called for a de-
velopmental genetic contribution to answering one of the core problems of the modern 
synthesis: the origin of discontinuous variation in nature. 
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The case of Richard Goldschmidt is similarly instructive. Like Dobzhansky, Gold-
schmidt believed in the possibility of developmental genetics. Unlike Dobzhansky, Gold-
schmidt actually worked out a sophisticated theory of developmental genetics, from 
which he drew substantial evolutionary conclusions (Goldschmidt 1938, 1982). These 
conclusions were profoundly at odds with the synthetic theory: Goldschmidt denied that 
macroevolution is compounded microevolution, denied that geographic races are incipi-
ent species, and allowed only a reduced role for natural selection in driving evolutionary 
change. The architects of the synthesis responded, not by arguing that his work was ir-
relevant, but rather by assimilating it where they could (as in the cases of Huxley and 
Stern, mentioned above), while denying the aspects of his theory that led to his problem-
atic evolutionary conclusions (Davis, Dietrich, and Jacobs 2009).  
What the case of Goldschmidt shows is that the proponents of the synthesis made 
quite substantial assumptions about what developmental genetics would look like when 
mature. Namely, they assumed that it would not have implications like those of Gold-
schmidt’s developmental genetics. Were development truly irrelevant to the synthetic the-
ory, such assumptions would be unnecessary. 
As these examples show, the synthesis included from start what developmental ge-
netic information it could. Thus we can see that the conceptual exclusion of development 
from the synthesis exists only from the developmentalist perspective that regards devel-
opmental genetics with suspicion. From such a perspective, developmental genetics can 
only get at the most superficial part of development: realization. The major phenomena 
of development (Lillie’s “embryonic segregation”) must be left out of a genetic approach. 
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In this sense, the developmentalists excluded themselves.13 From the vantage of the syn-
thesis, which was committed to the relevance of genetics to all of development, there was 
not and could not be any such exclusion. 
My analysis thus far shows that the conceptual exclusion of development from the 
synthesis, insofar as it was real, rested on an empirical question: how much of develop-
ment can be explained genetically? I have shown that participants in the synthesis an-
swered this question optimistically, and accordingly included developmental genetic 
findings in their evolutionary theorizing. But nothing I have presented thus far resolves 
Lillie’s powerful worries that the question is to be answered pessimistically: very little of 
development admits of a genetic explanation. Was Lillie right? We will see that neither 
of his arguments for the impossibility of developmental genetics succeeds. One was prob-
lematic from the start (Section 2.5). The other raised a more pressing issue, but even this 
has recently been resolved (Section 2.7). 
 
 
 
2.5 LILLIE’S ERROR 
 
We have seen that where Lillie saw an ontological split between heredity (genetics) and 
development, Dobzhansky saw only a methodological split between transmission 
                                               
13 As Wimsatt puts it, “Developmental genetics proved largely intractable and lacked any 
generalizable organizing machinery comparable to that provided by linkage mapping. 
Because of this, embryologists had gone their own way” (Wimsatt 2015, 368). 
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genetics and developmental genetics. Dobzhansky explicitly opposed reading into this 
methodological split any general split between heredity and development. Heredity, he 
insisted, covered both transmission and developmental genetics. On this point, Dobzhan-
sky (1982, 9–10; emphasis added) really could not be clearer, and is worth quoting at 
length: 
The elegance and precision of methods devised by genetics to control the 
results of experiments involving crosses of individuals differing in many 
hereditary characteristics have led to claims that the problem of heredity 
has been solved. Although a large amount of work still remains to be done 
in this field, it is indeed fair to say that the genetics of the transmission of 
hereditary characters is, by and large, understood now. But the problem of 
heredity is much wider. Knowing the rules governing the distribution of he-
reditary characteristics of an organism among the sex cells, one is in a posi-
tion to predict what constellations of genes are likely to be present in the 
zygotes coming from the union of such sex cells. Between the genes of a 
fertilized egg and the characters of the adult organism arising from it there 
lies, however, the whole of individual development during which the genes 
exert their determining action.  
 
In this passage, Dobzhansky rejected both of the “truisms” that Amundson sees as 
lying behind the first exclusion of development from the synthesis.14 Dobzhansky re-
jected the view that heredity is the passing of traits or representatives of traits as opposed 
to “the passing on of developmental processes” (Amundson 2005, 148). For Dobzhansky, 
these developmental processes were as much a part of heredity as the transmission of 
genes. With this, the second truism equally falls by the wayside. Development was part 
of heredity. 
                                               
14 Dobzhansky’s views on this point persisted unchanged into the third edition of Genetics 
and the Origin of Species (Dobzhansky 1951, pp. 12-13). 
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There nevertheless exist modified versions of both truisms that Dobzhansky accepted, 
and understanding these will help us to see the error in one of Lillie’s arguments against 
the possibility of a genetic theory of development. These modified truisms are: 
Modified Truism 1. Transmission is the passing of traits (or representatives of 
traits, such as genes) between generations. 
Modified Truism 2. The study of transmission is independent of the study of de-
velopment. 
The first truism is basically a definition of the subject matter of transmission genetics. 
The second truism is a hard-won accomplishment. The development of crossing experi-
ments in the Mendelian tradition made it possible to study transmission without study-
ing development as well. In other words, it enabled the isolation and independent study 
of one aspect of heredity. Whereas Amundson claimed that his two truisms were contro-
versial stipulations, these two truisms are rather innocuous. Even Lillie could accept them, 
and indeed did accept them, for they are the very basis for his diagnosis of a split between 
heredity and development.  
We are now in position to see why Lillie’s argument that no genetic theory could re-
spect the difference between open and closed terms suffered from a fatal flaw. The argu-
ment, recall, was that the methods of genetic analysis precluded genetic theories from 
treating developmental stages in their developmental context. As an analysis of the meth-
ods of transmission genetics, Lillie’s argument is perfectly good. Transmission genetic 
analysis does indeed look only at the correlations between genes (alpha) and traits 
(omega), skipping over the intervening processes. These methods could show genetic 
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effects on development, but only by treating developmental stages as if they were final, 
closed terms, as if they were fixed “traits” like any adult trait. Starting from the second, 
hard-won truism, that the methods of studying transmission can ignore development, 
Lillie correctly concluded that those methods cannot furnish a theory of development. 
This warrants only the modest conclusion that there cannot be a transmission genetic 
theory of development. Lillie, however, attempted to infer that there cannot be a genetic 
theory of development at all. That conclusion follows only on the assumption that all 
genetic study must be limited to the methods of transmission genetics. We have seen that 
Dobzhansky explicitly rejected that assumption. While Dobzhansky could not say what 
the methods of developmental genetics would be, since they had by his own admission 
not yet been developed, he did not expect them to be subject to the same limitations as 
those of transmission genetics, since it was precisely those limitations that led to the need 
for a distinct arena of developmental genetic study in the first place. 
It is important here to be clear about what Lillie got wrong and what he got right. 
Lillie’s argument rests on the assumption that all genetic methods will be subject to the 
same limitations as transmission genetic methods. Dobzhansky rejected this assumption, 
but this does not show that the assumption is false. It might have turned out that all forms 
of genetic analysis would indeed fail to preserve this distinction. But Lillie offered no 
good reason (indeed, no reason at all) in defense of this assumption. Lillie therefore failed 
to provide a principled reason why genetic analysis must fail to preserve the distinction 
between open and closed terms. 
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None of this suggests that Lillie was wrong to insist that a genetic theory of develop-
ment must preserve the distinction. Lillie’s criterion of adequacy still stands as legitimate. 
Only his argument that this criterion cannot be met fails. In 1937, it was an open question 
whether or not a genetic theory could satisfy the criterion. I will argue below (Section 2.7) 
that it is no longer an open question, for GRN theory satisfies it. But first there is another 
matter deserving attention, concerning Amundson’s use of Lillie’s argument, for Amund-
son’s analysis repeats Lillie’s error. 
 
 
 
2.6 GENETICS AND CAUSATION 
 
Amundson’s argument that the architects of the synthesis rejected the causal complete-
ness principle rests on his account of how Mendelian geneticists (and their synthesist 
followers) understood causality. Amundson (2005, 150) writes: 
If a single allele can be regarded as the cause of pink eye color, then it is 
possible to causally explain adult characteristics without any reference to 
the embryological processes that actually brought them about. 
 
This is just a consequence of the modified second truism about heredity (Section 2.5), 
but Amundson sees in it a direct conflict with developmental approaches to heredity. 
Commenting on a passage from Morgan et al. (1915, 209) in which they refer to a partic-
ular genetic factor as “the cause of pink,” Amundson (2005, 149) writes: “Prior to this 
assertion, ‘the cause’ of any adult body characteristic could potentially include the entire 
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embryological history of the organism.” Whereas a developmental biologist would have 
thought that a trait could not be causally explained without referencing this embryolog-
ical history, transmission genetic analysis seemed to obviate the need for reference to 
such processes. 
Amundson’s argument here rests on a mischaracterization of the transmission genetic 
understanding of causality. Transmission genetics does not license the claim that a single 
allele causes a particular trait. The claims that transmission genetic experiments license 
are claims about how differences in particular genes cause (against a particular shared ge-
netic and environmental background) differences in particular traits (cf. Waters 2007). A 
gene is never the cause of a trait, but a difference at a genetic locus may be the cause of a 
difference in a trait (Huxley 2010, 63). 
Transmission genetic analysis elucidates the input-output relations between the allelic 
values of genes and the phenotypic values of traits (given a particular genetic and envi-
ronmental background). What it cannot yield is knowledge concerning the mechanisms 
responsible for the existence of those input-output relations—i.e. the entire process of 
development. This is compatible, however, with the existence of other methods (those of 
developmental genetics) that do elucidate the proceses underlying these input-output re-
lations. As Woodward argues, there is no incompatibility between “difference making” 
and “connecting process” explanations (Woodward 2013). Transmission genetics skips 
over development, but it does not provide explanations that compete with developmen-
tal explanations. It doesn’t preclude the need for a connecting process explanation 
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invoking features of ontogeny. Like Lillie, Amundson takes the limitations of transmis-
sion genetics to be representative of the whole of genetics. They are not. 
This has implications for how we understand the purported rejection of the causal 
completeness principle by the synthesis (recall from Section 2.3). Though he gets the pre-
cise diagnosis wrong, Amundson is right that transmission genetic analysis claims for 
itself a certain kind of causal self-sufficiency. Transmission genetic analysis provides 
knowledge about the differences in phenotypic traits caused by differences at genetic loci, 
and this knowledge did not require any understanding of the intervening developmental 
process. This is, again, the modified second truism concerning heredity. 
In consequence, the population genetic theorizing that informed the modern synthesis 
is similarly self-sufficient. That work showed that a great deal of evolutionary analysis is 
possible in the absence of any knowledge of development. You can go a long way, evo-
lutionarily speaking, with genotype-phenotype correlations. This amounts to a rejection 
of a strong form of the causal completeness principle, according to which the principle is 
taken to claim that no understanding of evolution is possible without understanding on-
togeny. But, in that strong form, the principle is simply false. Indeed, showing that it is 
false can be taken as one of the major accomplishments of the synthesis. 
That this work is self-sufficient, however, does not require denying a milder form of 
the causal completeness principle, one that claims that because evolution can modify 
adult phenotypes only by modifying ontogeny, understanding development is important 
for some kinds of evolutionary analysis. It is this milder form of the principle that is all 
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that is required for development to be relevant to synthesis-derived evolutionary theo-
rizing.  
In this milder form, Dobzhansky and other proponents of the synthesis accepted the 
causal completeness principle. Dobzhansky specifically set out to offer a causal, genetic 
theory of evolution, and he included developmental genetics as one of the branches of 
genetics that could contribute to this theory. If Dobzhansky did not incorporate such con-
tributions into Genetics and the Origin of Species, this was for lack of anything to include. It 
was not due to any intractable conceptual barriers. This is further confirmed by the ex-
amples of Huxley, Stern, and Mayr (discussed above, Section 2.4), all of whom did draw 
on developmental genetic research to address evolutionary questions. 
Thus, where Amundson sees deep-seated incommensurability between the synthesis 
and evo-devo, based on the two programs’ relation to the causal completeness principle, 
what is actually going on is milder. The synthesis offered a route to the inclusion of de-
velopment in evolutionary theorizing, a route running through developmental genetics. 
It was the developmental biologists—not the architects of the synthesis—who argued that 
this route excluded development proper. In this regard, the synthesis did not reject the 
causal completeness principle: some evolutionary problems did require input from de-
velopmental genetics for their solution. What they did reject was an overly restrictive 
form of the principle that required that all evolutionary problems require input from de-
velopmental genetics. They showed that a great deal can be done without such infor-
mation. 
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 Evolutionary-developmental biology rests largely, though not exclusively, on devel-
opmental genetics. It emerged as a field following the discovery of important roles played 
by Hox genes in development, and has since given rise to a well-developed form of GRN 
theory, which places these roles in a broader theoretical framework concerning the role 
of genetic regulatory networks in development. Amundson recognizes that evolutionary-
developmental biology is drawing evolutionary implications from developmental genet-
ics (Amundson 2005, 4–9). What Amundson fails to see is that insofar as evolutionary-
developmental biology is a flourishing field, this is a vindication not of Lillie but of Dob-
zhansky. It is Lillie, not Dobzhansky, who would be surprised by the flourishing of this 
developmental genetic research program. 
 
 
 
2.7 LILLIE’S DOUBTS ASSUAGED 
 
The modern synthesis thus left conceptual space for input from developmental genetics 
and even, as we saw, began to include this input. But we have also seen that Lillie pro-
posed criteria of adequacy that any developmental genetic theory must—but no contem-
porary developmental genetic theory could—satisfy. He argued that this failure was due 
not to human frailty, but rather to the impossibility of the task.15 Though one of his 
                                               
15 Lillie explicitly criticized Goldschmidt’s developmental genetic theory for failing to 
meet his criteria. Though Goldschmidt (1938) published Physiological Genetics eleven 
 61 
arguments held no water (Section 2.5), his invocation of the developmental paradox pro-
vided powerful reason to worry about the prospects of developmental genetics. 
In this section, I argue that GRN theory meets both of Lillie’s criteria of adequacy: it 
explains how embryonic complexity increases over developmental time, and it preserves 
the distinction between open and closed terms in development. GRN theory thus accom-
plishes the reunion of heredity and development that Dobzhansky expected and Lillie 
thought impossible. It therefore provides a conceptual reconciliation of developmental 
genetics and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing that would be acceptable to both 
Lillie and Dobzhansky.16 
GRN theory has both a developmental and an evolutionary component. The develop-
mental component concerns the action of gene regulatory networks during animal devel-
opment. The major aim of the developmental component is to explain the increasing com-
plexity of the embryo over developmental time. This is apparent from the very first sen-
tence of Peter’s and Davidson’s (2015, 1) book expounding the theory: “Considered from 
an informational perspective, the most interesting and defining feature of animal devel-
opment is that it generates a continuous increase in complexity of spatial organization.” 
                                               
years after Lillie’s article, on my reading, Goldschmidt’s 1938 theory was vulnerable to 
exactly the same criticisms that Lillie raised in 1927. 
16 Though Dobzhansky was right and Lillie wrong about the possibility of developmental 
genetics, this does not mean that developmental genetics as it actually developed must 
be compatible with synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing. If this is not intuitive, con-
sider that if Goldschmidt’s developmental genetic theory had been correct, it would have 
vindicated Dobzhansky’s view of the relation between developmental genetics and evo-
lutionary theory while contradicting most of Dobzhansky’s substantive conclusions 
about the nature of the evolutionary process. 
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The evolutionary component concerns the principles of how these networks evolve, 
with implications for issues ranging from the origin of animal body plans during the 
Cambrian explosion (Davidson and Erwin 2009; Erwin and Valentine 2013) to microevo-
lution observed in contemporary populations (Erwin and Davidson 2009; Nunes et al. 
2013). In drawing evolutionary conclusions from their account of development, Peter and 
Davidson (2015, 4) explicitly endorse the causal completeness principle in its weaker form: 
Development produces the genomically encoded body plans of animals, 
and evolution is the process by which body plans arise de novo, and herit-
ably alter in deep time. Since causality in development must at root be con-
sidered in terms of information processing, and how spatial control of gene 
expression is mandated by genomic regulatory information, so also the evo-
lution of the body plan. At the informational level of the genomically en-
coded program for development, evolutionary process is equivalent to the 
time derivative of developmental process: evolution is change in this pro-
gram over deep time.  
 
Because understanding how GRNs evolve depends on understanding how they op-
erate during development, the developmental component of GRN theory is the core of 
the theory, with the evolutionary implications as downstream consequences. 
The developmental core of GRN theory hopes to explain increasing embryonic com-
plexity over developmental time in terms of a regulatory architecture built into the ge-
nome and so equally present in every cell. It must thus face up to the developmental 
paradox. At the most abstract level, GRN theory dissolves the paradox by showing how 
this regulatory architecture is able to produce increasingly finely specified patterns of 
gene expression over time. To see how this works, we must delve into the details. The 
account below is condensed from Peter and Davidson’s (2015) book, except where other-
wise indicated. 
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Figure 1. Example gene regulatory network. 
 
 
The basic claim of GRN theory is that major aspects of development result from the 
action of intricately structured, hierarchical genetic regulatory networks (GRNs) that con-
trol gene expression during development (Figure 1).17 These networks consist of genes 
and their regulatory elements. The regulatory elements consist of clusters of transcription 
factor binding sites known as enhancers. Transcription factor proteins bind to these sites 
in order to recruit (or block) the complex molecular machinery that is required to begin 
                                               
17 Figure 1 was created using BioTapestry (Longabaugh, Davidson, and Bolouri 2005). 
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transcription, thereby driving (or repressing) gene expression. Different transcription fac-
tors bind to different binding sites. Regulation of gene expression is therefore sequence-
specific. 
A gene, in the sense relevant here, is a stretch of DNA that may be transcribed to RNA 
and translated into a protein. Three types of gene are especially important in GRNs: tran-
scription factors, signaling genes, and effector genes. Transcription factors, as noted, di-
rectly bind to regulatory sequences and drive or repress expression. Signaling genes en-
able communication between cells, which is important in patterning gene expression. Ef-
fector genes encode proteins that are not involved in gene regulation, but instead provide 
cells with their specific physical properties. 
A particular GRN is defined by “the physical and functional relationships among reg-
ulatory genes” (Peter and Davidson 2015, 43). Regulatory interactions are combinatorial, 
with multiple transcription factors required to initiate transcription. Thus, each gene in a 
GRN requires multiple inputs. Their outputs are likewise multiple, as each transcription 
factor targets multiple downstream genes. There is a one-way flow of information 
through a GRN. For example, in Figure 1, the arrow from Gene 1 to Gene 2 is unidirec-
tional: it indicates only that the former regulates the latter. It is true that Gene 2 also reg-
ulates Gene 1, but this is a separate, equally unidirectional interaction. This gives GRNs 
a hierarchical character, with upstream elements regulating downstream elements. This 
allows for a statically encoded regulatory architecture (as depicted in Figure 1) to be suc-
cessively deployed over time. 
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GRNs are modular assemblages of subcircuits. These subcircuits fall into several dis-
tinct types, e.g. positive feedback loops and double negative gates. Subcircuit types are 
defined by their topologies and not by the particular genes they contain. Different types 
of subcircuit accomplish distinct developmental tasks. For instance, one common func-
tion of positive feedback loops is to take states of gene expression installed by transient 
inputs and stabilize them, so that they persist after the input is no longer present (see 
Gene 1, Gene 2, and Gene 3 in Figure 1). Double negative gates, by contrast, often serve 
to ensure that a particular set of genes is expressed in one region and not expressed any-
where else (see Gene 1, Gene 2, Gene 4, and Gene 5 in Figure 1).  
Subcircuits are organized into a hierarchical network, with distinct types of subcir-
cuits prominent at different levels of the hierarchy. These networks are determinate, in 
the sense that upstream circuits determine the activity of downstream subcircuits (Erwin 
and Davidson 2009). A developmental GRN terminates in a differentiation gene battery 
(Figure 1), a collection of effector genes. In Lillie’s terms, the upper levels of the hierarchy 
account for embryonic segregation, while the differentiation gene batteries account for 
the realization of the segregated potencies. 
With these materials, GRN theory resolves the developmental paradox and explains 
localized differentiation. The solution has two parts. The first part involves maternally 
deposited factors. Because GRN theory relies on a regulatory architecture encoded in the 
genome, that regulatory architecture is the same everywhere in the embryo. In order, 
therefore, for it to operate differently in different parts of the embryo, there must be some 
initial imbalance. This imbalance is furnished by materials in the egg cytoplasm, which 
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is already highly differentiated, though its level of differentiation pales in comparison to 
the adult organism. How exactly this imbalance is produced varies by organism. In am-
phibians, for instance, the dorsoventral axis is established by the localization of mater-
nally deposited factors opposite the point of sperm entry (Weaver and Kimelman 2004). 
By contrast, in Drosophila, “the spatial cues for the embryonic dorsoventral axis originate 
during oogenesis in the follicle cell layer”—the point of sperm entry is irrelevant 
(Moussian and Roth 2005). In both cases, the initial imbalance produces regions of differ-
ential gene expression. 
At this point, the regulatory architecture of the genome takes over, progressively in-
creasing this initial differentiation—the second half of GRN theory’s solution to the de-
velopmental paradox. This regulatory architecture takes one regulatory state as input and 
produces a new regulatory state as output. Regulatory states are defined as “the collective 
sum of specifically coexpressed transcriptional regulators in a given place at a given time” 
(Peter and Davidson 2015, 48). GRN theory shows how the regulatory genome can pro-
duce output states that are more finely differentiated than the input states. The primary 
means by which this occurs is cell-cell signaling. This allows GRN theory to explain lo-
calized differentiation. The regulatory genome takes a relatively slight initial imbalance 
and amplifies it in precise, repeatable ways. Put a little differentiation in, get a lot of dif-
ferentiation out. 
Furthermore, GRN theory preserves the distinction between open and closed terms, 
for the abstract hierarchical structure of GRNs translates into definite spatiotemporal pat-
terns of gene expression during development. In GRN theory, these regulatory states are 
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treated as open: depending on what signals they receive, they can give rise to multiple 
downstream regulatory states (explaining pluripotency). Moreover, they are recognized 
as having a past (the prior regulatory states that produced them) and a future (the subse-
quent regulatory states that they produce), eventually terminating in the activation of a 
differentiation gene battery. The activation of such a battery is responsible for realization 
(in Lillie’s sense), at which point the development of a particular region is “closed.” 
GRN theory thus meets Lillie’s criteria for a unified theory of heredity and develop-
ment. Contemporary developmental genetics has advanced into Lillie’s (1927, 366) “un-
conquered territory” and has done so without giving up “the theory of the integrity of 
the entire gene system in all cells.” Dobzhansky was right to conceive the split between 
heredity and development not as an ontological split between genetics and development 
but as a methodological split between transmission genetics and developmental genetics, 
a methodological split that allows for explanations that incorporate the results of both 
subfields of genetics. 
Insofar as the apparent conceptual (as opposed to contingent historical) exclusion of 
development from the synthesis rested on the existence of a split between heredity and 
development, that split existed only from the perspective of those who, like Lillie, re-
garded a genetic theory of development as an impossibility. Recall Amundson’s (2005, 
255) characterization of the incommensurability between the synthesis and evo-devo: 
whereas synthesis-derived theorizing focuses on the evolution of populations, evo-devo 
focuses on the evolution of ontogeny. As we saw, it is only if a genetic theory of develop-
ment is impossible that these two perspectives are fundamentally incompatible. 
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Though Lillie and his sympathizers had legitimate reasons to believe in the impossi-
bility of a genetic theory of development, GRN theory fully resolves their worries. It thus 
provides a theory that explains development in a language commensurable with the lan-
guage of the modern synthetic evolutionary theory: the language of genetics. 
 
 
 
2.8 RECAPITULATION 
 
In the foregoing, I have defended a number of interlinked claims. First, I have shown that 
developmental biologists and the architects of the modern synthesis understood the dis-
ciplinary split between the study of heredity and of development in different ways. De-
velopmental biologists argued for the existence of an ontological split between genetics 
and development, while the synthesists argued for the existence of a methodological split 
between transmission genetics and developmental genetics. 
Second, I have argued that, from the developmentalist perspective, developmental 
biology is incommensurable with the synthesists’ approach to evolutionary theorizing 
and so is conceptually excluded from the synthesis. However, this incommensurability 
and exclusion do not exist from the synthesists’ perspective, and the synthesists did at-
tempt to incorporate developmental genetic findings into their theorizing. 
Third, I have presented and evaluated two primary arguments favoring the develop-
mentalists’ perspective on the split between heredity and development. One of these 
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arguments rested on a confusion about the nature of genetic methods. The other (the de-
velopmental paradox) was more compelling. However, contemporary GRN theory has 
the resources to resolve the developmental paradox in a manner that vindicates the syn-
thesists’ view about the possibility of developmental genetics. GRN theory thus shows 
that developmental biology and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing are not in-
commensurable. 
All of the work done here has been concerned with showing that there is conceptual 
space within synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing for incorporating the conse-
quences of GRN theory. This does not mean that such integration will always proceed 
smoothly. Indeed, the Davidson quotation with which I began reveals clearly that it will 
not. Plenty of work remains to be done. I have shown that this work can be done on 
friendlier terms than has sometimes been thought. 
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3.0 CUVIERAN FUNCTIONALISM: 500 MILLION YEARS OF STASIS 
 
 
 
Cuvier believed that the radically different organizations of the four em-
branchements could not change from one to another without a fatal loss of 
integrated function during the transition. This argument is still a forceful 
one. (Raff 1996, 6) 
 
 
 
3.1 ANTI-GRADUALISM, THEN AND NOW 
 
The overarching aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to a broader project of un-
derstanding just how evolutionary-developmental biology (evo-devo) fits into the land-
scape of contemporary evolutionary theory. The focus here will be on the sense in which 
evo-devo involves what Ernst Mayr (1959) called “typological thinking.” To achieve this 
overarching goal, the chapter has three subsidiary aims: (1) to distinguish two ways in 
which Mayr’s notoriously unprincipled notion of typological thinking can be made pre-
cise, (2) to show that one of these ways—Cuvieran functionalism—plays an important 
role in evo-devo’s developmental genetic explanations of the deep conservation of animal 
body plans, and (3) to argue that Cuvieran functionalism is compatible with mainstream 
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evolutionary theorizing, and in particular with what Ron Amundson (2005) has called 
“exclusive population thinking”. The remainder of this introduction is concerned with 
making the relations between these three aims more salient. 
As Ernst Mayr tells the story, one of Darwin’s major achievements was to replace ty-
pological thinking with population thinking (Mayr 1959; see also Hull 1965a, 1965b). Ty-
pological thinking, rooted in Platonic philosophy, had dominated pre-Darwinian biology, 
which treated species as fixed types, limited in their ability to vary. Darwin's Origin stood 
this way of thinking on its head, making variation fundamental and unlimited, relegating 
“types” to the status of purely statistical epiphenomena. From this point on, according to 
Mayr, all major disputes in evolutionary biology—encompassing both opposition to evo-
lutionary theorizing of any stripe and opposition to particular Darwinian evolutionary 
theories (such as those of Mayr and Dobzhansky in the 1930s and 1940s)—could be fruit-
fully analyzed as pitting typological thinking against population thinking. The core of 
these disputes lay in the incompatibility of typological thinking with the acceptance of 
gradual evolution. A typologist, for Mayr, was necessarily an anti-gradualist. 
Evo-devo, as it has matured over the past several decades, has frequently found itself 
at odds with mainstream evolutionary theorizing. In attempting to understand these ten-
sions, scholars have latched onto Mayr’s framework. On one side are friends and practi-
tioners of evo-devo who have argued that typological thinking is essential to, and there-
fore vindicated by, evo-devo’s successes (Amundson 1998; Brigandt 2007; Love 2009a; 
Wagner 2014). As every modus ponens has its modus tollens, so some critics have suggested 
that evo-devo is vitiated by its typology (Jenner 2006). Ron Amundson (2005, chap. 11) 
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has even suggested that evo-devo’s typology is one factor (among several) that renders 
evo-devo incommensurable with mainstream evolutionary theorizing, with its commit-
ment to exclusive population thinking. 
A major impetus for understanding evo-devo as typological stems from its emphasis 
on deep conservation. This emphasis manifests at several levels, as evo-devo biologists 
study (i) animals’ deeply conserved genetic toolkit (Carroll 2008); (ii) gene regulatory net-
work “kernels” that have persisted unchanged for over 500 million years (Davidson and 
Erwin 2006); (iii) the conservation of complex phenotypic arrangements (Wagner and 
Schwenk 2000; Schwenk and Wagner 2001); and (iv) the deep conservation of animal 
body plans (Levin et al. 2016). Raff (1996, chap. 1) has suggested that this is a major dif-
ference between evo-devo and mainstream evolutionary theorizing: where the latter em-
phasizes the diversity of the organic world, the former emphasizes universality.18 The 
focus on what is constant as opposed to what is changing makes an analysis of evo-devo 
as typological—as a science of fixed types—alluring. 
The difficulty with analyzing evo-devo as a typological branch of evolutionary theory 
is that Mayr never offered a coherent account of typological thinking. As Joeri Witteveen 
(2015, 2016) has shown, Mayr’s initial introduction of the concept, justified as a “tempo-
rary oversimplification,” was unprincipled from the start, merging two distinct concepts 
                                               
18 The focus on diversity can be clearly seen at the start of Theodosius Dobzhansky’s Ge-
netics and the Origin of Species, a foundational work of the modern synthesis, from which 
contemporary evolutionary theorizing descends (Dobzhansky 1982, chap. 1). There, Dob-
zhansky establishes the diversity of the organic world as the key explanandum of evolu-
tionary theory, with no mention of conserved features as a comparably important ex-
planandum. 
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in a haphazard way, and only got worse with time. I am convinced by this work that 
“typology” and “typological thinking” are terms beyond repair, and that the analysis of 
evo-devo as typological is more apt to create confusion than illumination. 
I do not, however, think that the Mayrian project was entirely hopeless. In introducing 
the notion of typological thinking, one of Mayr’s aims was to isolate a common pattern 
of thought that gives rise to opposition to gradualistic evolutionary theories. Though he 
failed in his attempt to carry out this project, the question itself is a good one: are there 
common paths to anti-gradualism, repeated throughout the history of biology? This 
question is especially pertinent for understanding evo-devo. In order to explain deep 
conservation, the biologist is tasked with explaining why some part of an organism has, 
over long periods of time and in multiple distinct lineages, failed to evolve. By under-
standing the various possible routes to anti-gradualism, we may thereby come to better 
understand the conceptual foundations of evo-devo. 
In what follows, I argue that there are at least two distinct paths to anti-gradualism, 
one of which plays a crucial role in evo-devo’s explanation of deep conservation. I begin 
by presenting Mayr’s notion of typological thinking and demonstrating its close connec-
tion with anti-gradualism (Section 3.2), after which I show that anti-gradualism plays a 
key role in evo-devo’s developmental genetic explanation of deep conservation (Section 
3.3). I then distinguish two paths to anti-gradualism, natural state thinking (Sober 1980) 
and Cuvieran functionalism (Section 3.4). I show that Cuvieran functionalism plays a cen-
tral role in the developmental genetic explanation of deep conservation, while natural 
state thinking plays no role (Section 3.5). Having established the role of Cuvieran 
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functionalism in evo-devo, I argue that standard objections to typological thinking do not 
apply to Cuvieran functionalism (Section 3.6, Section 3.7, Section 3.8). I conclude by re-
flecting on how evo-devo’s emphasis on universality/conservation fits together with 
mainstream evolutionary theorizing’s emphasis on diversity (Section 3.9). 
 
 
 
3.2 TYPOLOGICAL THINKING AND ANTI-GRADUALISM 
 
Mayr believed that the division between typological thinking and population thinking 
rested primarily on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of variation. For the ty-
pologist, there exist “a limited number of fixed, unchangeable ‘ideas’ underlying the ob-
served variability” (Mayr 1959, 2). These ideas are what is truly real, while variation is 
ephemeral. For the population thinker, by contrast, unique individuals are the ontologi-
cal bedrock, and any collective description of a group of individuals (e.g. a species) can 
only be a statistical summary of the properties of those individuals. For the population 
thinker, the type is ephemeral, and variation is what is real. 
Typological thinking, Mayr claimed, was incompatible with accepting gradual evolu-
tion: 
Since there is no gradation between types, gradual evolution is basically a 
logical impossibility for the typologist. Evolution, if it occurs at all, has to 
proceed in steps or jumps. (Mayr 1959, 2) 
 
 75 
Accepting typological metaphysics precluded accepting gradual change between 
types. Because types constrain variation, only two possibilities are open to the typological 
thinker: (i) the complete absence of evolution beyond the boundaries set by the underly-
ing types, or (ii) evolution by saltational (single step) changes from one type to another. 
Gradual evolution, understood by the typologist as the change from one type to another 
by the gradual accumulation of small, within-type variants, is impossible, since the role 
of the type is precisely to constrain such variants within fixed limits. For the population 
thinker, by contrast, no such obstacles impede the acceptance of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory. Because variation is fundamental and unconstrained by any underlying type, nat-
ural selection can accumulate small variations indefinitely. 
For Mayr, typological thinking was not merely one path to anti-gradualism among 
many. It was the path, repeated throughout the history of evolutionary theorizing: 
Indeed, all saltationists have been typologists, and most typologists have 
been saltationist of one sort or another. Genuine variation and gradual 
change are, of course, incompatible with the typological viewpoint. (Mayr 
1960, 354) 
 
Opposition to gradualism has indeed played an important role in the history of evo-
lutionary thought and, as the next section shows, a form of localized anti-gradualism may 
play a role in explaining deep conservation. However, Mayr’s attempt to explain this in 
terms of a single, sweeping mode of thought—“typological thinking”—was a failure 
(Witteveen 2015, 2016). This is well-exemplified by the notorious saltationist Otto 
Schindewolf (1993), certainly among those Mayr intended his account to capture. At first 
glance, Schindewolf seems like a paradigmatic typological thinker. He explicitly tied his 
anti-gradualism to an account of the nature of variation, and he argued at length for the 
 76 
reality of types (Schindewolf 1993, 410–15). However, he explicitly disavowed idealist 
metaphysics, both in general and specifically as applied to types (Schindewolf 1993, 330, 
410–15). Mayr’s account fails to fit even this seemingly easy case. In the end, perhaps the 
only important figure who answers to Mayr’s notion of typology is Louis Agassiz 
(Winsor 2006). 
Even if Mayr’s attempt to explain all opposition to gradualism in one fell swoop was 
a failure, however, the basic project of searching for common themes underwriting anti-
gradualism in its myriad incarnations is worthwhile. Valuable work has been done in this 
area by Elliott Sober (1980), who showed that at least one important source of anti-grad-
ualism, which I call natural state thinking, can be made philosophically precise. We will 
see below that natural state thinking does not account for the role that anti-gradualism 
plays in evo-devo, but before the underpinnings of contemporary anti-gradualism can be 
disentangled, I must show that such a thing as (respectable) contemporary anti-gradual-
ism exists at all. To that task, I now turn. 
 
 
 
3.3 EXPLAINING DEEP CONSERVATION 
 
Deep conservation sets Darwinian evolutionary theory a difficult task: explaining why 
certain features of organisms have failed to evolve, despite the passage of extraordinarily 
long periods of time. This challenge is especially difficult if one accepts, as neo-Darwinian 
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evolutionary theory does, that genetic and phenotypic variation is widely available and 
that selection pressures are environment-relative (Rieppel 2010). The difficult becomes 
even more acute when we realize that we are trying to explain a phenomenon that in-
volves multiple independent lineages in terms of causes (mutation and selection) that 
operate strictly within individual populations. 
To put these abstract points into a concrete context, consider the gene regulatory net-
work that underlies endomesoderm specification in echinoderms. A crucial portion of 
this network, involving positive feedback between five genes, is identical in both sea ur-
chins and starfish, which diverged over 500 million years ago (Davidson and Erwin 2006). 
Over those hundreds of millions of years, sea urchin and starfish populations have been 
exposed to a wide variety of environments, and they have almost certainly confronted 
these environments with a range of variations in the structure of this network. Moreover, 
since their divergence, they have been evolving independently, exposed to different se-
lection pressures (and confronting them with different variations) both diachronically 
(within individual lineages over time) and synchronically (across contemporary popula-
tions). Yet, for some reason, none of these variations persisted to the present day. Nor is 
this an isolated case: major features of animal body plans have been conserved since the 
Cambrian radiation (Erwin and Valentine 2013). 
Eric Davidson (a developmental geneticist) and Douglas Erwin (a paleontologist) 
have offered an explanation in terms of the genetic underpinnings of development 
(Davidson and Erwin 2006; Erwin 2015). Anti-gradualism plays a crucial role in this ex-
planation. In subsequent sections, I will draw out the underlying pattern of thought 
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involved in this explanation, but for now I simply wish to present it with as little philo-
sophical baggage as possible. 
According to gene regulatory network (GRN) theory, the orderly progress of animal 
development (from a single cell to a fully differentiated organism) depends on the action 
of hierarchically structured GRNs. These networks precisely control the spatiotemporal 
expression of genes in the developing organism, allowing the embryo to differentiate. 
This process involves different types of developmental tasks, and one of the important 
results of GRN theory is that similar tasks tend to be accomplished by the activity of sim-
ilarly structured GRN subcircuits (Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 6). For instance, in 
order to develop a body part, an embryo must (a) specify the domain in which that part 
will develop, (b) determine the morphological structure of the part, and (c) actually build 
the part. Different GRN subcircuits underlies each task (Peter and Davidson 2011). 
Davidson and Erwin’s explanation of deep conservation concerns the first of these 
tasks: domain-specification. They argue that deep conservation of body plan features is 
the result of deep conservation of GRN subcircuits, called “kernels,” essential for domain-
specification. Kernels have four key properties (Davidson and Erwin 2006, 796): 
1. They “execute the developmental patterning functions required to specify the 
spatial domain of an embryo in which a given body part will form.” Accord-
ingly, they are high in the GRN hierarchy, i.e. the network downstream of a 
kernel is much larger than the upstream network. 
2. They are dedicated to serving that function alone; they are not reused else-
where in development. 
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3. They are recursively wired (i.e. involve a great deal of positive feedback), with 
the result that “the products of multiple regulatory genes of the kernel are re-
quired for function of each of the participating cis-regulatory modules of the 
kernel.” 
4. Because of this recursive wiring, “interference with the expression of any one 
kernel gene will destroy kernel function altogether,” resulting in the complete 
failure to develop the body part in question. 
Together, these four properties of kernels can be used to explain a fifth feature: they 
are deeply conserved. Davidson and Erwin (2006) offer two examples of kernels: one for 
endoderm specification in echinoderms, and one for heart-field specification conserved 
between Drosophila and vertebrates (see Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 7 for more 
examples). Both of these kernels originated when Bilateria first diversified and have been 
conserved since (>500 million years). What explains this? Davidson and Erwin (2006, 799) 
write: 
We think that change in [kernels] is prohibited on pain of developmental 
catastrophe, both because of their internal recursive wiring and because of 
their roles high in the developmental hierarchy. 
Because kernels are recursively wired, each gene in the kernel is essential to its func-
tion. Eliminating any one gene disrupts the functioning of the entire kernel. Because ker-
nels are high in the developmental GRN hierarchy, such disruption has substantial down-
stream consequences. Disrupting the heart progenitor field specification kernel, for in-
stance, prevents the development of a heart. Thus, any change to the linkage in a kernel 
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is likely to have catastrophic phenotypic effects.19 This generates strong selection against 
mutations that cause such changes—heartless animals don’t leave many offspring. That 
leads to the deep conservation of kernels, and thus to the deep conservation of those body 
plan elements that depend on them. 
Three features of this explanation of deep conservation deserve mention. First, it is 
not an explanation of the origin of GRN kernels. It is an explanation of the conservation 
of GRN kernels that have already originated. Davidson and Erwin have little to say about 
the formation of kernels. They simply assume that they are produced by gradual, Dar-
winian evolution of a mundane sort (Davidson and Erwin 2006, 799). As such, their ex-
planation is explicitly not saltationist (Erwin and Davidson 2006; contra Coyne 2006). 
Second, a crucial premise of their argument is anti-gradualist, albeit in a local and not 
a global sense. They claim that there is no possibility of gradual phenotypic evolution 
through the modification of GRN kernels, because no changes to the linkages of GRN 
kernels produce small phenotypic effects. GRN kernels can either evolve by saltation or 
not at all. Since large phenotypic changes tend to be detrimental, the result is that GRN 
kernels, once formed, do not subsequently change. This is not a rejection of gradual evo-
lution altogether—as we have just seen, they allow for the gradual origin of kernels—but 
                                               
19 In fact, there are some differences between the heart-field specification kernel in Dro-
sophila and mouse. These changes are the exceptions that prove the rule, however. Each 
of the changes is of the same type: what is a direct linkage between two genes in one 
species is an indirect linkage in the other. For instance, in mouse, Gata4 activates Nkx2.5 
directly, whereas in Drosophila Pnr (Gata4 homolog) activates Mid, which activates Tin 
(Nkx2.5 homolog). The regulatory result is the same: gene A activates gene B. The only 
difference concerns the exact route by which this result is achieved. 
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an argument that a particular type of GRN subcircuit cannot evolve gradually once 
formed. It is precisely localized anti-gradualism, not global anti-gradualism. 
Third, the anti-gradualism involved in their explanation of deep conservation is not 
absolute. GRN kernels represent one extreme in a graded hierarchy of variability and 
conservation. Davidson and Erwin (2006, fig. 3) suggest a general picture according to 
which different levels of the GRN hierarchy tend to correspond (roughly) to features con-
served at different levels of the Linnean hierarchy: kernels underlie characters conserved 
at or above the phylum level, while differences at the periphery of the network tend to 
underlie differences between species. Intermediate portions of the GRN hierarchy are 
conserved at intermediate levels (this picture is developed further in Peter and Davidson 
2011, 2015). Thus, while anti-gradualism plays a crucial role in explaining deep conser-
vation, it is a part of a broader explanatory strategy for explaining why some parts of the 
genome evolve more readily than others. 
 
 
 
3.4 TWO PATHS TO ANTI-GRADUALISM 
 
Given that contemporary evo-devo explains deep conservation through a localized form 
of anti-gradualism, we may ask whether this anti-gradualism is sui generis or whether it 
rests on any broader pattern of thought. Here, I distinguish two bases of anti-gradualism: 
natural state thinking and Cuvieran functionalism. In this manner, I replace Mayr’s sweeping 
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unification of all forms of anti-gradualism with a piecemeal approach that nonetheless 
allows us to recognize shared patterns of thought in temporally separated biologists. I 
stress that these two options are non-exhaustive: neither, for instance, will fit the arch-
saltationists Richard Goldschmidt and Otto Schindewolf. I select them because they are 
useful for understanding contemporary evo-devo: what it is, what it is not, and how it 
fits together with mainstream evolutionary theorizing. 
 
3.4.1 Natural State Thinking 
 
Elliott Sober, in an attempt to recover something of philosophical value from Mayr’s di-
atribes against “typology” and “essentialism”, identified a type of model that he called a 
natural state model. On such a model, one distinguishes “between the natural state of a kind 
of object” and those non-natural states “produced by subjecting the object to an interfering 
force” (Sober 1980, 360). Evolutionary versions of natural state models treat species as 
having natural states around which individuals vary. Imposing selection on a population 
of such individuals can draw the population away from its natural state, but, once the 
selection is removed, the population will revert to the natural state. Moreover, there is 
only so far that selection can modify the population away from its natural state: variation 
is constrained.  
Two phenomena could be invoked to support such a view in the nineteenth century. 
First, it was well-known that one could rapidly produce large changes in domesticated 
species, but that such efforts could only proceed so far before hitting limits. Second, it 
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was equally well-known that, as soon as such selection was relaxed, domesticated species 
showed a marked tendency to revert to their wild forms. Together, these phenomena 
suggested that artificial selection was best understood as an interfering force that can 
modify species only to a limited extent.20 
Natural state thinking played an important role in early opposition to Darwin, as ex-
emplified by Fleeming Jenkin’s (1867) review of Darwin’s Origin. Jenkin’s review is most 
famous for raising the swamping problem that arises when natural selection is combined 
with blending inheritance. In fact, however, he raised the swamping problem only as a 
challenge to the possible role of large, single-step changes in Darwinian evolution. Jen-
kin’s argument against the possibility of natural selection producing new species by ac-
cumulating small variations is rather different, and rests on his endorsement of a natural 
state model. 
Jenkin argued that natural selection cannot accumulate small variations indefinitely 
because, as the experience of breeders shows, such accumulation soon hits limits beyond 
which it cannot proceed further. Thus it appeared to Jenkin that there exist empirically 
determinable limits to the variability of species, and that these limits never exceed species 
boundaries. Domestication had never split one species into two. Species appeared to have 
an inherent tendency to stability. Jenkin captured this by describing variation within a 
species as contained within a sphere, with the average individual at the center. 
                                               
20 Today, we explain the limits to domestication by invoking standing genetic variation 
(once this is exhausted, selection becomes limited by the availability of new mutations), 
and we explain reversion as the result of the renewed operation of the same selection 
pressures that originally produced the wild form. 
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Individuals could vary in any direction, but were more likely to vary toward the center 
of the sphere. Artificial selection could push a population toward the edge of the sphere, 
but no further, and as soon as selection was relaxed, the population would start moving 
back toward the center. Importantly, this tendency to revert was not explained by the re-
imposition of selection pressures in a direction contrary to the artificial selection regime. 
It was explained entirely in terms of the variational properties of the species: variation 
predominantly trends toward the natural state.  
As each species had its own natural state, speciation required that some individual be 
produced with a distinct natural state from the original species. This could not occur by 
the accumulation of small variants; it had to occur in a single step. Jenkin thus, on the 
basis of his natural state model, denied the possibility of gradualism. Speciation, if it oc-
curred at all, must occur by saltation. Jenkin in fact allowed for such saltational evolution 
as a possibility, though he correctly noted that it was not Darwinian. 
I’ve described this example at some length in order to make apparent just how distinct 
it is from the explanation of deep conservation considered in the previous section. That 
explanation does not treat GRN kernels as natural states. Genetic variants can arise any-
where in a GRN kernel, in any direction, and show no internally driven tendency to revert 
back to the conserved state. Nor are there any principled limits on how much a GRN 
kernel can vary. In principle, the DNA sequences on which a given kernel is based could 
accumulate point mutations indefinitely. What prevents them from doing so are strong 
selection pressures. 
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If, therefore, we are to find a more general pattern of thought underlying this partic-
ular explanation, we must look elsewhere than natural state thinking. This in no way 
undermines Sober’s analysis of the role of natural state models in underwriting anti-grad-
ualism. It just shows that Mayr’s hope to find a single basis for all opposition to gradual-
ism cannot succeed. There are multiple paths to anti-gradualism. 
 
3.4.2 Cuvieran Functionalism 
 
The work of Georges Cuvier illustrates a second path to anti-gradualism. Though Cuvier 
never published a detailed rebuttal of Lamarck’s transmutationist theory, preferring in-
stead to let it die of being ignored (Burkhardt 1977, 195–96), his work nonetheless pro-
vided a coherent rationale for rejecting Lamarck’s theory. In reconstructing Cuvier’s view, 
I draw on the work of E. S. Russell (1982, chap. 3), George Coleman (1964), and Richard 
Burkhardt (1977, 191–201). Coleman’s account is especially interesting, since he explicitly 
argues that Cuvier was “the high priest of typology” and that this underwrote his oppo-
sition to transmutation (Coleman 1964, 98). His own excavation of Cuvier’s reasoning, 
however, shows that Cuvier’s opposition rested on a basis quite distinct from Platonic 
metaphysics. 
At the heart of Cuvier’s thought was his principle of the “conditions of existence.” 
This principle began from the truism that viable organisms must be constructed in such 
a way that they can survive in the environment(s) in which they are found. For Cuvier, 
this notion had both an internal and an external face (Coleman 1964, 68; Burkhardt 1977, 
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194). Internally, the parts of an organism must be functionally integrated: they must work 
together to form a coherent whole. Externally, the particular form this functional integra-
tion takes must be suited to a particular environment. 
E. S. Russell (1982, 34) has argued that the internal face is the more important of the 
two in Cuvier’s thought, and that “the idea of the external conditions of existence, the 
environment, enters very little into his thought.” It was the emphasis on internal func-
tional integration, for instance, that was the root of Cuvier’s important notions of the cor-
relation and subordination of parts (Coleman 1964, 67). I shall therefore follow Russell 
(1982, 238–40) in treating emphasis on functional integration within the organism as the 
core of specifically Cuvieran functionalism, in contrast to Darwinian functionalism, which 
stresses adaptation to particular environments. I claim neither that they are incompatible 
nor that Cuvier and Darwin stressed one to the complete exclusion of the other. I merely 
claim that they are different, and that they need names. 
Cuvier’s functionalism underwrote his arguments (a) in favor of the view that every 
taxonomic group was a sharply defined, morphologically stable unit (Coleman 1964, 99) 
and (b) against transmutationist hypotheses. In particular, he thought that this necessity 
for functional integration limited variability. Central organs (e.g. the heart and nervous 
system) could not vary as much as less essential features (e.g. hair and color), as varia-
tions to these organs were more likely to upset the overall integration of the organism 
(Coleman 1964, 143). Furthermore, modification in any one part necessitated modifica-
tions in many others, again to preserve functional integration. Boundaries between taxo-
nomic groups were sharply defined because the intermediates were not viable (Coleman 
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1964, 90; Burkhardt 1977, 193). The non-viability of intermediates equally ruled out the 
possibility of gradual transformation, which would require proceeding through such in-
termediate stages.21 
The line of reasoning summarized above can be condensed into a three-step argument 
against the possibility of gradual evolution. First, organisms must be functionally inte-
grated in order to survive (principle of the conditions of existence). Second, this need for 
functional integration makes intermediate forms non-viable. Third, the non-viability of 
intermediate forms precludes the possibility of gradual transformation, and so explains 
the existence of sharp boundaries between taxonomic groups. Note that no metaphysical 
commitment to the underlying reality of types is presupposed here. It is not the invaria-
bility of types (i.e. group characters) that explains the impossibility of transmutation. Ra-
ther, the invariability of types and the impossibility of transmutation receive a common 
explanation in terms of the non-viability of intermediates. 
It is also worth noting that this Cuvieran functionalist argument against the possibility 
of transmutation does not rest on beliefs about the nature of variation.22 It rests entirely 
on the non-viability of intermediates: if intermediates are not viable, gradual evolution 
                                               
21 Cuvier also offered empirical evidence against transmutation, including: (i) that Egyp-
tian mummified animals showed that animal forms remained stable over long periods of 
time (Burkhardt 1977, 149); (ii) that species whose range included multiple distinct envi-
ronments showed that animal form remains stable in different environments (Coleman 
1964, 145); and (iii) that the fossil record shows a lack of the intermediate forms a trans-
mutationist theory would predict (Coleman 1964, 150). None of these arguments, how-
ever, turn on his functionalist commitments. 
22 To look ahead, this is in keeping with the analysis of structuralism and functionalism 
developed in chapter five. 
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cannot bridge the gaps between natural groups. This says nothing about whether or not 
such variants can or do arise. 
Cuvieran functionalism therefore offers a path to anti-gradualism that departs quite 
radically from Mayr’s account of typological thinking, despite Coleman’s (1964, 98) diag-
nosis of Cuvier as “the high priest of typology.” Mayr’s notion of typological thinking 
implied a close connection between anti-gradualism and the metaphysics of variation. 
This connection is maintained in Sober’s account of natural state thinking, but is lost in 
my reconstruction of Cuvieran functionalism. 
We can therefore see that Cuvier’s three-step argument against transmutation, based 
on his functionalist commitments, provides a second path to anti-gradualism, distinct 
from the path relying on natural state thinking.23 In the next section, we will see that it 
plays an important role in the explanation of deep conservation. 
 
 
 
3.5 CUVIERAN FUNCTIONALISM TODAY 
 
The explanation of deep conservation presented above (Section 3.3) repeats Cuvier’s 
three-step argument point-for-point, albeit in a quite different argumentative context. In 
                                               
23  Though distinct, the two are compatible, as is exemplified by St. George Jackson 
Mivart’s On the Genesis of Species (Mivart 2009). In that work, he both reiterated Jenkin’s 
arguments based on natural state thinking (Mivart 2009, 118) and challenged the ability 
of Darwin’s theory to account for “the infinitesimal commencement of structures” on Cu-
vieran functionalist grounds (Mivart 2009, 23, 52). 
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particular, where Cuvier applied his functionalist argument globally, considering the 
functional integration of the entire organism, Davidson and Erwin apply the argument 
in a locally restricted setting: they apply it to particular GRN subcircuits. 
One of the key features of GRN kernels is their recursive wiring: kernels are charac-
terized by extensive positive feedback. This allows them to play a crucial developmental 
role: they can convert transient inputs into a stably maintained regulatory state (Wagner 
2014, chap. 3; Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 6). Because they are functionally integrated 
to such a degree, loss of a single gene in the kernel can destroy kernel function entirely, 
resulting in failure to develop the body parts under their developmental control 
(Davidson and Erwin 2006). Combined with the importance of these parts to the organ-
ism, this makes gradual evolution of kernels extremely difficult. 
In this argument, we can see each step of Cuvier’s three-part argument. Davidson and 
Erwin begin with an emphasis on the recursive wiring of special GRN subcircuits (step 1: 
functional integration). Note that functional integration here is inward-looking. If the 
wiring of kernels is disrupted, then they fail to serve their developmental function and 
so fail to produce a viable offspring. This non-viability is largely environment-independ-
ent. A fly without a heart will not survive in any naturally occurring environment. Nor 
will a sea urchin that fails to properly develop its endomesodermal layer in early devel-
opment. This leads to the conclusion that small changes to the linkages in these subcir-
cuits will lead to developmental catastrophe, not in some particular environment, but in 
any environment the organism is likely to encounter (step 2: the non-viability of 
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intermediates). These subcircuits therefore cannot evolve in a gradual manner (step 3: 
anti-gradualism). 
A word is required about what it means for kernels to evolve gradually. Gradual 
change is most readily understood at the phenotypic level, where it implies that large 
phenotypic changes are produced by the continuous accumulation of smaller such 
changes. As all genetic changes are discontinuous, the notion of gradual evolution is ef-
fectively meaningless at the genetic level. Though changes to GRN structure are techni-
cally phenotypic changes, as they are the consequences of (rather than identical to) 
changes in DNA sequences, the best available models of GRN structure are nonetheless 
discrete. Either a gene activates/represses another, or it does not, and so a linkage is ei-
ther present in a GRN, or it is absent (Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 1). In this regard, 
GRN evolution, like genome evolution, is essentially discontinuous, and the idea of grad-
ual evolution does not straightforwardly apply. Provisionally, however, we might un-
derstand gradualism at the GRN level as involving the change of a single regulatory link-
age at a time, in contrast to large-scale rewiring in a single step. 
Understanding GRN-level gradualism in this way, we can expand on the sense in 
which Davidson and Erwin argue for the non-viability of intermediates as applied to ker-
nels. The recursive wiring of kernels makes it difficult for them to evolve gradually, i.e. 
one linkage at a time, once they are established. Any one change would require compen-
satory changes to preserve the kernel’s function. This is a GRN-level analog of Cuvier’s 
view that single parts cannot change independently: change to any one part requires mul-
tiple coordinated changes. As acknowledged above (footnote 2), some changes to kernel 
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structure are possible, but they are of a special type: they convert a direct linkage to an 
indirect linkage.24 Thus they preserve kernel structure, considered at the appropriate 
level of abstraction, and are therefore the exceptions that prove the rule. Since no mech-
anism is known that could simultaneously produce coordinated changes to multiple link-
ages, saltatory evolution of kernels is off the table. The only remaining option is non-
evolution: once formed, kernels cease evolving. 
As my aim in this chapter is ultimately to show how evo-devo fits into the broader 
landscape of evolutionary theorizing, I have focused on a developmental genetic expla-
nation of deep conservation. Now that the Cuvieran functionalist argument pattern is on 
the table, however, we can see that it is in fact applied rather widely. In particular, it is 
the argument pattern that underlies Wimsatt’s notion of generative entrenchment 
(Schank and Wimsatt 1986; Wimsatt 2015). Generative entrenchment is a relational prop-
erty of entities: the more the activity or structure of a complex system depends on the 
presence of a given entity, the greater that entity’s generative entrenchment, and the 
stronger the constraints it imposes on the evolutionary process. The emphasis is on dia-
chronic dependencies: traits are generatively entrenched “to the degree that they have a 
number of later developing traits depending on them” (Wimsatt 1986, 198). Cuvieran 
functionalism, by contrast, also covers synchronic dependencies (cf. Wagner and 
Schwenk 2000; Schwenk and Wagner 2001). Models of generative entrenchment thus pro-
vide one way of locally applying Cuvieran functionalist reasoning: they show that 
                                               
24 Or vice versa. I do not know if the polarity of the changes between the Drosophila and 
vertebrate heart kernels has been determined. 
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gradual evolution is difficult in highly entrenched parts of an organism, and thus explain 
why evolutionary change is displaced onto other parts of an organism. 
Mayr’s notion of typological thinking was meant to capture a pattern of thought in-
herently at odds with Darwinian evolutionary theory—a pattern of thought he believed 
was pervasive enough to explain centuries’ worth of opposition to gradual evolution. 
We’ve seen that at least two distinct patterns of thought can generate anti-gradualism: 
natural state thinking and Cuvieran functionalism. We know that the former is incom-
patible with Darwinian evolutionary theory (Sober 1980). The question is whether the 
latter fares any better. If it does not, the problems are more extensive than the loss of a 
particular explanation of deep conservation. 
 
 
 
3.6 INTEGRATING DEVELOPMENTAL GENETICS INTO EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
As we saw above (Section 3.3), neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory has difficulty explain-
ing cases of deep conservation. Olivier Rieppel (2010, 668; cf. Wake, Roth, and Wake 1983) 
expresses the tension as follows: 
Stable developmental stages preserved through geologic time create a puz-
zle for Darwinian evolutionary theory, based as it is on fundamental varia-
tion, natural selection, and continuity of transformation. 
 
If small variants are produced for all parts of the organism, and if natural selection 
accumulates small variations over time, how can anything remain constant over long 
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periods of time? Selection can favor phenotypes optimized for a particular environment, 
but body plans are conserved across numerous environments. The difficulty lies in ex-
plaining something stable across many environments and populations (body plans) in 
terms of a cause that’s relative to a particular environment and population (mutations 
and selection pressures). 
In addressing this issue, caution is required. Darwin’s evolutionary theory is not iden-
tical to the neo-Darwinian theorizing of the modern synthesis. The synthesis involved 
conceptual innovations—most crucially in this context, the genotype-phenotype distinc-
tion—that help to resolve the tension Rieppel diagnoses. In particular, the genotype-phe-
notype distinction allowed biologists to reconceive each of Rieppel’s three bases of Dar-
winism (variation, selection, and continuity). The explanation of deep conservation pro-
vided by contemporary developmental genetics depends essentially on these reconcep-
tions. 
Evolutionary change, as understood during the modern synthesis, is first of all geno-
typic change: “a change in the genetic composition of populations,” as Dobzhansky (1982, 
11–12) put it. This can be connected to phenotypic change by studying genotype-pheno-
type correlations (transmission genetics) and the causal processes that produce these cor-
relations (developmental genetics). Developmental genetics thus has a role to play in ex-
plaining how the population genetic processes that alter the genetic composition of pop-
ulations manifest in evolution of the phenotype.25 
                                               
25 This picture is defended in chapter two. 
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The synthesis was Darwinian in emphasizing variability, selection, and continuity, 
but it understood each of these against the background of the genotype-phenotype dis-
tinction. Individual variability, i.e. the variations that randomly arise in particular organ-
isms, is first and foremost genetic, though genetic variants may have phenotypic conse-
quences. Selection concerns both genotype and phenotype. On the level of phenotype, 
selection may be understood both in terms of the causal interactions between organisms 
and their environments that determine reproductive success. On the level of genotype, it 
may be understood as the genetic response to phenotype-level selection (Endler 1986, 
chap. 1). 
Finally, continuity concerns the phenotype. The synthesis insisted that alleles with 
large phenotypic effects were usually disadvantageous, and thus played only a minor 
role in evolutionary change. Alleles with small effect sizes were the basic matter of evo-
lutionary change, with the result that the phenotypic would evolve gradually (though 
possibly rapidly; see Simpson 1982). At the genetic level, there is no question of continuity. 
All genetic change is discontinuous. Even if some genetic changes (e.g. point mutations) 
can be semi-arbitrarily considered “smaller” than others (e.g. large deletions), such 
“small” genetic changes are not more likely to have small phenotypic effects than are 
“large” genetic changes. Thus, even if a measure of genetic continuity can be given, there 
is no reason to think that selection will favor genetic continuity in the way it favors phe-
notypic continuity (Wright 1963, 366). 
The crucial takeaway from all this is that the synthesis, in basing itself on Mendelian 
genetics and the genotype-phenotype distinction, separated variability from continuity. 
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Variability is genetic (though it may have phenotypic effects), whereas continuity is phe-
notypic (with no application to the genotype). This separation eases the tension with deep 
conservation. The GRNs that pattern stable developmental stages are not any less varia-
ble, genetically, than any other region of the genome. However, genetically unremarkable 
changes affecting these GRNs have quite remarkable phenotypic effects: large effects that 
are negative in all environments (Davidson and Erwin 2006; Erwin 2015). By revealing 
the processes connecting genotype to phenotype, developmental genetics can explain 
how the fact that selection favors continuous phenotypic change insulates certain regions 
of the genome (and associated aspects of the phenotype) from evolutionary change over 
long stretches of time. 
Thus, contemporary Cuvieran functionalism, so far from being in tension with the 
modern synthesis, rests precisely on the synthesis’ commitment to genetic variability, se-
lection, and phenotypic continuity. By themselves, these commitments do not furnish an 
explanation of deep conservation. To get such an explanation, the gap between genetic 
variability and phenotypic continuity—that is, the gap between genotype and phenotype 
must be bridged. That is what developmental genetics does: it shows how alterations to 
different regions of the genome have predictably different phenotypic effects. By apply-
ing Cuvier’s anti-gradualist argument locally rather than globally, it complements the 
theorizing of the modern synthesis and augments its explanatory power. 
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3.7 DEFINITION VERSUS DIAGNOSIS 
 
Perhaps because Mayr’s notion of typological thinking was so nebulous, biologists and 
philosophers have offered quite varied criticisms of exactly what’s wrong with it. In this 
and the following section, I consider two such criticisms, both connected to the issue of 
deep conservation, in order to show that neither challenges Cuvieran functionalism. 
Davidson and his colleagues’ account of the deep conservation of GRN kernels, and 
their more general picture of GRN evolution, helps to explain why body plans are im-
portant theoretical constructs in evo-devo (Raff 1996; Erwin and Valentine 2013). The 
very idea of a “body plan” has, however, been criticized as perniciously typological 
(Ghiselin 2005a; Jenner 2006). Here, I alleviate this worry. 
Both Ghiselin and Jenner raise this worry in the context of the view that species are 
individuals rather than classes. This is not the place to re-litigate that long-standing de-
bate. It is enough to recognize that lineages are defined by shared ancestry. An ancestral 
species plus all of its descendants constitutes a lineage. No amount of subsequent evolu-
tionary change can remove a particular species from its ancestral lineage (Jenner 2006, 
387). If a future vertebrate lost every feature that characterizes the vertebrate body plan, 
it would still belong to the vertebrate lineage, i.e. it would still be a vertebrate. No genetic 
or phenotypic trait is essential for a given species to belong to a given lineage. Only de-
scent matters. A consequence of this is that characters can only ever be diagnostic of sys-
tematic groups. They can never be definitive. 
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Both Ghiselin and Jenner worry that evo-devo’s notion of body plans falls afoul of this 
important point. For instance, Ghiselin (2005a, 132–33), critiquing Stephen Jay Gould, 
writes: 
He tried to make essences be not transcendent, but immanent, by incarnat-
ing them in the genome. In effect, he confused what are often called ‘‘con-
servative characters’’ or ones that evolve very slowly and perhaps for a 
while not at all, with ones that are unrestricted with respect to space or time. 
 
Davidson and his colleagues also make “essences” (by which Ghiselin here means 
body plans) immanent in the genome (discussed further below, Section 3.8). The worry 
is that, in doing so, they treat them as features definitive of classes, about which laws of 
nature (or something like laws of nature) can be formulated (e.g. a claim about the evo-
lutionary possibilities of “the tetrapod limb”). 
This is a misplaced worry, however. Not only do Davidson and his colleagues not 
erroneously treat kernels as definitive of taxonomic groups, their position would hardly 
be sensible if they did. They are, after all, trying to explain the deep conservation of body 
plans. They do this by showing that the developmental genetic bases of body plan ele-
ments are themselves deeply conserved. The problem thus changes to explaining the con-
servation of the relevant GRN subcircuits. Crucially, these regions of the developmental 
GRN are no less susceptible to mutation than any other genomic region. Lineages con-
taining these GRNs will continuously produce individuals that lack the supposedly “es-
sential” kernel. Evolutionarily speaking, the regions of the genome that underlie GRN 
kernels might change. That is precisely why it’s interesting that they don’t.26 Thus, were 
                                               
26 See also Wagner and Schwenk (2000, 188), who are very clear that evolutionarily stable 
configurations (ESCs)—whose stability they explain on Cuvieran functionalist grounds—
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Davidson and Erwin truly typologists in the way that worries Ghiselin and Jenner, their 
very explanandum would disappear. 
Davidson and Erwin take on board the insight that lineages are determined by shared 
ancestry and no more. Even a GRN kernel is merely diagnostic of a particular taxon, not 
definitive. At the same time, so long as those regions of the GRN are conserved, general 
claims can be made about the evolutionary possibilities of the body plan elements that 
depend on them. These claims are not spatiotemporally unrestricted: they extend (in 
space and time) exactly as far as conservation extends. 
 
 
 
3.8 BODY PLANS AND POPULATIONS 
 
Ron Amundson (2005) raises a quite distinct worry about the relationship between evo-
devo, with its emphasis on deep conservation, and synthesis-derived evolutionary theo-
rizing. Though he brings together numerous diverse threads in making this case, to which 
I can’t do justice here, the culmination of his argument posits an ultimately simple basis 
for the continuing tensions between the fields. Mainstream, neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
theorizing is committed to something Amundson (2005, chap. 11) calls exclusive population 
thinking (described below). According to Amundson, evo-devo’s reliance on the notion 
                                               
are representative but not definitive of monophyletic clades: “Because both origin and 
escape from an ESC are relatively rare, ESC character states should be representative of a 
higher clade or significant parts of it.” 
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of animal body plans as causal factors in evolution (which Amundson diagnoses as typo-
logical) falls afoul of exclusive population thinking. 
I have argued that Cuvieran functionalism underwrites evo-devo’s appeals to con-
served body plans by explaining their persistence over deep evolutionary time. If Cuvi-
eran functionalism can be shown to be compatible with exclusive population thinking, 
then the tension Amundson details can be dissolved. Here, I make the case that Cuvieran 
functionalism is compatible with any defensible interpretation of exclusive population 
thinking. 
Exclusive population thinking, for Amundson, is the view that all evolutionarily rel-
evant causes must operate within and not across populations. Amundson (2005, 256) 
writes: 
Let us suppose that exclusive population thinking is generally accepted by 
neo-Darwinians. In this view, adaptive radiation is the way of evolution. 
Once speciation occurs, no causal force can unify distinct populations. […] 
As long as development is conceived as a unified process that is shared 
among reproductively isolated groups, it is irrelevant to selection within 
populations. Therefore it is irrelevant to evolution. As long as evo-devo in-
volves developmental types, it is perniciously typological. From this per-
spective, the only way for evo-devo to form a synthesis with neo-Darwin-
ism is for evo-devo to […] relinquish entirely the view that ontogeny is a 
thing that can be shared. 
 
Amundson characterizes the conflict between population thinking and typological 
thinking as a disagreement over whether anything can unify the evolution of distinct lin-
eages. Exclusive population thinking takes the negative position: once one lineage di-
verges into two daughter lineages, the daughter lineages follow independent evolution-
ary courses. As Reeve and Sherman (1993) put it, the ancestor does not reach up through 
time to clutch its descendants by the throat. Historically conserved characters are a mere 
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residue that cannot constrain further change. On this view, evo-devo’s invocation of con-
served body plans as causal factors in evolution is misguided: it treats body plans as more 
than the mere residue of history. 
Amundson considers two possibilities for harmonizing evo-devo and mainstream (for 
Amundson, “neo-Darwinian”) evolutionary theorizing. Either evo-devo can give up its 
reliance on the notion of conserved body plans as causal factors in evolution, or neo-
Darwinian theorists can give up their commitment to exclusive population thinking. Nei-
ther option is especially attractive. There is something basically right in the idea that pop-
ulations, once they have diverged, evolve independently. And yet the contemporary de-
velopmental genetic explanation of deep conservation of body plan elements is central to 
evo-devo, despite spanning lineages that diverged hundreds of millions of years ago. 
Both are crucial to contemporary evolutionary theorizing, so any attempt at harmoniza-
tion that favors one at the expense of the other is ipso facto inadequate.  
Happily, however, the conflict that Amundson diagnoses only exists if one adopts an 
overly restrictive interpretation of exclusive population thinking, one that is routinely 
and justifiably violated by evolutionary explanations offered outside of evo-devo. There 
is a less restrictive version of exclusive population thinking justified by the successes of 
mainstream evolutionary theorizing, but this interpretation is compatible with evo-
devo’s Cuvieran functionalism. 
What does it mean to say that lineages evolve independently, not unified by any 
causal force? Lineages diverge when gene flow between two populations is eliminated. 
Once gene flow is eliminated, alleles in one population no longer compete with alleles in 
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the other. Variations that arise in one population are limited to that population and can-
not spread to the other. No population genetic cause unifies the population: selection, 
drift, gene flow, mutation, etc. are all localized within a single population. And since 
population genetic processes drive evolutionary change, that means that lineages evolve 
independently once diverged. 
The more restrictive interpretation of exclusive population thinking claims that, be-
cause distinct lineages evolve independently in this way, the evolution of each individual 
lineage must be explained independently. It amounts to a denial of the possibility of gen-
eral explanations in evolution. Each lineage has a unique history, and that history must 
be explained in terms of the particular evolutionary forces acting on that lineage. Gene 
flow is the only causal force that binds lineages together; once it is cut off, they go their 
separate ways. 
Such an interpretation certainly excludes evo-devo’s Cuvieran functionalist explana-
tion of deep conservation, but it excludes much else besides. For example, why do many 
bird and mammal lineages tend to be larger in cooler climates (Bergmann’s rule; Meiri 
and Dayan 2003)? And why does this trend fail in other lineages, such as amphibians and 
insects (Adams and Church 2008; Shelomi 2012)? If explanations that transcend single 
populations are forbidden, then each instance of this trend must be explained inde-
pendently. It’s reasonable to ask, however, for a more general explanation, one in terms 
of shared features of the groups that experience the trend leading those groups to expe-
rience similar selection pressures in similar environments. In the case of Bergmann’s rule, 
the standard explanation is in terms of the need for endotherms (such as birds and 
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mammals) to minimize heat loss in colder environments (Walters and Hassall 2006). This 
explains why some (but not all) independent lineages face similar selection pressures and 
so show similar evolutionary trajectories. Though the lineages experience these causes 
independently, we can nonetheless offer a unified explanation of their evolutionary tra-
jectory because the same causal factor is repeated in multiple lineages. 
The strong interpretation of exclusive population thinking is therefore untenable. Ex-
clusive population thinking should require only that causes cannot transcend popula-
tions—that is, that independently evolving lineages should experience and respond to 
evolutionary causes independently. But it should not require that explanations cannot 
transcend populations, because similar causes can affect independent populations in sim-
ilar ways. Once we see this, however, we can see that Cuvieran functionalism under-
writes appeals to body plans in a way that is compatible with this more defensible un-
derstanding of exclusive population thinking. According to Davidson and Erwin, what 
underlies conserved body plan elements are conserved GRNs. These are conserved be-
cause changes to their structure are rarely if ever viable. Their functional integration gives 
rise, in every population in which they are present, to the same, strong selection pressures. 
Thus, though they can change, they do not (Section 3.7). So far, no cause that unifies sep-
arated populations is required. All that’s needed is that similar selection pressures arise 
independently in multiple lineages. There is no mystery in that. 
Once it is allowed that key portions of the regulatory networks underlying the devel-
opment of conserved body plan elements are themselves conserved, the puzzle about 
how conserved body plan elements can unify the evolution of distinct populations 
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vanishes. If changes that affect certain regions of the GRN are routinely selected against, 
then evolutionary divergence in the relevant characters must occur via changes at other 
regions of the GRN. The conservation of some GRN regions can thus impose constraints 
on the evolution of those characters. Since these conserved regions of the GRN are present 
in each descendant lineage,27 they can impose the same constraints on each population 
(cf. Arthur 2001, 276). This is no more mysterious than the explanation of trends in body 
size evolution: in both cases, similar causes affect independent lineages, allowing for a 
unified explanation of their evolutionary trajectories.28  
In this manner, developmental types are able to unify separate populations in a man-
ner compatible with exclusive population thinking, once that is itself interpreted in a 
manner compatible with the practice of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theorizing. No 
“spooky” causal influence of the ancestor on its descendants is needed. All that is re-
quired is the repeated presence, in diverged lineages, of the same underlying GRNs. The 
ancestor doesn’t clutch its descendants by the throat. It simply bequeaths to them, with 
severe selection pressures as its faithful executor, the regulatory architecture that con-
strains their evolution. 
 
 
                                               
27 This only strictly true when there is perfect conservation, as appears to be the case with 
GRN kernels. Other characters may, during rare evolutionary events, change, as in the 
transition from the teleost fin to the tetrapod limb (for further discussion of such issues, 
see Wagner 2014, chaps. 1–6). 
28 David Stern (2011, chap. 8) explicitly integrates Cuvieran functionalist reasoning with 
population genetics when he argues that network-disrupting mutations are more likely 
to be fixed in small populations than in large populations. 
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3.9 UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY REVISITED 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to elucidate the role of anti-gradualist arguments in con-
temporary developmental genetic explanations of deep conservation, and to show how 
these arguments can be integrated into evolutionary theorizing without falling afoul of 
classic objections to “typological” thinking. In doing so, I have defended the following 
claims: 
• There exist at least two distinct paths to anti-gradualism—Cuvieran function-
alism and natural state thinking—and that these paths cannot be unified under 
any more general heading, such as Mayr’s notion of “typological thinking.” 
(Section 3.4) 
• Contemporary developmental genetics draws on localized applications of Cu-
vieran functionalist reasoning to explain deep conservation (Section 3.3, Sub-
section 3.4.2, Section 3.5). It does not draw on natural state thinking (Subsection 
3.4.1). 
• By relying on neo-Darwinian interpretations of the nature of variation, selec-
tion, and continuity, Cuvieran functionalist reasoning in evo-devo comple-
ments neo-Darwinian theorizing while expanding its explanatory power (Sec-
tion 3.6). 
• Cuvieran functionalist reasoning in evo-devo does not fall afoul of the errors 
with which typological thinking has been charged. It does not treat conserved 
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characters as definitional of taxonomic groups; it treats them merely as diag-
nostic (Section 3.7). Moreover, it is compatible with any defensible understand-
ing of exclusive population thinking (Section 3.8). 
In light of this, it is worth revisiting Raff’s (1996, chap. 1) claim that evo-devo differs 
from synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing in emphasizing universality rather than 
diversity. This is often taken to support the view that evo-devo is a structuralist program 
in biology, in contrast to the functionalism of neo-Darwinian theorizing. This view struc-
tures Amundson’s (2005) book-length treatment of the issue, and it has been endorsed by 
various evo-devo biologists (e.g., Alberch 1989; Wagner 2014). This is not the place for a 
full treatment of structure-function disputes (see chapter five), but, roughly, structuralists 
see internal and/or ahistorical causal factors as the primary drivers shaping organismal 
form, while functionalists see external, historical causal factors (e.g., selection) as the pri-
mary drivers. 
There is truth to this narrative—evo-devo has, from its inception up to the present 
day, had a strong structuralist strain (e.g., Alberch 1989; Kauffman 1993; Müller 2003; 
Newman 2014b)—but, in light of what I’ve argued here, it’s overly simplistic. If function-
alism is conceived as including only Darwinian functionalism, with its emphasis on con-
tinuous variability and environment-driven selection pressures, and if structuralism is 
understood as the only alternative to functionalism, then evo-devo’s emphasis on deep 
conservation can only seem structuralist.29  
                                               
29 Alberch (1989, 25), for instance, seems to endorse something like these assumptions 
when he argues that functionalist approaches inherently treat nature as continuous. 
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But there’s a third option: Cuvieran functionalism. Like Darwinian functionalism, Cu-
vieran functionalism (in its post-Darwinian forms) emphasizes the role of selection in 
driving evolutionary change (or evolutionary stasis). Like structuralism, Cuvieran func-
tionalism emphasizes what is universal (evolutionarily conserved) over what is diverse 
(evolutionarily labile), and does so by focusing on the internal organization of the organ-
ism, not its relation to any particular environment. While it’s true that evo-devo has al-
ways had a sizable structuralist contingent, evo-devo, especially those regions of evo-
devo centered on developmental genetics, also has a strong Cuvieran functionalist con-
tingent (e.g. Carroll 2008; Wagner 2014; Peter and Davidson 2015), and structure-function 
disputes arise within evo-devo.30 
In order, therefore, to understand both the internal structure of evo-devo and the 
place of evo-devo within the broader landscape of evolutionary theorizing, we must rec-
ognize Cuvieran functionalism as an alternative to both structuralism and Darwinian 
functionalism. 
  
                                               
30 For instance, Stuart Newman and Ramray Bhat (2008, 2), representing the structuralist 
approach to evo-devo, refer to Sean Carroll’s approach as “Neo-Neo-Darwinian.” 
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4.0 THE FINE STRUCTURE OF ‘HOMOLOGY’ 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The pectoral fin of a dugong, the forelimb of a mole, and the wing of a bat, though they 
do not appear especially similar and though they serve distinct functions (swimming, 
digging, and flying, respectively), are nonetheless the “same” part: they are all variations 
on the vertebrate limb (Owen 2007). They are all, as biologists put it, homologous. 
Homology is among the most important and most controversial phenomena in biol-
ogy: important because it is the “basis of comparative biology” (Hall 1994), controversial 
because biologists rely on multiple, possibly incompatible accounts of homology. In par-
ticular, there is a longstanding conflict between accounts of homology based on Darwin-
ian evolutionary theory (e.g. Lankester 1870; Hennig 1966) and accounts of homology 
based on morphology and development (e.g. Owen 2007; Wagner 1989). 
The relationship between these two types of account remains contentious. Genealog-
ical accounts, which today are generally framed in terms of phylogenetic systematics 
(Wiley and Lieberman 2011), are dominant. The status of developmental accounts of ho-
mology is less clear. Some take the two types of account to stand in an antagonistic 
 108 
relationship (Amundson 2005, pp. 238–44; Ramsey and Peterson 2012; Currie 2014), while 
others see them as merely different, useful for different purposes (Brigandt 2002; 
Jamniczky 2005; Griffiths 2007). If we accept the latter suggestion, then we need some 
picture of how the accounts relate. Not much has been written on this score (but see 
Brigandt 2007; Laublichler 2014). 
This chapter presents a general framework showing how genealogical and develop-
mental accounts of homology fit together. In this framework, both types of account cap-
ture aspects of homology that the other type cannot. Both types of account therefore work 
together to contribute to a full understanding of homology. 
In rough outline, I argue that the two types of account relate as follows (Figure 2).31 
Genealogical accounts rely on notions of ‘character’ and ‘descent’ that abstract away from 
the particular mechanisms by which characters are inherited. Thanks to this abstraction, 
phylogenetic systematics can incorporate data drawn from all kinds of biological charac-
ters (genes, body parts, behaviors, etc.). However, the genealogical account presupposes 
the existence of inherited units. These units are inherited in different ways. Considering 
these differences leads to the development of enriched accounts of homology that, though 
tied to the genealogical account, apply to more limited domains (e.g. just to genes, or just 
to body parts). Even as their domain is restricted, however, these accounts expand the 
reference of ‘homology’, for they include phenomena (e.g. paralogy, serial homology) 
                                               
31 In Figure 2, large boxes represented accounts of homology, while small boxes represent 
sub-concepts. 
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that are excluded by a strict genealogical account. Developmental accounts of homology 
are best understood as enriched accounts that apply specifically to body part homology. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The fine structure of ‘homology’. 
 
 
There is thus a complex conceptual structure underlying the various uses of the term 
‘homology’. This structure consists of (1) an abstract, genealogical account that applies to 
all kinds of biological characters and (2) a set of locally enriched accounts that complete 
the genealogical account within a limited domain (e.g. body parts) while also including 
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additional phenomena (e.g. serial homology) not covered by the genealogical account. I 
aim to show that, once this fine structure is appreciated, the longstanding tensions be-
tween the two types of account vanish.32 
 
 
 
4.2 HOMOLOGY: THE PROBLEM 
 
Any adequate account of homology must explain how the parts of organisms can be the 
same part, despite potentially great dissimilarity. This problem is capture by Owen’s 
(1843, p. 379) classic definition of a homolog as “the same organ under every variety of 
form and function.” This definition does not say in what sense homologs are “the same.” 
The problem of homology might thus be put as follows: Owen’s definition is correct, but 
what does it mean? 
Here the disputes begin. Accounts of homology can be grouped into two main clas-
ses—genealogical and developmental—that provide different types of answers to this 
question. There are four key sources of tension between these two accounts. 
Tension 1: what is the nature of homological sameness? Genealogical accounts ex-
plicate sameness in terms of shared descent: two parts are homologous if they derive 
from the same part in a common ancestor. Developmental accounts, by contrast, explicate 
                                               
32 The view that ‘homology’ has a complex conceptual structure resonates with Mark Wil-
son’s (1982, 1994, 2006, 2018) studies of conceptual behavior in classical mechanics and 
materials science. 
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sameness in terms of shared features of development. Günter Wagner’s (1989, p. 1163) 
account of homology, for instance, treats two parts as homologous if they share “histori-
cally acquired and genetically regulated developmental constraints.” This basic differ-
ence over the nature of homological sameness gives rise to three further sources of ten-
sion. 
Tension 2: how much dissimilarity is permitted? Genealogical and developmental 
accounts of homology differ over the extent to which homologs can be dissimilar. Gene-
alogical accounts explain homological sameness in terms of a shared origin. Because the 
origin is a fixed historical event, no amount of subsequent divergence can destroy the 
homology between two parts. Genealogical accounts thus allow for indefinite divergence. 
Developmental accounts do not. They explain sameness in terms of extant, causally active 
factors operative in development, and the requirement that these factors be conserved 
constrains the degree to which homologous parts can diverge. 
Tension 3: how many types of homology? Genealogical and developmental accounts 
of homology disagree about whether serial homology (the same part repeated within a 
single individual) is genuine homology. Strictly speaking, genealogical accounts exclu-
sively concern special homology (the same part in different species). Phylogenetic sys-
tematics ties homology to the topology of phylogenetic trees (see below, Section 4.3), and 
no account of serial homology emerges from this (Cracraft 2005; cf. Lankester 1870; De 
Beer 1971). Developmental accounts, by contrast, explicitly include serial homology 
(Wagner 2014, p. 418). 
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Tension 4: what is the proper target of homology assessments? Genealogical and 
developmental accounts of homology appear to disagree over what is properly homolo-
gized. Whereas developmental accounts homologize characters (e.g. the vertebrate fore-
limb, whatever form it takes), genealogical accounts homologize character-states (e.g. hav-
ing a forelimb shaped like a fin) (Wagner 1989; Brigandt 2007). In this way, they disagree 
concerning the proper targets of homology assessment. 
On account of these four sources of tension, a number of philosophers have taken 
genealogical and developmental accounts of homology to be in competition (Amundson 
2005, pp. 238–44; Ramsey and Peterson 2012; Currie 2014). Others, however, have de-
fended the compatibility of the two accounts, on the grounds that they are useful for dif-
ferent purposes (Brigandt 2002; Jamniczky 2005; Griffiths 2007). Roughly, the genealogi-
cal account is useful for reconstructing phylogenies, while developmental accounts are 
important for understanding the evolution of novel structures. Once the different pur-
poses of these accounts are recognized, they can be seen as no longer fighting over the 
same ground. Among biologists, advocates of both compatibility (Panchen 1999, 
discussion; Wagner 2014) and conflict (Cracraft 2005) can be found. 
This chapter sides with the compatibilist camp. It is not enough, however, to show 
that genealogical and developmental accounts serve different purposes, for that does not 
explain in what sense they are both accounts of homology. A viable compatibilist analysis 
of homology must both (a) make clear how the two types of account are related and (b) 
do so in a way that shows how to resolve the four sources of tension described above. In 
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what follows, I defend a framework for understanding homology that satisfies both de-
siderata. 
One feature of this framework is that the scope of different accounts of homology 
varies not only in terms of the range of characters covered, but in terms of the range of 
taxa covered. Accordingly, the sections of this chapter vary in scope. The discussion of 
the genealogical account of homology (Section 4.3) covers all taxa, reflecting the unifying 
role of the genealogical account. The discussion of gene homology (Section 4.5) likewise 
applies to all taxa. By contrast, the discussion of body part homology (Section 4.6) covers 
only animal taxa, since that is the scope of the enriched account under discussion. The 
scope of the chapter as a whole, however, is general: it provides a framework for making 
sense of applications of ‘homology’ to all taxa and for all characters. 
The easiest way to introduce this framework is by presenting a genealogical account 
of homology (Section 4.3), as the limitations of such an account reveal the need for en-
riched accounts of homology. After explaining the general features of enriched accounts 
(Section 4.4), I provide examples of two such enriched accounts: one for gene homology 
(Section 4.5) and one for body part homology (Section 4.6). I then return to a more abstract 
discussion of the nature of enriched accounts of homology (Section 4.7). With the frame-
work in place, I show how it resolves the four sources of tension just described (Section 
4.8), then compare my account to two other recent proposals (Section 4.9). 
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4.3 A GENEALOGICAL ACCOUNT OF HOMOLOGY 
 
In this section, I present a genealogical account of homology, based on the methods and 
conceptual framework of phylogenetic systematics. This account unifies applications of 
‘homology’ to all kinds of biological entities. It does so by relying on abstract notions of 
‘descent’ and ‘character’. Subsequent sections will show how making these abstract no-
tions concrete by incorporating mechanistic details give rise to locally enriched accounts 
of homology. 
According to the genealogical account of homology, homologs are characters or char-
acter states (the distinction is explained below) that descend from the same character 
(state) in a common ancestor. Character state homology is tied to the topology of phylo-
genetic trees, while homology of characters (“transformational homology”) is im-
portantly presupposed in the methodology of phylogenetic systematics. I take up these 
two types of genealogical homology in turn. 
 
4.3.1 Homology of Character States 
 
Phylogenetic systematics aims at reconstructing the phylogenetic relationships between 
taxa. Phylogenetic relationships are distinct from tokogenetic relationships (Figure 3; see 
Hennig 1966, pp. 29–32). Tokogenetic relationships hold between parents and offspring 
within an interbreeding population. When a single interbreeding population splits into 
two, this yields phylogenetic relationships between the ancestral and descendant 
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populations. Phylogenetic relationships produce a strict hierarchy representable in a phy-
logenetic tree; tokogenetic relationships do not. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Phylogenetic relations (left) and tokogenetic relationships (right). 
 
 
To reconstruct phylogenetic relationships systematists record the similarities and dif-
ferences between a given set of taxa (Wiley and Lieberman 2011). Figure 4 shows a data 
matrix recording the similarities and differences of nine characters among four taxa. In 
the figure, the columns are taxa, while the rows are characters. Each character can occur 
in at least two character states. For example, “number of digits” might be a character, 
while “one” and “five” are possible states of that character. For simplicity, the characters 
in Figure 4 come in only two character states, coded as ‘0’ or ‘1’. 
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Figure 4. Hypothetical data matrix. Rows are characters; columns are taxa. 
 
 
Next, the systematist searches for the phylogenetic tree that is best supported by the 
data (Figure 5). Inferring a phylogenetic tree from the data requires adopting a model of 
evolution, capturing the possible and probable transitions between states of a given char-
acter. For instance, for molecular data, the Jukes-Cantor model of DNA evolution as-
sumes that all four bases of DNA occur with equal frequencies, and that the rate of tran-
sition is the same for all pairs of bases (Huson, Rupp, and Scornavacca 2010, pp. 29–31). 
For morphological data, a model might assume that loss of a complex character is more 
likely than gain. In generating Figure 5, I assumed that 0 is the ancestral state for each 
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character, that 0à1 is the only possible transformation for each character, and that other-
wise all transitions are equally likely. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Phylogenetic tree produced from the data matrix in Figure 4. 
 
 
For understanding character state homology, however, what matters is not the model 
used to infer the phylogenetic tree from the data, but rather the topology of the tree pro-
duced. Once a tree is inferred, homology relationships can be read off the tree directly. 
There are two ways in which character states can be homologous. Symplesiomorphies 
are shared ancestral character states, while synapomorphies are shared derived character 
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states. As both are shared due to common descent, both fall under a genealogical account 
of homology. 
 
4.3.2 Transformational Homology 
 
Character state homology does not exhaust the genealogical account of homology. To 
construct a data matrix, one must recognize a second kind of homology: transformational 
homology. Even to ask whether two shared character states are homologous or inde-
pendently derived, they must be treated as states of a single character. Characters must 
be able to transform from one state to another (e.g. reduction in digit number during the 
evolution of horses). In this sense, characters form “transformation series” (Hennig 1966). 
Just as a data matrix encodes hypotheses of character state homology by giving two taxa 
the same value for some character, so it encodes hypotheses of transformational homol-
ogy by placing the features of distinct taxa in the same row. 
This point is independent of the sort of data one considers in phylogenetic analysis. 
In the morphological case, for instance, it would be incorrect to compare the coloration 
of bird wings to the coloration of butterfly wings, since the two groups evolved wings 
independently. Wing coloration thus does not form a transformation series in the two 
groups. In the molecular case, it is essential to compare base identity at homologous loci. 
This is the purpose of sequence alignment, a necessary stage in the phylogenetic analysis 
of molecular data (Huson, Rupp, and Scornavacca 2010, chap. 2). 
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Though the process of inferring a phylogenetic tree from the data evaluates the hy-
pothesis that shared character states are shared due to common ancestry, it presupposes 
hypotheses of transformational homology. Hypotheses of transformational homology are 
thus “logically prior” to hypotheses of character state homology (Brower and 
Schawaroch 1996, p. 269). 
Both transformational homology and character state homology are intelligible within 
and indeed necessary to a phylogenetic framework (Assis and Brigandt 2009, p. 251). The 
genealogical account of homology thus includes both. 
 
4.3.3 ‘Descent’ and ‘Character’ 
 
The genealogical account of homology just described unifies applications of the term ‘ho-
mology’ to biological entities of all kinds. It is able to serve this unifying role because it 
relies on an abstract, purely formal understanding of both ‘descent’ and ‘character’. An-
ything can be a “character” (i.e. used in phylogenetic systematics), provided that it yields 
transformation series. Likewise, a phylogenetic descent relationship is simply any rela-
tionship that gives rise to phylogenetic patterns recoverable by phylogenetic analysis. 
Such patterns hold among biological taxa, but can also be found outside of biology, as in 
the relationships between languages: Darwin quite properly spoke of linguistic homolo-
gies (Darwin 1981, p. 59). Genealogical accounts thus abstract away from the details of 
particular kinds of character, focusing only their formal features (in terms of the topology 
of phylogenetic trees). 
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By relying on formal notions of ‘descent’ and ‘character’, the genealogical account 
achieves broad applicability. Any character that is informative of phylogenetic relation-
ships between taxa can be homologized. This is so even though the processes by which 
different kinds of parts are inherited can be quite different. DNA is replicated by copying 
from a template. Body parts are not. Nonetheless, both can form transformation series. 
Later, we will see how these differences give rise to locally enriched accounts of homol-
ogy. For now, however, what matters is that the genealogical account of homology is able 
to apply to all kinds of characters, despite these differences. 
The formal nature of the genealogical account also makes room for the fact that ho-
mology “dissociates” across different kinds of biological entity. For instance, homologous 
body parts may develop via non-homologous developmental pathways and involve the 
expression of non-homologous genes (De Beer 1971; Wray and Abouheif 1998). In the 
other direction, homologous genes and developmental precursors may be involved in the 
development of non-homologous adult structures (Havstad, Assis, and Rieppel 2015). 
The genealogical account of homology permits (but does not require) such dissociations, 
because the formal notions of ‘descent’ and ‘character’ impose no a priori requirements 
on the relations between different homologs. Once the means by which different kinds of 
homologs are inherited are considered, constraints on dissociation will become important, 
but no such constraints are required by the genealogical account considered in isolation. 
As represented in Figure 2, the genealogical account of homology, in addition to cov-
ering transformational and character state homology, also includes special homology and 
orthology. Special homologs are body parts shared due to descent from a common 
 121 
ancestor (e.g. the vertebrate forelimb); orthologs are the same for genes. These stand in a 
one-to-many relationship to transformational homologs: each special homolog/ortholog 
is the basis for multiple transformation series. For instance, orthologous genes contain 
multiple loci, each of which forms a transformation series. Likewise, the vertebrate fore-
limb is the basis of many transformation series, such as digit number and length. They 
thus stand in the background of phylogenetic analysis without featuring in it directly. To 
see how they enter the picture, we need to look at the reasons why enriched accounts of 
homology are required. 
 
 
 
4.4 ENRICHED ACCOUNTS OF HOMOLOGY 
 
The methodology of phylogenetic systematics requires the identification of characters 
whose character states are informative of phylogenetic relationships among taxa. Only 
once such characters are recognized can phylogenies be reconstructed. How are they to 
be recognized? Answering this question will reveal the need for locally enriched accounts 
of homology. I first explain why such accounts are needed (Section 4.4.1), then summa-
rize their key features (Section 4.4.2). 
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4.4.1 Why Enriched Accounts of Homology are Needed 
 
Phylogenetic relationships are produced by the evolutionary process of descent with 
modification. When an ancestral species splits into two descendant species, the descend-
ants resemble the ancestor (and each other) in some respects, but differ in others. Thus, 
shared descent can explain shared similarities. A phylogenetic relationship, however, is 
simply one that answers to a particular formal structure (Hennig 1966, pp. 18–21). There 
is no principled reason that ancestors and descendants, qua ancestors and descendants, 
cannot be radically different. Phylogeny alone places no limits on the extent of possible 
divergence between them. 
To understand why real-world phylogenetic relationships show these similarity rela-
tionships, we must therefore look beyond phylogeny itself. Because offspring resemble 
their parents, descendant populations resemble their ancestors. If we want to know why 
common ancestry can explain similarities between taxa, we therefore need to consider 
the processes that produce parent-offspring similarities. 
This is especially important for understanding homology, because, as we saw above, 
applying the methods of phylogenetic systematics requires that we first recognize com-
parable features of distinct taxa. The data used to infer phylogenetic relationships are 
laden with assumptions about which characters can be and are shared by descent. The 
grounds for such assumptions, however, lie in our understanding of how such characters 
are inherited. In this sense, the genealogical account of homology is internally incomplete: it 
assumes that certain characters are shared by descent without explaining how this is 
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possible. It requires completion by consideration of the details of inheritance, which will 
furnish an explanation of what it means for parts to be shared by descent.33 
At this point, a complication arises: what it means for two parts in different taxa to be 
shared by descent depends on the nature of the part in question. The reason is that dif-
ferent processes underlie the inheritance of different kinds of biological entities. The 
mechanisms of DNA replication, which involve copying from a template, are responsible 
for genomic parent-offspring resemblances. Body parts, by contrast, are reproduced each 
generation without the benefit of a template, relying instead on complex networks of reg-
ulatory interactions between genes (among other causes). Still other kinds of characters 
(e.g. behaviors) are inherited differently than either genes or body parts. 
For this reason, the manner in which the genealogical account is to be completed will 
depend on the type of character in question—thence the need for local, not global enrich-
ment. These local differences in the nature of inheritance matter for two reasons. First, 
from the standpoint of phylogenetic systematics, comparisons between character states 
that do not belong to the same transformation series introduce error into the process of 
phylogeny reconstruction (Fitch 1970). As accurate identification of transformational 
homologs is essential, it is necessary to understand how different kinds of characters are 
inherited. 
                                               
33 This argument resembles others in the literature on homology (Wagner 1989, p. 1158; 
Müller and Newman 1999, p. 65; Laublichler 2014, p. 73). These authors defend the need 
for a developmental account of homology, but do not draw the broader conclusion about 
the need for enriched accounts. 
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Second, though phylogenetic systematics is the basis for the genealogical account of 
homology, homology matters beyond systematics (Jamniczky 2005). For instance, under-
standing how a particular kind of character evolves requires establishing comparability 
for that kind of character. For example, during the modern synthesis, the attempt to un-
cover the genetic basis of species differences required identifying homologous genes 
across species (Spencer 1963). Likewise, contemporary evolutionary-developmental biol-
ogy’s attempt to explain the origin of morphological novelty requires contrasting the evo-
lution of genuine novelties from the (often extreme) modifications of pre-existing parts 
(Müller and Wagner 1991).34 
We should therefore expect that consideration of the local processes of descent for 
different kinds of characters will inflect our understanding of homology both within and 
beyond systematics. Consideration of these processes leads to accounts of homology that 
apply to only a limited subset of biological entities. These I refer to as enriched accounts 
of homology. 
 
4.4.2 Three Features of Enriched Accounts of Homology 
 
Enriched accounts of homology have three key features. Here, I state them dogmatically; 
the examples of the next two sections will justify my claims. 
First feature. Enriched accounts of homology apply to a more limited domain than 
the genealogical account of homology; enrichment is therefore local. For instance, the 
                                               
34 This distinction is controversial (Minelli 2016). The issue is treated below (Section 4.6). 
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enriched accounts considered below apply, respectively to genes (Section 4.5) and to (an-
imal) body parts and cell types (Section 4.6). These domains must be determined empiri-
cally. It happens to be the case that Günter Wagner’s account of homology applies to both 
body parts and cell types. It may turn out that Wagner’s account is wrong, and that these 
actually require separate enriched accounts. Further, it is an open question whether Wag-
ner’s account can be extended to the parts of plants. He suggests it can in at least some 
cases, but there are reasons to worry (Wagner 2014, chap. 12; Kendig 2016). There is no 
way to intuit what types of characters can be subsumed under a single enriched account. 
Second feature. Enriched accounts of homology are connected to the genealogical ac-
count of homology. This connection has two aspects. First, enriched accounts must pick 
out a type of homolog that is shared due to common ancestry, and that forms the basis 
for recognizing transformation series. Wagner’s enriched account of body part homology 
includes special homology, while the enriched account of gene homology includes orthol-
ogy (Figure 2). As mentioned above (Section 4.3), special homologs and orthologs stand 
in a one-to-many relationship to transformational homologs. Enriched accounts thus con-
strain but do not determine the choice of transformational homologs, and so play an im-
portant background role in the methodology of phylogenetic systematics. 
Second, enriched accounts must, for the relevant type of genealogical homolog, explain 
what it means for such homologs to be shared by descent. That is, enriched accounts must 
elucidate the particular processes that enable these parts to be related by descent. As we 
saw above, the genealogical account, because it presupposes the ability of parts to be so 
related, is internally incomplete. In explaining how such relationships are possible for a 
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particular kind of character, enriched accounts of homology complete the genealogical account 
within a limited domain. 
Third feature. Enriched accounts of homology include types of homology that do not 
fall under the genealogical account. This is because enriched accounts of homology ex-
plain homological sameness not in terms of a purely formal notion of ‘descent’, but rather 
in terms of the particular processes that make shared descent possible. It turns out (em-
pirically) that these enriched accounts of homological sameness can be applied in cases 
where the genealogical account cannot, yielding phenomena such as serial homology, 
paralogy, and xenology (Figure 2). While the genealogical account recognizes no connec-
tion between, e.g., special and serial homology (Cracraft 2005), there is such a connection, 
and this is captured by enriched accounts. 
In combination, these three features show that enriched accounts of homology overlap 
with the genealogical account but are not nested within it. Neither is complete without 
the other. The genealogical account unifies the application of ‘homology’ to many differ-
ent kinds of character, but only by ignoring the details that explain how these characters 
can be related by descent at all. In ignoring these details, it overlooks the real connections 
between genealogical homology (e.g. special homology and orthology) and non-genea-
logical homology (e.g. serial homology, paralogy, and xenology). Enriched accounts, by 
focusing on these details, are able to (a) explain the connections between genealogical 
and non-genealogical homology (third feature) and (b) explain how characters can be 
related by descent (second feature). Because enriched accounts apply only within limited 
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domains (first feature), however, the sense in which they are all accounts of homology is 
lost without the genealogical account, to which each is connected (second feature). 
That is why a compatibilist picture that recognizes the need for multiple co-existing 
accounts is correct. As noted above (Section 4.2), any viable compatibilist view must ex-
plain in what sense developmental and genealogical accounts of homology are accounts 
of the same thing. The framework just described satisfies this demand. In their regions of 
overlap, the genealogical account and a given enriched account provide different per-
spectives on the same phenomenon. The next two sections justify this framework by look-
ing in detail at two particular enriched accounts, one for gene homology and one for body 
part homology. 
 
 
 
4.5 THE ENRICHED ACCOUNT OF GENE HOMOLOGY 
 
Enriched accounts of homology complete the genealogical account within a limited do-
main. They do so by considering the processes that allow entities within that domain to 
be related by descent. In the case of DNA, these processes are well understood, with the 
result that homologizing genes is conceptually, though not always practically, a simple 
process. DNA consists of two anti-parallel strands with complementary nucleotide se-
quences. During replication, the strands are separated, with each strand serving as a tem-
plate for its complement, such that two new double-stranded DNA molecules are created, 
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each consisting of one old and one new strand. Though errors may occur in this process, 
it is generally quite faithful, with the result that the new molecules are nearly identical to 
each other and to the original. 
On this basis, an enriched account of gene homology emerges: genes (in this context, 
any stretch of DNA of interest) are homologous just in case they descended, via this rep-
lication mechanism, from the same stretch of DNA in a common ancestor. Thus far, this 
is just a genealogical account of homology that makes reference to the specific mechanism 
by which DNA is inherited. It possesses the first two features of enriched accounts, but 
not the third. However, the behavior of DNA during replication forces us to complicate 
the account. Occasionally, the molecular machinery required for replication “slips” and 
copies a particular stretch of DNA twice, resulting in a new DNA molecule with two 
genes that both descended from a single gene in the ancestor. Other mechanisms (e.g. 
unequal crossing over and mobile genetic elements) can also give rise to duplicated genes, 
or even to a duplication of the entire genome. 
Biologists thus recognize two sameness relations that can obtain between genes, both 
of which involve being descended from the same stretch of ancestral DNA. Two copies 
of the same gene that are the result of duplication and so coexist within a single organism 
are paralogs, while two copies of the same gene that are the result of speciation are 
orthologs. Only orthologs fall under the genealogical account of homology. Character 
states of paralogous genes cannot be treated as part of the same transformation series: 
“phylogenies require orthologous, not paralogous genes” (Fitch 1970, p. 113). Paralogy 
thus falls under the enriched account of gene homology, but not under the genealogical 
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account of homology, illustrating how enriched accounts expand the reference of ‘homol-
ogy’ beyond the domain of the genealogical account. 
Other features of how DNA is inherited complicate the account still further. Lateral 
gene transfer, in which stretches of DNA (not necessarily functional) are transferred be-
tween different species, is rampant among prokaryotes and known, though rare, in eu-
karyotes (Eme and Doolittle 2016). It allows for the same gene to be present in different 
species. Like orthologs, laterally transferred genes are the same gene in different species, 
and biologists perfectly readily speak of laterally transferred genes as “homologous” (e.g. 
Mohanraju et al, 2016). Unlike orthologs, however, laterally transferred genes produce 
tokogenetic rather than phylogenetic relationships between species, and so require the 
addition of a third category of gene homology: xenology (Gray and Fitch 1983).35 
Thus we can see that consideration of the mechanisms by which DNA is inherited is 
the basis for an enriched account of gene homology that possesses all three features of a 
locally enriched account. It applies to a limited class of biological entities, namely 
stretches of DNA. It can also apply to proteins (Fitch 1970), but not, for instance, to body 
parts or behaviors (first feature). It is connected to the genealogical account, explaining 
how it is possible for genes to stand in descent relationships, i.e. be orthologous (second 
feature). Lastly, the enriched account of gene homology expands the reference of 
                                               
35 Unlike paralogy, xenology is not simply a problem to be avoided in systematics. It is 
arguably a phenomenon to be included. Where xenology is prevalent, systematists can-
not simply assume that relationships between taxa can be captured by a strict tree, and 
must instead infer from the data to a phylogenetic network (Huson, Rupp, and 
Scornavacca 2010). However, whether one infers a tree or a network, one must still un-
dertake a sequence alignment step that furnishes the relevant transformation series, and 
this is presupposed, but not tested, by the data-to-tree/network inference. 
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‘homology’ by including paralogy and xenology, even though these are excluded by the 
genealogical account (third feature). 
 
 
 
4.6 WAGNER’S ENRICHED ACCOUNT OF BODY PART HOMOLOGY 
 
Understanding body part homology requires understanding development, and 
knowledge of developmental processes has played a role in determining body part ho-
mologies since at least the late 18th century (Goethe 2009; Owen 2007). The fertilized em-
bryo contains a nucleus (including DNA) and surrounding cytoplasm. In the strictest 
sense, that is all that an offspring inherits from its parents.36 Adult morphology must be 
developed epigenetically each generation. In contrast to DNA replication, a parent’s 
limbs do not serve as templates for its offspring’s limbs. Thus, when body parts are ho-
mologized, they are homologized in accordance with an enriched account distinct from 
the enriched account that applies when genes are homologized. The crucial consideration 
is the nature of the continuity between ancestral and descendant body parts. 
Because homology dissociates between genes and body parts (De Beer 1971; Wray 
and Abouheif 1998), body part homology cannot be easily reduced to gene homology 
                                               
36 The discussion of development in this section primarily applies to animal development, 
and it focuses exclusively on the role of gene regulation in development, ignoring the role 
of non-genetic resources that shape development. I exclude such considerations because 
they do not feature in Wagner’s account of body part homology. 
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(Brigandt 2002). Furthermore, homologous body parts may develop via different devel-
opmental pathways (De Beer 1971), and different body parts may develop from the same 
developmental precursors (Havstad, Assis, and Rieppel 2015). An enriched account of 
body part homology must be compatible with these phenomena. Specifically, any at-
tempt to explain body part homology in terms of shared developmental processes must 
(a) identify what developmental features are conserved between homologs and (b) ex-
plain why dissociation in other features is possible.37 
No consensus account of body part homology currently exists. I here present Günter 
Wagner’s (1989, 1994, 1999, 2014) account, not out of commitment to its correctness, but 
because it illustrates in detail what an enriched account of body part homology might 
look like.38 Wagner (1989, p. 1163) sets himself the task of accounting for three core ex-
plananda. First, homologous body parts share conserved features. Despite variation in 
form and function, there is deep evolutionary conservation of animal body plans, and an 
account of body part homology should explain why body plans are conserved. Second, 
homologous body parts are individualized, i.e. they possess “a certain minimal degree of 
complexity, differentiation, and genetic/epigenetic autonomy” (Wagner 1989, p. 1160). 
Wagner emphasizes variational individuality: the ability for genetic mutations to affect 
                                               
37 Some authors (Ramsey and Peterson 2012, 261; Currie 2014, 703) have used the mere 
fact of dissociation as an objection to developmental accounts of homology. This is a mis-
take. Dissociation in some respects does not entail dissociation in all. Dissociation is 
properly understood as an explanandum for accounts of body part homology, not as an 
objection to such accounts (cf. Wagner 2014, 90–93). 
38 Gerd Müller (2003) offers a distinct enriched account of body part homology. Ales-
sandro Minelli (2016) raises serious challenges to Wagner’s approach to homology. I defer 
discussion of these challenges to the end of this section. 
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one part but not another. Third, homologous body parts possess a single evolutionary 
origin and thus characterize a monophyletic taxon. 
The latest incarnation of Wagner’s account explains the conserved similarity, individ-
ualization, and phylogenetic uniqueness of homologs in terms of shared character iden-
tity networks, or ChINs (Wagner 2014, chap. 3). ChINs are gene regulatory network 
(GRN) subcircuits, usually wired in a positive feedback loop, that “form the interface 
between developmental signals and those genes that actually engender the morphologi-
cal character during morphogenesis and differentiation” (Wagner 2014, p. 97). 
Animal development involves the precise control of gene expression in space and time 
(Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 1).39 As the embryo develops, it is progressively subdi-
vided into more and more domains, each characterized by a distinct regulatory state. In 
this process, transient chemical signals furnish positional information that blocks out a 
domain. These signals activate a positive feedback loop that stabilizes the regulatory state 
of that region (Peter and Davidson 2015, chap. 6). Downstream of this positive feedback 
loop, “realizer” genes are expressed that are responsible for the formation of a particular 
body part within that domain (morphogenesis). This feedback loop (Wagner’s ChIN) sta-
bilizes the identity of the region, fating it to express a particular set of realizer genes. As 
lineages evolve and diverge, the realizer genes downstream of the ChIN can change, 
                                               
39 GRN theory in its current form is primarily applicable to animal development. How-
ever, developmental information is relevant for resolving homology assessments in 
plants as well (cf. Sajo, Longhi-Wagner, and Rudall 2008; Vrijdaghs et al. 2009; Golding 
and Ponder 2010; De-Paula et al. 2011) 
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leading to variation in form and function. So long as the ChIN is conserved, however, 
these body parts share what Wagner calls a “character identity”—they remain homolo-
gous. 
Just as the complications of DNA replication and lateral transfer forced the recogni-
tion of different types of gene homology, so the complications of development force the 
recognition of different types of body part homology. Wagner ties homology to character 
identity. Character identity can be shared across species (special homology), as in the case 
of the dugong’s fin and the bat’s wing. However, it can also be shared within an individ-
ual (serial homology). The dugong, after all, has two pectoral fins, and the bat two wings. 
If Wagner’s account is correct, this is because the same ChIN is activated in two regions 
of the embryo. 
Wagner’s account can explain all three explananda described above. Because ChINs 
are recursively wired, and because they are responsible for ensuring the expression of an 
entire suite of genes essential for body part development, they are likely to be refractory 
to evolutionary change (Davidson and Erwin 2006). They thus tend to be conserved, even 
as the downstream genes they regulate are gradually changed. Wagner can thus explain 
the sense in which two body parts can retain the same identity despite substantial modi-
fications of form and function. 
Wagner can also explain the individualization of body parts. A given gene can come 
to be regulated by a given ChIN without necessarily being regulated by any other ChIN. 
Body parts whose development is controlled by distinct ChINs can therefore vary inde-
pendently. At the same time, Wagner can explain why individualization is often 
 134 
incomplete. Serial homologs, in which the same ChIN is activated in multiple regions of 
the embryo, tend to vary in tandem because a downstream gene activated in one serial 
homolog is likely to be activated in every other. 
Lastly, any individual ChIN emerges in a particular lineage at a particular time and, 
unless it is modified or lost, can be found in all members of that lineage. In this way, 
Wagner captures the phylogenetic uniqueness of homologs. 
Wagner’s account of body part homology has all three features of enriched accounts 
of homology. It applies only to a limited domain of biological entities, namely animal 
body parts. Wagner (2014, chap. 8) also extends his account to cell types, on the grounds 
that cell type identity is also determined by ChINs (first feature). Wagner’s account is tied 
to the genealogical account, because character identities are phylogenetically unique. By 
tying character identity to the expression of conserved ChINs, Wagner explains how 
body parts can be shared due to descent from a common ancestor, even as they are mod-
ified. Wagner’s special homologs are thus the proper basis for recognizing transformation 
series (second feature). Lastly, Wagner’s account expands the reference of ‘homology’ to 
include serial homology, which is not covered by the genealogical account (third feature; 
Figure 2).40 
                                               
40 In this discussion, I have simplified things for ease of exposition. In fact, the appropriate 
bearer of character states is not the entire organism (or part) over the entire course of its 
life, but a suitably thick time-slice of the organism (part), called a semaphoront. In an ex-
cellent paper, Havstad, Assis, and Rieppel (2015) show that ontogenetic identity (identity 
of a part across the different semaphoronts of a single individual) and phylogenetic iden-
tity (identity of a part across evolutionary transformations) can come apart. For example, 
in Drosophila melanogaster, female genitalia develop from the embryonic segment A8. In 
males, however, A8 develops into a tergite-like structure (Keisman, Christiansen, and 
Baker 2001). A8 in females is phylogenetically identical to A8 in males, and it is 
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While Wagner’s account of homology illustrates what an enriched account of animal 
body part homology might look like, it is controversial. In a recent paper, Alessandro 
Minelli (2016) argues that Wagner is too sanguine about the manner in which body parts 
remain “the same” over time, even as their features change. On Wagner’s account, body 
parts possess an underlying identity that persists even as the features of those parts 
change. Wagner thus has a two-layer ontology, in which characters possess both an iden-
tity (determined by their underlying ChIN) and a particular realized state (determined 
by the operation of downstream realizer genes). Minelli rejects this approach in favor of 
a single-layer ontology. On Minelli’s view, traits are to be understood as “complex and 
ever-changing intersections of an indeterminate number of features.” This disagreement 
has further consequences. Wagner’s approach lends itself to the traditional assumption 
that homology is an all-or-nothing relation (cf. Fitch 2000), while Minelli favors a combi-
natorial approach to homology that allows for parts to be partially homologous. Relat-
edly, Wagner’s account permits a sharp distinction between the origin of novel features 
and their respective diversification, while Minelli’s account denies the possibility of 
drawing such a distinction. 
The crucial question, for the purposes of this chapter, concerns the basis for Minelli’s 
objections. Here Minelli is explicit that his criticisms are founded on an understanding of 
                                               
ontogenetically identical to the adult female genitalia. Likewise, A8 in males is ontoge-
netically identical to the tergite-like structure. Yet the female genitalia and the male 
tergite-like structure are not homologous. Over the course of development, a homologous 
precursor develops into non-homologous structures. One task of an enriched account is 
to explain why this is so. Wagner’s account would analyze such cases as involving ini-
tially homologous precursors that come to express non-homologous ChINs. 
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how body parts are inherited, which includes their manner of development. He accepts 
that there exist conserved developmental modules, but argues that these modules are 
related to body parts in a many-to-many fashion: many such modules go into the building 
of any single part, and each individual module is used in the building of distinct parts. 
Body parts are thus the product of a “peculiar intersection (both spatial and temporal) of 
developmental modules” (Minelli 2016, p. 49). This has two implications: first, that there 
are no grounds for a Wagnerian two-layer ontology, since all developmental modules are 
on a par; and, second, that these intersections, due simply to the number of modules they 
involve, are unlikely to be deeply conserved. 
Though Minelli’s account challenges Wagner’s at crucial points, it serves the same 
basic function: it attempts to explain how it is that body parts can be related by descent. 
That is, Minelli challenges Wagner not by denying the need for an enriched account of 
body part homology, but by offering a competing enriched account. Whichever view of 
body part homology should prove correct, my central contention—that some enriched 
account is needed—stands. 
 
 
 
4.7 ENRICHED ACCOUNTS OF HOMOLOGY ARE LOCAL 
 
I have shown how consideration of the processes by which characters are inherited leads 
to the development of enriched accounts of gene and body part homology. The 
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genealogical account is unifying in the sense that it furnishes abstract requirements that 
all (genealogically) homologous characters must meet: they must be shared due to com-
mon descent. The ability of particular kinds characters to satisfy these requirements de-
pends on concrete processes by which those kinds of characters are inherited. These pro-
cesses are distinct for different kinds of characters. Genes are homologous in case they 
descend via replication from the same ancestral sequence. Body parts are homologous (if 
Wagner is right) in case they develop via the activation of shared ChINs. Enriched ac-
counts thus show how it is possible to satisfy the requirements of the genealogical ac-
count within particular domains. 
A central feature of the framework I have presented and defended is that these en-
riched accounts are local, in the sense that they apply to different domains. According to 
this framework, biologists work with more than two accounts of homology (one genea-
logical and one enriched). They work with one genealogical account and multiple en-
riched accounts, each with its particular, limited domain. My aim in this section is to de-
fend this claim against an objection. 
The objection I have in mind claims that enriched accounts are more unified than I 
have let on. Granting that, at the level of details, enriched accounts are clearly distinct, 
the objection claims that the resulting pictures, conceived more abstractly, share certain 
structural similarities. In this regard, only a single enriched account is required. Such a 
view might be motivated by considering an apparent structural similarity between the 
two enriched accounts provided above. For both gene and body part homology, we can 
distinguish the same part/gene in different species (special homology, orthology) from 
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the same part/gene in a single organism (serial homology, paralogy). It is true that the 
enriched account of gene homology recognizes xenology, whereas Wagner’s enriched ac-
count of body part homology involves nothing of the sort. However, there is no concep-
tual difficulty in imagining a laterally transferred ChIN, merely a host of practical diffi-
culties. 
On this basis, one might suggest that there is a basic template for constructing en-
riched accounts. No matter what processes are responsible for the inheritance of a partic-
ular type of character, there are three ways in which two tokens of that character type 
might be related. They might be related in different species due to shared descent (special 
homology, orthology), or in different species due to lateral transfer (xenology), or in a 
single individual due to duplication (serial homology, paralogy). In some cases, one or 
more of these conceptual possibilities may be unrealized (as there is no analog of xen-
ology for animal body parts), but these three conceptual possibilities are exhaustive, no 
matter the type of character. 
I do not deny that enriched accounts will involve some subset of these three possibil-
ities. However, I contend that, despite these similarities, the differences between distinct 
enriched accounts are more important. In the remainder of this section, I consider special 
homology and orthology, in order to illustrate the nature of these differences and the 
reasons they matter.41 
                                               
41 For reasons of space, I do not discuss serial homology and paralogy, but similar con-
siderations apply.  
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On Wagner’s (2014, pp. 58–65) account of body part homology, two types of special 
homologs are recognized: strict special homologs and variational modalities. Variational 
modalities capture cases where special homologs come in two or more distinct forms. The 
tetrapod limb and teleost fin are special homologs, even though they are structurally 
quite distinct. The array of actual fin forms occupies a distinct region of morphospace 
than the array of actual limb forms. They are thus two variational modalities of the same 
special homolog. Note that this is a structural distinction. In the case of gene homology, 
however, no similar structural distinction can be drawn. 
Among genetic phenomena, the closest corresponding distinction is between 
orthologs that share a molecular function and orthologs that serve distinct molecular 
functions (Wagner 2014, p. 80). The defining difference is in terms of molecular function, 
in contrast to the case of body parts, where the difference is in terms of variational prop-
erties. It is true that orthologs with different molecular functions are likely to occupy dis-
crete regions of sequence space, and so generate a pattern similar to variational modali-
ties. But it is shared function that creates this pattern. By contrast, a tetrapod limb is a 
tetrapod limb even if it serves, as in the case of a whale’s flipper, the same function as a 
fish fin. 
In short, it is possible to draw a structural division between types of special homolog, 
but not between types of ortholog. This matters for understanding how special homologs 
and orthologs evolve. Special homologs are subject to both developmental and functional 
constraints, whereas orthologs are subject only to functional constraints. As Amundson 
(1994) has argued, developmental and functional constraints have distinct evolutionary 
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implications and should not be conflated. The reason for this difference lies in the nature 
of the homological sameness relation. Body parts are homologous if they share the same 
character identity. This requires sharing an underlying ChIN, which in turn constrains 
their patterns of variability. The mechanisms of DNA replication do not furnish any com-
parable constraints on variability. 
These differences between special homology and orthology point to a deeper differ-
ence in how these two enriched accounts explain sameness “under every modification of 
form and function.” The genealogical account explains this in terms of shared descent 
(with modification). Because the genealogical account refers homology to historical origin, 
it permits potentially unlimited divergence after that origin. No amount of subsequent 
divergence can change the fact that two parts share a common origin. The genealogical 
account by itself thus places no constraints on subsequent divergence. 
But, as we saw above (Section 4.4), the genealogical account is incomplete. It furnishes 
abstract requirements that homologous characters must satisfy, but does not consider the 
specific processes of inheritance that make the satisfaction of these requirements possible. 
Once the details are considered, limits to divergence may be discovered. In Wagner’s 
theory of body part homology, what is homologized are character identities, as fixed by 
ChINs. Preserving body part homology thus requires the evolutionary conservation of 
ChINs. Homology-preserving divergence is limited to divergence that occurs via the 
modification of the genes downstream of the relevant ChIN. Wagner’s account thus 
makes the conservation of particular similarities essential to the conservation of homo-
logical sameness. 
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By contrast, the mechanisms of DNA replication set no limits on divergence. Two 
stretches of DNA in different species may be homologous (descended via replication 
from the same stretch in a common ancestor) even if, over evolutionary time, every single 
nucleotide has diverged between the two sequences. Unlike the case of body part homol-
ogy, no particular similarities are essential to the preservation of homology. It is true that 
the recognition of orthologous DNA sequences requires the preservation of sufficient 
similarity to distinguish similarity due to common descent from similarity due to chance 
(Strimmer, von Haeseler, and Salemi 2009, pp. 137–40). However, the difficulty of recog-
nizing that two highly dissimilar sequences are related by descent does not change the 
fact that they are so related. Even leaving that point aside, recognizing orthology requires 
only a sufficient degree of overall similarity, not similarity in any particular subset of 
bases. Wagner’s account of body part homology, by contrast, sets no limits on overall 
dissimilarity, so long as the essential similarity (the ChIN) is preserved. 
The enriched accounts of body part homology and gene homology thus lead to im-
portantly divergent pictures of how these different kinds of characters evolve. These dif-
ferences matter both within systematics (recall that inferring phylogenies from morpho-
logical or molecular data requires adopting a model of how the characters used evolve) 
and in the study of evolutionary change more generally. Thus, the surface similarities 
between orthology and special homology are just that: superficial. Enrichment truly is 
local, ineliminably dependent on the particular processes involved in the inheritance of 
particular kinds of characters. 
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4.8 RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF HOMOLOGY 
 
According to the framework I am defending, developmental accounts of homology 
should be understood as enriched accounts of body part homology. Other enriched ac-
counts arise when other kinds of characters (genes, behaviors, etc.) are homologized. 
These enriched accounts are not in competition with the genealogical account of homol-
ogy. Rather, they complete (and extend) that account within particular domains. 
This compatibilist view of the relationship between enriched accounts and the genea-
logical account is tenable only if the four sources of tension between genealogical and 
developmental accounts (Section 4.2) can be resolved. My aim in this section is to show 
that the framework I have offered eliminates these tensions. 
The first tension concerns the nature of homological sameness. Genealogical accounts 
say that homologous parts are the same in virtue of their shared descent. ‘Descent’ here 
is understood purely formally, in the context of the methodology of phylogenetic system-
atics. There are multiple mechanisms that can produce such descent relationships be-
tween parts: replication in the case of genes, development controlled by a ChIN in the 
case of body parts. In saying that body parts are homologous because they share the same 
character identity, Wagner is not denying the genealogical account. He is explaining how 
it is possible that body parts can answer to that account’s formal requirements. This point 
is not limited to Wagner’s account. Other enriched accounts are compatible with the 
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genealogical account for the same reason: one of their key features is that they explain 
how characters can be shared due to descent. Thus the first tension disappears. 
The second tension concerns the amount of dissimilarity between homologs that each 
account permits. Developmental accounts limit the amount of allowable dissimilarity be-
tween homologs. Genealogical accounts do not. This generates no inconsistency, how-
ever. The key consideration here is that the genealogical account imposes purely formal 
requirements on homology, in terms of the topology of phylogenetic trees. Because the 
genealogical account says nothing about what it is to be the same character, it is silent 
about the degree to which homologs can diverge. For this, we must look to enriched ac-
counts. Wagner’s developmental account says that body part homology requires the con-
servation of the underlying ChIN. By contrast, in the case of genes, the appropriate en-
riched account does not require the conservation of any essential similarity. The genea-
logical account is consistent with both. It permits but does not require the possibility of 
complete dissimilarity. Similar considerations apply to the issue of dissociation. The ge-
nealogical account is consistent with all kinds of dissociation, while developmental ac-
counts reveal limits to the dissociation that is actually possible.42 The second tension dis-
appears along with the first. 
                                               
42 This point is very important, and not always recognized. For instance, Jenner (2006) 
accuses Wagner’s account of homology of failing to respect that homologs, like taxa, are 
individuals, not classes (cf. Ghiselin 2005b). The problem, Jenner argues, is that Wagner 
does not allow for homologs to diverge indefinitely. Jenner’s error is to attempt to draw 
a physical conclusion from a conceptual point. It is true that no amount of divergence can, 
simply in virtue of being divergence, erase common ancestry. But one cannot conclude from 
this, as Jenner does, that the physical mechanisms underlying inheritance cannot be such 
that, in reality, they forbid indefinite divergence. 
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The third tension concerns the role of serial homology: the genealogical account ex-
cludes it, while developmental accounts include it. Here it is important to see that the 
term ‘homology’ covers multiple distinct (though related and overlapping) phenomena. 
Genealogical sameness (shared descent) and developmental sameness (shared ChIN) are 
distinct types of sameness. There is no special homology of body parts without the over-
lap of both of them. It is in virtue of sharing a ChIN that body parts are able to stand in 
descent relationships. Thus, in this region of overlap, developmental sameness is part of 
the account of what genealogical sameness is. 
But neither sameness relation is limited to this region of overlap. Genealogical same-
ness is shared by other kinds of characters that lack developmental sameness altogether 
(e.g. genes) or that lack the specific kind of developmental sameness (conserved ChINs) 
shared by body parts (e.g. behaviors). Equally, character identity is shared not just among 
special homologs, but also among serial homologs. The third tension, too, has vanished. 
The fourth tension concerns the proper target of homology assessments: characters or 
character states. We are now in position to see that this is misleading. “Character” is am-
biguous here: it can refer both to transformation series (e.g. number of digits) and to the 
parts that underlie these transformation series (e.g. the vertebrate forelimb). Since we al-
ready have the term ‘transformation series’ for the former, I will use ‘character’ for the 
latter. Then we can distinguish three targets of homology assessment: (1) characters (spe-
cial homologs, orthologs, etc.), (2) transformation series, and (3) character states. As we 
have seen, the genealogical account covers all three (Figure 2). Genealogical and devel-
opmental accounts overlap in the first category and, insofar as developmental accounts 
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constrain (without determining) the identification of transformation series, also the sec-
ond. Homologizing character states is indeed peculiar to the genealogical account, but 
there is no incompatibility here. Both accounts agree that characters and transformation 
series can be homologized. About homologizing character states, developmental ac-
counts are simply silent. And so the fourth tension disappears along with the rest. 
In the end, we can see that there is truth in both of the traditional views about the 
relationship between genealogical and developmental accounts of homology. Those who 
have treated them as antagonistic have correctly recognized that they cover, at least in 
part, the same phenomena. The genealogical sameness of body part homologs is not a 
wholly distinct phenomenon from their developmental sameness. Rather, their develop-
mental sameness is precisely what allows them to be genealogically the same. Thus, the 
two accounts had better be consistent in what they say about special homology. None-
theless, the compatibilists are correct that they cannot be unified into a single account. 
The developmental sameness relationship (and enriched sameness relationships more 
generally) can be instantiated in cases where genealogical sameness is not (e.g. serial ho-
mology), and vice versa (e.g. orthology). Genealogical and enriched accounts overlap but 
are not identical. Where they overlap, they are compatible. Where they do not overlap, 
the issue fails to arise. 
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4.9 OTHER ACCOUNTS OF HOMOLOGY 
 
I am not the first to attempt to bridge the gap between genealogical and developmental 
accounts of homology. Recently, Brigandt (2007) and Ramsey and Peterson (2012) have 
defended accounts with similar aims. Ramsey and Peterson defend a genealogical ac-
count of homology that incorporates input from developmental biology, while Brigandt 
defends a developmental account of homology that fits with systematic practice. I con-
tend that the framework I have defended marks an improvement over both. It is compat-
ible with Brigandt’s account but has greater generality, and it preserves the advantages 
of Ramsey and Peterson’s account without sharing that account’s central flaw (discussed 
below). I discuss them in turn. 
Brigandt is concerned, as I am, to make sense of the relations between genealogical 
and developmental accounts of homology. But whereas I begin from genealogical ac-
counts and expand outward to enriched accounts (including developmental accounts), 
Brigandt starts with development. He characterizes homologs as units of heritable phe-
notypic variability—i.e. as characters that can take different character states. Understand-
ing the developmental sameness of body part homologs offers an explanation for why it 
is possible to perform phylogenetic analyses that take for granted the existence of char-
acters that come in different character states. 
According to the framework I have defended, Brigandt can be understood as showing 
how a developmental account of homology fulfills the function of an enriched account. 
Brigandt does not, however, draw the conclusion that such accounts are required for 
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every kind of character used in phylogenetic analysis. Philosophical work on homology 
has focused on understanding the legitimate roles (if any) of a developmental account of 
body part homology, largely ignoring the fact that there has long existed an enriched 
account of gene homology. In fact, however, the situation is exactly comparable in the 
two cases. My aim has been to draw attention to this more general state of affairs, while 
Brigandt’s aim, expressed in my terminology, was to look at the proper role of a particular 
enriched account. Our views are compatible, and complementary. 
I turn now to Ramsey and Peterson’s genealogical account of homology. They argue 
that a single definition of ‘homology’ can be offered that (a) incorporates the role of in-
formation about the mechanisms of descent and (b) subsumes all legitimate uses of the 
term (including serial homology and paralogy). They present an abstract schema for how 
to include information about descent mechanisms. As this schema applies in all cases, 
they can be seen as offering a fully general template for constructing enriched accounts. 
I aim to show that this template imposes arbitrary restrictions on the nature of the rela-
tions between different types of character. 
Ramsey and Peterson begin with a straightforward genealogical account of homology. 
Traits T and T* belonging, respectively, to organisms O and O* are homologous if they 
are present in every organism along the shortest path (on a phylogenetic tree) connecting 
O and O*. But there is a problem: there can be failures of continuity that do not undermine 
homology. For instance, sexually dimorphic traits need not be continuously present. The 
posterior lobe is a male-specific genital structure found in certain Drosophila species. Sup-
pose a male has a female offspring, who in turn has a male offspring. In this case, the 
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female lacks the structure (violating continuity), and yet clearly the lobes in the males are 
homologous. 
What is required here is some account of how such characters are inherited, an ac-
count that explains how a part can remain the same through descent despite such viola-
tions of continuity—an enriched account, in other words. Moreover, though the example 
I chose involved a morphological structure, such violations of continuity can affect other 
kinds of character as well, for instance behaviors. Ramsey and Peterson provide a gen-
eral-purpose solution to this problem. 
Ramsey and Peterson’s solution rests on the assertion that there exist distinct biolog-
ical levels that stand in a strict ordering, such that for a given level LN-1 (e.g., develop-
ment), one can distinguish a higher level LN (morphology) and a lower level LN-2 (genes). 
They then allow for violations of continuity at LN provided that there is continuity at LN-
1, but not if continuity is only preserved at LN-2. For instance, a violation of continuity at 
the morphological level might be bridged by continuity at the developmental level, but 
not by continuity at the genetic level. Though they make the point using the morphology, 
development, and genes as example levels, their claim is general. Whatever levels biolo-
gists identity, violations of continuity can be bridged by continuity at the next level down, 
but no lower. 
This account assumes the existence of an objective (i.e. research agenda-independent) 
hierarchy of levels in biology, with a clear ordering, such that it is unambiguous, given a 
particular LN, what is LN-1 and what is LN-2. At a minimum, this assumption requires 
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further elaboration.43 Levels are not simply size scales, given that developmental pro-
cesses involve entities at both genetic and morphological size scales. Moreover, whereas 
genes and morphological parts are entities, development is a process involving those en-
tities. Thus, it is unclear what it means to say that development is a level intermediate 
between the genetic and the morphological levels. 
Even granting the assumption, however, their account runs into serious trouble. In 
trying to solve the problem of failures of continuity, Ramsey and Peterson recognize the 
need for understanding how characters are inherited—the need, that is, for an enriched 
account. The role of this account is to show how a character can be continuously inherited 
even if the character itself, for whatever reason, fails to appear in particular individuals. 
What Ramsey and Peterson’s account does is to impose a restriction on what enriched 
accounts can include: they can involve continuity at LN-1, but not at LN-2. I contend, how-
ever, that this restriction is arbitrary, and that it runs the risk of ruling out successful 
enriched accounts of homology on illegitimate grounds. 
For example, consider Wagner’s account of body part homology, taking body parts as 
LN. If we take ChINs as LN-1, his account fits their schema. But ChINs are almost certainly 
not LN-1. Suppose we accept Ramsey and Peterson’s distinction of three levels: morpho-
logical, developmental, and genetic. On this division of levels, ChINs arguably fit best at 
the genetic level. Gene regulatory networks are based on regulatory information encoded 
in cis-regulatory DNA sequences. True, ChIN activation depends on processes of gene 
regulation that can reasonably be treated as developmental. In the case of our lobeless 
                                               
43 For critique of this assumption, see Currie (2014). 
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female Drosophila, however, the (hypothetical) ChIN is never activated, so the violation 
of continuity extends to these processes. All the female inherits is the underlying genetic 
information—LN-2. 
Nonetheless, we may wish to treat gene networks, which involve a great deal of ge-
netic information distributed throughout the genome, as a level distinct from that of sin-
gle genes. Salazar-Ciudad and Jernvall (2013) have made a recent proposal along these 
lines. They, however, distinguish three levels below morphology: genes, gene networks, 
and epigenetic networks. ChINs, once again, are LN-2. Finally, even if we set aside these 
issues and allow that gene networks are one level below morphology, it is questionable 
whether all morphological characters belong to a single level. Morphology includes quite 
distinct kinds of characters besides morphological parts, such as tissues, cell types, and 
organelles. Many analyses treat them separately, including, pertinently, those based on 
GRN theory (Wagner 1989, 2014; Peter and Davidson 2015). 
No matter how Ramsey and Peterson choose to flesh out ‘level’, then, we will almost 
certainly be forced to recognize at least one level intervening between ChINs and body 
parts. Thus, Wagner’s account is illegitimate, according to Ramsey and Peterson’s schema. 
This is exactly the wrong result. Wagner’s account, if correct, solves the very problem 
that motivated their schema. It explains how body parts can be continuously inherited 
despite violations of continuity at the morphological level. In insisting that continuity be 
preserved at LN-1, Ramsey and Peterson arbitrarily limit the search space for solutions to 
the problem they identify. There is no reason to expect that the world will respect these 
limitations, as Wagner’s theory shows. 
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Nonetheless, Ramsey and Peterson do have a reason for imposing this limitation: 
without it, they worry, cases of spurious continuity will be admitted. Here they are con-
cerned about cases of deep homology, in which independently evolved structures make 
use of homologous genetic resources. For example, homologous transcription factors 
(Eyeless in Drosophila, PAX6 in mice) play important roles in eye development in their 
respective taxa (Shubin, Tabin, and Carroll 2009). Our best evidence, however, suggests 
that eyes evolved independently in these lineages. In this sense, deeply “homologous” 
structures are not really homologous at all. Ramsey and Peterson’s account can account 
for this: deep homology involves genetic continuity (LN-2), but developmental disconti-
nuity (LN-1). 
But, while they get the right result, they get it for the wrong reason. The trouble with 
deep homology isn’t that it involves violations of continuity at both LN and LN-1. The 
reason why deep homology is not genuine homology is that it does not solve the problem 
posed by such violations. Eyeless and PAX6 are implicated in a conserved pathway in-
volved in opsin production. But opsin production is not eye production, and the eyes that 
rely on this conserved pathway evolved independently. That is why the continuous pres-
ence (the homology) of the underlying pathway does not ensure the homology of the 
structure. It has nothing to do with the level at which the continuity occurs. If Wagner 
(2014, pp. 102–5) is right, there is a conserved ChIN underlying insect eyes, and this is at 
the same level as the opsin pathway (indeed, it includes the gene that codes for Eyeless). 
Unlike the opsin pathway, however, this ChIN is crucial for establishing eye identity. It 
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is this difference that explains why one, but not the other, can account for the preservation 
of homology across violations of continuity. 
The difficulty with Ramsey and Peterson’s account stems from their attempt to im-
pose an arbitrary restriction on what an enriched account of homology can look like. Be-
yond setting out a problem that such accounts must solve (the problem of failures of con-
tinuity), they claim that any adequate solution must involve only a very particular sort of 
lower-level continuity, regardless of the sort of character under discussion. But it is a 
matter for empirical determination, not stipulation, what sort of continuity can and can-
not solve the problem. 
I conclude that, instead of trying to find a single schema that can simultaneously per-
form the unifying work of the genealogical account and the detailed work of locally en-
riched accounts, we should accept that ‘homology’ has a fine structure of the sort illus-
trated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
4.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter, I have presented a general framework for understanding how distinct 
accounts of homology are related. The core claim I have defended is that there is a fine 
structure underlying uses of ‘homology’, consisting of a single genealogical account and 
multiple locally enriched accounts (Figure 2). I have argued that recognizing the existence 
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of this fine structure dissolves the several alleged sources of tension between genealogical 
and developmental accounts of homology. 
The genealogical account unifies the application of ‘homology’ to all kinds of biolog-
ical characters by showing they can all play the same formal role in phylogenetic system-
atics. It does so by relying on notions of ‘descent’ and ‘character’ that abstract away from 
the processes by which characters are inherited. All that is required is that characters 
stand in phylogenetic relationships.  
Because of this, however, the genealogical account takes for granted the existence of 
transformational homologs: stable characters that can come in multiple distinct states. 
Recognizing transformational homologs requires consideration of the manner in which 
characters are inherited. Accounts of homology that consider such information are en-
riched accounts of homology. 
Enriched accounts of homology have three key features. First, they apply to a limited 
domain, i.e. they are locally, not globally enriched. Second, they are connected to the ge-
nealogical account. This connection has two aspects: (a) enriched accounts overlap with 
the genealogical account concerning certain phenomena (e.g. special homology and 
orthology), and (b) within the region of overlap, enriched accounts complete the genea-
logical account by explaining how it is possible for a particular kind of character to stand 
in descent relationships. Third, enriched accounts expand the reference of ‘homology’ 
beyond what is covered by the genealogical account, including such phenomena as serial 
homology, paralogy, and xenology. 
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According to this framework, genealogical and developmental accounts of homology 
are compatible and inextricably intertwined. Specifically, developmental accounts of ho-
mology are to be understood as one type of enriched account of homology, applying 
within a particular domain. Once this is recognized, developmental accounts are seen to 
be consistent with and indeed complementary to the genealogical account in the regions 
where they overlap. 
I have defended a compatibilist view of the relationship between different accounts 
of homology. I have tried, not merely to register that distinct accounts serve distinct func-
tions, but to make clear in what sense the accounts, despite their differences, concern the 
same thing. The key lies in recognizing the fine structure that binds together the many 
different uses of the term. 
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5.0 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
 
 
 
“The forms of the spicules are the result of adaptation to the requirements 
of the sponge as a whole, produced by the action of natural selection upon 
variation in every direction.” (Minchin 1898, 569) 
 
 
“It would scarcely be possible to illustrate more briefly and more cogently 
than by these few words [...] the fundamental difference between the Dar-
winian conception of the causation and determination of Form, and that 
which is based on, and characteristic of, the physical sciences.” (Thompson 
1992, 693, commenting on Minchin) 
 
 
 
 
5.1 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
 
The history of biology is mottled with conflicts between structuralists and functionalist 
(Russell 1982; Asma 1996; Amundson 2005). The fiery dispute between Georges Cuvier 
and Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire before the French Academy of Sciences, during which 
the two grand principles of Conditions of Existence and Unity of Type struggled for dom-
inance, is perhaps most famous (Appel 1987), but that is only the beginning. The debate 
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also played out in England in the divergent approaches of Richard Owen (2007) and 
Charles Darwin (1964). In the 20th century, Richard Goldschmidt (1982) and Otto Schinde-
wolf (1993) offered structuralist critiques of the modern synthesis (Dobzhansky 1982; 
Mayr 1982; Simpson 1982). The rise of evolutionary-developmental biology around the 
1980s generated (and continues to generate) new structure/function disputes (Webster 
and Goodwin 1982; Hughes and Lambert 1984; Alberch 1989; Ho and Saunders 1993; 
Kauffman 1993; Webster and Goodwin 1996; Newman and Bhat 2008). And, of course, 
there is the conflict between Thompson and Minchin highlighted in the epigraph. The list 
could be extended ad nauseam. 
I have begun with a list of examples rather than with a characterization of the two 
competing positions, because the examples make perspicuous the major difficulty facing 
any attempt to develop such a characterization. What the examples show is that structur-
alism and functionalism have survived 200+ years of often drastic theoretical change in 
biology. Structuralism must be broad enough to capture Owen, Thompson, and Alberch; 
functionalism must subsume Lamarck, Minchin, and Mayr. At the same time, the posi-
tions must avoid being so broad as to be vacuous. My aim in this chapter is to develop an 
account of the nature of structuralism and functionalism that satisfies these desiderata. 
Structuralism and functionalism are generally characterized in terms of the relative 
explanatory priority of structure and function: structuralists say that structure is explan-
atorily prior to function, while functionalists say the opposite (Russell 1982; Amundson 
2005; Boucher 2015). Local structure/function disputes (over, say, the form of the spicules 
in sponges) then arise when structuralists and functionalists provide competing answers 
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to particular questions. On this approach, structuralism and functionalism, as positions 
or stances endorsed by individual scientists, are primary. Structure/function disputes are 
then characterized in terms of localized conflicts between these background positions or 
stances. 
In this chapter, I take the opposite approach. I argue that local structure/function dis-
putes are primary, and that structuralism and functionalism as background positions are 
secondary. More specifically, evolutionary biologists ask why-questions about the evolu-
tion of organismal form. These questions ask why X evolved rather than Y. Such ques-
tions can have either structuralist or functionalist answers, where the requisite notions of 
structuralist and functionalist answers can be precisely specified. On this basis, we can 
characterize structuralists as those who tend to give structuralist answers to the conten-
tious why-questions of their day (and similarly for functionalists). Nonetheless, structur-
alists will happily give functionalist answers, and functionalists will happily give struc-
turalist answers, to many why-questions. Moreover, the background theories that drive 
structuralists may be quite different, and so for functionalists. 
The crucial piece of the analysis, in which the notion of structuralist and functionalist 
answers to why-questions is developed, comes late (Section 5.6), as substantial prep work 
is needed to motivate the view. I begin by arguing that standard presentations of struc-
turalism and functionalism in terms of explanatory priority misdiagnose the issue. The 
disagreement concerns the proper role of function in explaining form (Section 5.2). I then 
discuss Darwin’s functionalism and the key wrinkles his innovations introduced into 
structure/function disputes, as well as what they left unchanged (Section 5.3). With 
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evolutionary theory in the picture, I introduce the crucial distinction between the gener-
ation and the spread of variation (Section 5.4). I show that, in an evolutionary context, 
structure/function disputes stem from disagreements over issues concerning the gener-
ation of variation (Section 5.5). This then motivates my analysis of structuralist and func-
tionalist answers to why-questions: structuralist answers involve the generation of vari-
ation, while functionalist answers involve the spread of variation (Section 5.6). Finally, I 
consider the status of structuralism and functionalism in light of my analysis of struc-
ture/function disputes (Section 5.7). 
 
 
 
5.2 EXPLANATORY PRIORITY IS NOT THE ISSUE 
 
Standard presentations of structuralism and functionalism treat them as disagreeing over 
whether form is explanatorily prior to function (structuralism) or vice-versa (functional-
ism). Here, I argue that, while there is a clear sense in which functionalists treat function 
as prior to form, there is no corresponding sense in which structuralists treat form as prior 
to function. 
If structuralists and functionalists are to be understood as disagreeing over a matter 
of explanatory priority, then we need a characterization of explanatory priority. Here is 
a clear way to understand the issue: the explanans is prior to the explanandum. On this 
view, functionalists take function as explanans and structure as explanandum, and so 
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treat function as explanatorily prior to structure. Structuralists do the opposite. This ap-
pears to be how the issue is understood in much of the secondary literature. E. S. Russell 
(1982, ix), for instance, characterizes the debate as a dispute over the question, “Is func-
tion the mechanical result of form, or is form merely the manifestation of function or 
activity?” Stephen Asma (1996, 12) likewise writes, “the question was whether specific 
organic structure was the result of specific function or vice versa.” 
This picture is true enough in the case of the functionalists, but it gets structuralists 
entirely wrong. This is best appreciated in the light of some examples. For functionalists, 
consider Lamarck and Cuvier. Lamarck offered a transmutationist theory according to 
which novel structures arise as a result of the origin of new organismic needs.44 As or-
ganisms changed their behavior so as to better meet these needs, their behavior affected 
their physiology, leading to structural modifications inherited by their descendants. In 
this way, structural modifications arose in order to fulfill particular functions. Structure 
is explanandum; function is explanans. The same holds for Cuvier, who explained the 
features of organisms in terms of their conditions of existence (Coleman 1964; Burkhardt 
1977; Russell 1982). Organisms, for Cuvier, were tightly integrated, structured so as to be 
suited for a very particular form of life. That form of life determined its structure. Once 
again, structure is explanandum, while function is explanans. 
But now consider the manner in which Richard Owen, arch-structuralist, attempted 
to refute these functionalist views. Owen did not proceed by arguing that structure 
                                               
44 Lamarck’s theory also involved an environment-independent force that progressively 
drove organisms to greater complexity. This force is irrelevant to his functionalism, so I 
ignore it here. 
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explains function. Indeed, his arguments precluded that possibility altogether. In On the 
Nature of Limbs, Owen (2007) offered the example of the bat’s wing, the dugong’s fin, and 
the mole’s forelimb. Each of these is adapted to a different function: the bat’s wing for 
flight, the dugong’s fin for swimming, and the mole’s forelimb for digging. Nonetheless, 
each is structurally very similar. Each consists of the same bones in the same arrangement. 
The same structure thus serves many functions. Because of this one-to-many relationship 
between structure and function, Owen argued that function was impotent to explain 
these structural correspondences, or Unity of Type.45  
Note, however, that Owen’s argument equally forecloses the possibility of explaining 
function in terms of structure. If the structure is the same in each case, then structure is 
insufficient to explain the differences in function. Owen’s argument is a double-edged 
sword. In showing that function is not explanatorily prior to structure, it equally shows 
that structure is not explanatorily prior to function. But Owen was not sabotaging his 
own project, because Owen was not attempting to explain function at all. Owen was at-
tempting to explain structure, just as Lamarck and Cuvier were attempting to explain 
structure. He argued that function could not explain structure. True, the bat’s wing is 
admirably suited to flight, but the features that allow it to serve that function are minor 
modifications superimposed on a stable underlying structure. Function can explain those 
modifications, but not the archetypal structure that remains unchanged across multiple 
functions. 
                                               
45 Geoffroy made similar arguments (Appel 1987, 85; Asma 1996, 16). 
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Thus, for Owen, structure is independent of function, but it is not explanatorily prior 
to function. There is a sense in which structure is prior to function: functional modifica-
tions are superimposed on top of stable underlying structures. But this is not explanatory 
priority, at least not in the same sense. The claim that functionalists treat function as prior 
to structure, while structuralists treat structure as prior to function thus hides an equivo-
cation: the sense of “prior” is different in the two cases. Moreover, the claim does not 
point directly to the really important difference between Lamarck and Cuvier on one side 
and Owen on the other. 
The key issue at stake in the above structure/function dispute was the question: does 
function explain structure? The functionalists said yes. The structuralists said no. They 
shared exactly the same explanandum: both sought to explain structure. The disagree-
ment entirely centered on the explanans. Note that this characterization makes function-
alism a much more constrained position than structuralism. The functionalist must ex-
plain structure in terms of function. But the structuralist is only committed to denying 
that function explains structure.  
This characterization imposes no requirements on what a structuralist believes does 
explain structure. That’s appropriate, since structuralists have offered quite diverse ex-
planations of structure. Drawing on the list of structure/function disputes discussed ear-
lier, we can get a sense of this variety. Richard Owen (2007) explained structure in terms 
of a quasi-Platonic archetype that lay behind the observed variation (but see Camardi 
2001). Richard Goldschmidt (1982) and Pere Alberch and Emily Gale (1985) explain struc-
ture in terms of the potentialities of the developmental system to generate variants. 
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D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1992) and Stuart Newman and Ramray Bhat (2008) ex-
plain structure in terms of the action of physical forces. Despite these quite different 
(though not necessarily incompatible) explanations of structure, all minimize the explan-
atory role of function and are recognizable structuralists. 
Thus far, then, we can understand functionalists as those who explain structure in 
terms of function and structuralists as those who claim that structure is largely independ-
ent of function. We will later see that this characterization is incomplete (Section 5.6). 
Especially within an evolutionary context, there are substantive constraints on how one 
can explain structure and still be a structuralist. In consequence, one can deny that func-
tion explains structure without being a structuralist. But, for now, this characterization 
will suffice. 
 
 
 
5.3 DARWIN AND THE COMPLICATION OF FUNCTIONALISM 
 
Darwin took Owen’s challenge to functionalism seriously, and he used his evolutionary 
theory to develop more sophisticated resources for explaining structure in terms of func-
tion. In doing so, he reconfigured the nature of structure/function disputes in key ways. 
At the same time, key features of these disputes remain constant across the Darwinian 
revolution, and these constancies are equally important. 
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Owen, recall, had shown the impotence of function to explain structure on the 
grounds that the same structure in different species was used for many different func-
tions. Darwin recognized the force of this argument and, in his genial fashion, accommo-
dated it in his evolutionary theory. At the end of the sixth chapter of the Origin, Darwin 
(1964, 206) wrote: 
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on 
two great laws—Unity of Type, and the Conditions of Existence. By unity 
of type is meant that fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in 
organic beings of the same class, and which is quite independent of their 
habits of life. On my theory, unity of type is explained by unity of descent. 
The expression of conditions of existence, so often insisted on by the illus-
trious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of natural selection. For 
natural selection acts by either now adapting the varying parts of each be-
ing to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; or by having adapted 
them during long-past periods of time: the adaptations being aided in some 
cases by use and disuse, being slightly affected by the direct action of the 
external conditions of life, and being in all cases subjected to the several 
laws of growth. Hence, in fact, the law of the Conditions of Existence is the 
higher law; as it includes, through the inheritance of former adaptations, 
that of Unity of Type. 
 
Darwin made two crucial moves in this passage. First, he explained Unity of Type in 
terms of unity of descent. Dugongs, bats, and moles share structurally similar forelimbs 
because they all descended from the same ancestor, and that ancestor likewise had a fore-
limb with the same structural arrangement. Natural selection then caused this structure 
to diverge in different lineages to serve different functions (thus explaining the Condi-
tions of Existence). In this way, Darwin acknowledge and explained the central phenom-
enon motivating Owen’s structuralism. 
Darwin’s view, based just on the above, is not yet a functionalist view. So far, he seems 
to have granted Owen’s point entirely. Selection superimposes minor functional 
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modifications atop inherited structures. These structures are prior (in the literal, temporal 
sense) to their eventual functions. The role for functional considerations is, thus far, se-
verely limited. 
This is where the second move comes in. At the end of the passage, Darwin argued 
that Conditions of Existence is the “higher law” on the grounds that what an organism 
inherits are “former adaptations.” In this way, Darwin reduced Unity of Type to Condi-
tions of Existence. Yes, selection superimposes modifications on top of inherited structure, 
but that inherited structure is itself the product of past selection. Unity of Type is just a 
product of the fact that Conditions of Existence exert their influence over time, rather 
than statically, at a single moment of creation. 
By introducing history in this way, Darwin freed functionalist explanations from as-
sumptions of optimality. Any explanation of current structure requires a two-part ex-
planans: current function and past function. As Darwin put it in the B species notebook: 
“The condition of every animal is partly due to direct adaptation & partly to heredetary 
[sic] taint” (Barrett et al. 2008, 182). Past function explains ancestral structure, while cur-
rent function explains modifications to suit current needs. Explanations are thus func-
tionalist all the way down. But, because history is involved, form is now explained, not 
in terms of a single function, but in terms of the entire sequence of different functions that 
all left their mark on the structure. Darwin thus granted to Owen the impotence of current 
function to explain the shared structure of vertebrate forelimbs. But all vertebrate fore-
limbs have a substantially shared history, i.e., they were, for a good portion of their his-
tory, subject to the same functional constraints. For a Darwinian functionalist, able to cite 
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past as well as current function, the existence of a one-to-many relationship between 
structure and current function is not a problem. 
The introduction of Darwin’s evolutionary theory thus substantially changed the ter-
rain of structure/function disputes. Darwin introduced a novel explanatory resource into 
the arsenal of functionalists (namely, past function), and in doing so he deprived the 
structuralists of one of their most powerful arguments. 
At the same time, Darwin left much unchanged. The central issue in the disputes was 
still the role of function in explaining structure. It is true that Darwin tied the notion of 
function to the action of natural selection, and so gave it a new theoretical basis.46 How-
ever, this does not make Darwin’s functionalism radically different from that of his fore-
bears. The adaptedness of organisms to their environments and the use of particular parts 
to serve particular functions is a phenomenon that is recognizable independently of our 
understanding of how it comes about. As has long been recognized in philosophy of sci-
ence, phenomena (and characterizations thereof) have a life independent of the theories 
proposed to explain them and can remain stable across theoretical change (Bogen and 
Woodward 1988; Woodward 1989; Hacking 1992). The notion of function has, in just this 
manner, persisted across the Darwinian revolution (Asma 1996, chap. 4). Pre-Darwinian 
creationists offered one mechanism connecting function to structure (God’s consideration 
of organisms’ needs in the creation). Lamarck (1914, chap. VII) offered another (needs à 
                                               
46 The fact that structuralism and functionalism have survived radical theory change of 
this sort is a major motivator for Boucher’s (2015) view that they are best understood as 
stances sensu van Fraassen, rather than as substantive theses (van Fraassen 2002; cf. 
Boucher 2014). More on this below (Section 2.7). 
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behavioral changes à physiological changes à inheritance of said changes). And Darwin 
offered a third (the struggle for life à selection à evolutionary change). All three invoke 
function as an explanans of structure, though they fill out the intervening links differently. 
Considered from the perspective of structure/function disputes, Darwin’s major in-
novation is therefore not his notion of natural selection. Natural selection offered a way 
of understanding how function shapes structure that was scientifically viable in a way 
that creationist and Lamarckian ideas were not. It did not, however, fundamentally re-
shape the explanatory task of functionalists. Far more important was his sophistication 
of the resources of functionalism, giving functionalists the ability to invoke past as well 
as present functions in explaining structure. 
 
 
 
5.4 THE GENERATION AND SPREAD OF VARIATION 
 
In a contemporary evolutionary context, a complete explanation of evolutionary change 
must have two components. It must state how variants were generated, and it must state 
why these variants spread or failed to spread within a population (Endler 1986). With the 
benefit of hindsight, we can see that older transmutationist views also provided answers 
to these questions, even though they did not always clearly distinguish them. In the next 
two sections, we will see that the distinction between these two questions is essential for 
understanding the structure/function disputes that arise in an evolutionary context. Here, 
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my main aim is simply to present the distinction clearly, and to draw a few preliminary 
implications for our understanding of structure/function disputes. 
The distinction emerged most clearly in the context of population genetic modeling 
in the first half of the 20th century. These models include two kinds of evolutionary causes: 
those that introduce new genetic variants into a population (mutation, migration) and 
those that affect which mutations spread through a population (selection, drift). Mutation 
and migration are causes that affect the generation of variation; selection and drift are 
causes that affect the spread of variation.47 In this way, the two processes (generation and 
spread) are separable. Evolutionary change involves both processes, and so a full expla-
nation of any given evolutionary change will cover both.48 
This division of the problem space was an essential element of the modern synthesis. 
Here, for instance is Theodosius Dobzhansky in his important Genetics and the Origin of 
Species (Dobzhansky 1982, 13): 
Mutations and chromosomal changes arise in every sufficiently studied or-
ganism with a certain finite frequency, and thus constantly and unremit-
tingly supply the raw materials for evolution. But evolution involves some-
thing more than origin of mutations. Mutations and chromosomal changes 
are only the first stage, or level, of the evolutionary process, governed 
                                               
47 I am setting aside the many recent attempts to expand evolutionary theory to include 
substantial non-genetic components (cf. Pigliucci and Müller 2010). The same issue arises 
there: non-genetic variants must be generated, and they must spread through the popu-
lation. 
48 This is not to say that an adequate evolutionary explanation always has to cover both—
far from it (this will be important below). For instance, when a population encounters an 
environmental change, selection often operates on standing genetic variation. Simply 
looking at the population’s response to the environmental change, no new variants are 
needed and so an explanation can involve only the spread of variation, ignoring how the 
variants were generated. Nonetheless, if we ask about the origin of the standing genetic 
variation, in the background were processes of both generation (to produce the variation) 
and spread (to maintain it). 
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entirely by the laws of the physiology of individuals. Once produced, mu-
tations are injected in the genetic composition of the population, where 
their further fate is determined by the dynamic regularities of the physiol-
ogy of populations. A mutation may be lost or increased in frequency in 
generations immediately following its origin, and this (in the case of reces-
sive mutations) without regard to the beneficial or deleterious effects of the 
mutation. The influences of selection, migration, and geographical isolation 
then mold the genetic structure of populations into new shapes, in conform-
ity with the secular environment and the ecology, especially the breeding 
habits, of the species. This is the second level of the evolutionary process, 
on which the impact of the environment produces historical changes in the 
living population. 
 
Dobzhansky’s two levels are, quite clearly, the generation of variation (first level) and 
the spread of variation (second level).49 This distinction between problems of generation 
and problems of spread is maintained in contemporary evolutionary theory (Endler 1986). 
One might reasonably worry that this distinction only applies to those biologists who 
accepted it explicitly, and that it distorts the views of others to force this distinction upon 
them. In fact, however, the distinction is illuminating when applied to other transmuta-
tionist thinkers. In applying this distinction to biologists as diverse as Lamarck, Thomp-
son, and Goldschmidt, we can notice an interesting feature of their views. All three pre-
sented mechanisms for the generation of variation that also accounted for their spread. 
That is, their views entailed that both problems could be solved in a single step. For La-
marck, because organisms shared the same environment, each individual would generate 
and pass on the same sort of variant to their offspring. Thus, no additional factors need 
to be cited to explain the spread of variation. Meanwhile, for Thompson: the same phys-
ical forces act on all individuals of the same species, so any aspects of form that are 
                                               
49 Dobzhansky goes on to discuss a third level, concerning the mechanisms that create 
distinct populations, but this is irrelevant to my concerns here. 
 169 
determined by these forces will be the same in all individuals. Again, what accounts for 
generation also accounts for spread. Goldschmidt’s view also solves both problems in 
one step, though in a different way. For Goldschmidt, the developmental system has the 
potential to generate large novelties via a single mutation. The “hopeful monsters” so 
generated are so different from other individuals that—if they are viable—they found a 
new population in one step.50 The novel features of the hopeful monster are thus imme-
diately at fixation in the new population, so neither selection nor drift are required to aid 
their spread. 
The distinction thus usefully illuminates each of their views, both individually and in 
virtue of showing interesting commonalities between them. Note that these commonali-
ties exist across the divide between structuralists and functionalists: both functionalists 
(Lamarck) and structuralists (Thompson, Goldschmidt) can offer theories that solve both 
problems together. The inverse is true as well: both functionalists and structuralists can 
keep the two problems separate. This is obviously true for functionalists such as Dob-
zhansky, but it is equally true for the structuralist arguments of Pere Alberch and Emily 
Gale (1985; discussed further below, Section 5.6). Thus, in making this distinction, I am 
not prejudging the issue in favor of either camp. 
The distinction is also useful for clarifying the structure/function disputes that arise 
within the context of Darwinian evolutionary theory. In Lamarck’s transmutationist the-
ory, functional concerns directly affect the generation of variation. Though Darwin was 
                                               
50 This generates its own problems: in sexual lineages, it would seem that at least two of 
the same hopeful monster must be generated at one time to make this possible. But this 
issue does not affect the points I am making. 
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sympathetic to Lamarckian ideas about the generation of variation, post-Mendelian Dar-
winians have strongly rejected them. Variants are generated without regard for the or-
ganism’s needs. Functional considerations arise only when it comes to the problem of 
spread. Thus, for a Darwinian, functionalist explanations must be expressed in terms of the 
spread of variants through a population. In this regard, Darwin stands with the structuralists 
against Lamarck’s functionalism. Both Darwin and his structuralist critics agree that the 
generation of variation cannot be explained functionally.51 
At this point, if I have been successful, the prospects for the integration of structuralist 
and functionalist perspectives should be seeming pretty good. Structuralists and (Dar-
winian) functionalists both recognize the need to explain both the generation and the 
spread of variation. Both agree that functional explanations are restricted to the spread 
of variation. This leaves (or so it seems) a lot of room for structuralists to make important 
contributions concerning the generation of variation. Since any complete explanation of 
form must involve an account of both generation and spread, it would seem that such an 
explanation must integrate structuralist and functionalist concerns. So how do struc-
ture/function disputes arise? 
 
 
 
  
                                               
51 On the flip side, insofar as proponents of the extended evolutionary synthesis (Pigliucci 
and Müller 2010) argue that at least some variation can be explained functionally, there 
is a limited sense in which they are Lamarckian. 
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5.5 THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURE/FUNCTION DISPUTES IN AN EVOLUTIONARY 
CONTEXT 
 
In this section, I defend two claims about the nature of structure/function disputes in an 
evolutionary context. I argue, first, that they concern the sources of direction in evolu-
tionary theory. Second, I show that the driving force of these disputes are disagreements 
about how variation is generated. There may be downstream disagreements about how 
variation spreads in a population, but these are consequences of the more basic disagree-
ment about how variation is generated. 
The previous section painted an optimistic picture about the prospects of reconciling 
structuralism and functionalism. This optimistic picture might be further motivated by 
considering a biologist who managed to integrate the two approaches to at least some 
degree. I have in mind Charles Darwin. Darwin (1964, chap. 5) devoted an entire chapter 
of the Origin to the issue of the laws of growth. He was especially interested in correlated 
variation, in which two parts (call them S and T) that seem independent vary together. 
When variation in S is correlated with variation in T, then selection for changes in S will 
inevitably result in changes in T. To explain why T evolved as it did, we need to invoke 
both selection (acting on variation in S) and facts about the potentialities of the develop-
mental system, namely that it produces correlated variation. 
In this explanation, the direction of evolutionary change is explained in part by selec-
tion, in part by potentialities of the developmental system. Though this type of explana-
tion is a happy case of integration, in other cases the question of the sources of direction 
 172 
in evolutionary change is precisely what gives rise to structure/function disputes. One 
of the central claims of the (functionalist) modern synthesis was that selection is the only 
direction-giving factor in evolution (Mayr 1969a; Mayr and Provine 1981). In making this 
claim, the proponents of the synthetic theory intended to exclude both neo-Lamarckian 
theories that let functional needs influence the generation of variation and structuralist 
theories that dispensed altogether with the need for selection to explain directional evo-
lutionary change. In this latter camp, besides Goldschmidt, were orthogeneticists who 
allowed internal features of the organism to drive evolutionary change (e.g. Schindewolf 
1993). 
The claim that natural selection is the only direction-giving factor in evolution re-
quires careful exegesis. If it is taken to mean that the generation of variation plays no role 
whatsoever in determining the direction of evolutionary change, it is a remarkably strong 
claim. It is a strong claim because it is committed to the view that variation is isotropic (or 
nearly so): that variation is generated equally in all directions (cf. Minchin in the epi-
graph).52 The processes that generate variation furnish selection with varieties of all sorts, 
in sufficient frequencies that all the work of determining which variants survive into fu-
ture generations is done by selection (and by drift, which is random and ipso facto not 
direction-giving). Variation by itself does not bias (let alone determine) the direction of 
evolutionary change.  
There are two problems with this assumption: it is in many cases arguably incoherent, 
and where it is coherent it tends to be false. It is arguably incoherent whenever the 
                                               
52 Pere Alberch (1980, 653–54) accuses neo-Darwinians of just this assumption. 
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directions of variation are considered qualitatively.53 At some point in evolutionary his-
tory, scales evolved into feathers (Wagner 2014, chap. 9). But scales might have evolved 
into any number of other things: skin, hair, an outer shell, or any of the kinds of outer 
covering of animals that exist only in possibility space. Could there be variation in the 
direction of all of these infinite possibilities? Clearly not in any actual (hence finite) pop-
ulation. The notion can be made coherent in cases where a property is quantitative and 
variation can be characterized in terms of increases or decreases (e.g., height), since in 
such cases there are limited directions in which variations might arise. Even in such cases, 
however, the assumption that variation is isotropic is usually false (Arthur 2001). 
But this strong form of the assumption cannot possibly be what the architects of the 
synthesis actually meant, for the simple reason that they were aware of correlated varia-
tion. In the case considered above, Darwin granted both structural and functional contri-
butions to evolutionary direction. Without selection favoring changes in S, there would 
be no change in either S or T. But selection alone cannot explain the directional change in 
T. The features of the developmental system that produce correlated variation between 
the two parts are necessary to explain this. If, for instance, S and T were correlated in the 
inverse direction, then the same selection pressure on S would have driven T to evolve in 
the opposite direction. So features of development are direction-giving factors. 
Since the synthesists accepted such cases as this, they could not have meant to exclude 
any role for the generation of variation in explaining evolutionary direction. A more char-
itable interpretation of their claim is two-fold: that variation is present in many (not all) 
                                               
53 I thank Jim Woodward for pressing me on this point. 
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directions, and that selection is essentially involved in any directional evolutionary 
change. That is certainly true of this case, where selection is required to for the directional 
evolution of both S and T. This view also rules out the views they rejected: orthogenetic 
invocations of “mutation pressure” explain directional change without selection, as do 
Lamarckian views which render selection redundant by having the variation generated 
in each individual. Goldschmidt is a trickier case, as he allowed selection a minor role in 
eliminating non-viable, “hopeless” monsters. But even in his case, the primary direction 
of evolution is determined by what mutants are generated, not by a process of selection 
accumulating small changes over time. 
We are now in position to see that structure/function disputes, in an evolutionary 
context, invariably involve disagreements concerning the generation of variation. As we 
saw, on the strong reading of the synthesists’ claim that natural selection is the only di-
rection-giving factor in evolution, this claim rests on a very restrictive assumption about 
how variation is generated, namely that it is generated isotropically. If variation is gen-
erated in an anisotropic manner, then developmental bias has a role to play in shaping 
the direction of evolutionary change (Arthur 2001). On a more plausible interpretation of 
the claim, the assumption of isotropy is relaxed, but certain pictures of how variation is 
generated are ruled out. Goldschmidt’s emphasis on large mutations that accomplish 
speciation in a single step, for instance, gives too great a directional role to the processes 
that generate variation. While selection is given a role in filtering out the nonviable of 
these large variants, selection’s role in accumulating small variants is restricted within 
species boundaries. Its direction-giving role is thus minimized. 
 175 
The same is true for the dispute between Minchin and Thompson. Minchin explains 
the evolution of spicules in terms of selection acting on “variation in every direction.” 
Selection (and thus function) is of especial importance because variation by itself is non-
directional. Thompson, in just the opposite manner, allows variation to entirely deter-
mine form, because all variation is in one direction (that determined by physical forces). 
No role remains for selection. While they do conflict over the role of selection, they do so 
in virtue of their views about the nature of variation. Their conflict is first and foremost 
about the generation of variation. 
In both cases, then, the heart of the dispute concerns the generation of variation. There 
may be downstream conflicts over the role of selection in determining organismal form, 
but these conflicts are the consequences of the deeper disagreement over the problems of 
generation. Functionalists, as much as structuralists, are committed to some answer to 
the question of how variation is generated. 
We may therefore say that structure/function disputes arise when disagreements 
over the way in which variation is generated lead to further disagreements about the 
sources of directional evolutionary change. 
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5.6 WHY-QUESTIONS AND LOCALIZED STRUCTURE-FUNCTION DISPUTES 
 
In the foregoing, I have attempted to lay out some of the major issues that characterize 
conflicts between structuralists and functionalists. Here, I tie these threads together into 
a precise specification of what constitutes a structure/function dispute in the context of 
evolutionary theory. Specifically, I give an account of what it means to give a structuralist 
or a functionalist answer to a specific contrastive why-question. I argue that the twin no-
tions of structuralist and functionalist answers to particular contrastive why-questions 
are prior to any characterization of structuralism and functionalism more generally. 
Evolutionary biologists seek both (i) to develop a general picture of the evolutionary 
process and (ii) to explain the evolution of particular structures. The majority of the phil-
osophical discussion of structuralism and functionalism has concerned general pictures 
of evolutionary theory. Goldschmidt’s structuralist theory, for instance, conflicted with 
the functionalist theory established during the modern synthesis. It is tempting, on this 
basis, to seek to characterize structuralism and functionalism in terms of the type of over-
arching theory one endorses. 
I propose to take the opposite approach. In understanding structuralism and func-
tionalism, it is better to begin with structure/function disputes as they arise concerning 
the evolution of particular structures. One of the most profound lessons of evolutionary 
theory is that evolutionary processes are themselves evolved. Different processes domi-
nate in different lineages. As a result, biologists trade in restricted generalizations, not 
universal laws (Beatty 1995; Mitchell 2000). It is theoretically possible that much 
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evolution occurs in accordance with the synthetic picture on which selection accumulates 
mutations with small effect sizes, but that in some cases Goldschmidtian hopeful mon-
sters have arisen and founded a new species in a single step. Thus, while a background 
picture of how evolution works may generate expectations about a particular case, ulti-
mately each case must be taken on its own terms. 
When biologists seek to explain the evolution of particular structures, local structure-
function disputes arise. These disputes enjoy at least semi-independence from any back-
ground commitment to a structuralist or functionalist general picture, however such 
might be characterized. In these local structure/function disputes, explanations of the 
evolution of any particular structure can be broken down into answers to distinct why-
questions (on why-questions, cf. van Fraassen 1980, chap. 4). In answering these why-
questions, structuralist answers (in terms of the generation of variation) or functionalist 
answers (in terms of the spread of variation) can dominate to the exclusion of the other. 
Consider the case of digit reduction in amphibians (Alberch and Gale 1985). Both anu-
rans (frogs) and urodeles (salamanders) contain lineages that have lost all or part of cer-
tain digits. These cases of digit reduction show two interesting patterns. First, there are 
distinct trends within both the anuran and urodele lineages. For instance, anurans that 
have lost only one phalange always lose a phalange from the first digit, while urodeles 
that have lost only one phalange always lose a phalange from the fourth digit. Second, as 
the example shows, these trends are different within the two lineages. Anurans and uro-
deles lose distinct phalanges first. 
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How are we to explain these patterns of digit reduction? Alberch and Gale contrast 
two strategies. The first, which they prefer (and experimentally substantiate) is that both 
urodele and anuran developmental systems are highly constrained in their potential for 
digit reduction, such that, if a mutation causes loss of a single phalange, it always causes 
loss of the same one. That is, selection can favor digit reduction over digit increase, but it 
cannot favor (in anurans) loss of a phalange from the first digit over loss of a phalange 
from the third digit, because only the first type of variant is produced. The trends within 
urodeles and anurans are thus explained by shared potentialities of their developmental 
systems, while the differences are explained by the fact that the anuran and urodele de-
velopmental systems have different potentialities.  
On the functionalist approach, by contrast, any developmental constraints are weak 
and local: weak in the sense that many different phalanges might be the first to be lost, 
local in the sense that different urodeles would have different constraints (and same for 
anurans). If so, shared constraints can obviously not explain these evolutionary trends, 
in which case selection is the most likely explanation. Specifically, trends seen in multiple 
lineages are likely due to similar selection pressures operating in each lineage. 
So far, this fits the basic pattern we have considered. The functionalist makes assump-
tions about how variation is generated that leave most of the work of determining evolu-
tionary direction to selection. Meanwhile, the structuralist makes different assumptions 
according to which the generation of variation substantially limits the course of evolution 
(in this case, in the same way across multiple lineages). 
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In moving to a particular case, however, we are able to ask more precise questions. 
Now the task is not to explain organismal form in general, but to explain the evolution of 
particular forms, as well as to explain common features of multiple cases of such evolu-
tion. Explanations answer why-questions, which have the structure “why X rather than 
Y?” In the context of evolutionary theory, this amounts to: why did X evolve rather than 
Y? For example: why did those anuran lineages that lost digits lose digit one first, rather 
than any other digit? In asking these specific questions, we can precisely localize the 
structure/function dispute at issue. The key is to distinguish structuralist answers to 
these questions from functionalist answers. I define these as follows: 
• Structuralist answers exclusively invoke biases in the generation of variation 
to explain why X evolved rather than Y. 
• Functionalist answers exclusively invoke selection influencing the spread of 
variation to explain why X evolved rather than Y. 
The emphasis on exclusivity is important. As we will see shortly, the structuralist and 
functionalist positions that Alberch and Gale consider both give answers to the why-
questions at issue that satisfy the exclusivity requirement. But it is possible also to give a 
hybrid answer to such questions. Such an answer allows both selection and biases affect-
ing the generation of variation to influence the direction of evolution (Arthur 2001). Fi-
nally, neutral answers are also possible—neutral in sense that they invoke neither struc-
turalist nor functionalist factors. An explanation in terms of drift operating on isotropic 
variation would be neutral in this way. 
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Let us return to the case of amphibian digit reduction. In this case, there are many 
why-questions we might ask. Here is a sample: 
(W1) Why did these anuran lineages lose a phalange from its first digit, while 
those other anuran lineages did not? 
(W2) Why did these anuran lineages lose a phalange from its first digit, rather 
than gain (a) phalange(s) or not change at all? 
(W3) Given that they all lost a phalange, why did these anuran lineages all lose a 
phalange from their first digit, rather than some other phalange? 
(W4) Given that they all lost a phalange, why do anuran and urodele lineages 
lose a different phalange first, rather than the same phalange? 
(W5) Why did this particular anuran lineage lose a phalange from its first digit, 
rather than from some other digit. 
On both the structuralist and the functionalist views, W1 and W2 receive answers in 
terms of selection (or potentially drift). That is, Alberch and Gale accept that there was 
selection pressure for digit reduction rather than increase (answering W2) that operated 
only in certain lineages (answering W1). In other words, both the “structuralist” and the 
“functionalist” offer a functionalist answer to these questions. Note that structuralist an-
swers to both W1 and W2 are possible. For W2, for instance, Alberch and Gale might have 
argued that the potentialities of the amphibian developmental system are such that vari-
ants are only generated in the direction of reduction, never increase. 
Moving to the opposite extreme (W5), in allowing that the functionalist could accept 
local developmental constraints (i.e. allowing the functionalist to reject that variation is 
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isotropic), Alberch and Gale suggest that the functionalist could say, of a particular line-
age, that developmental constraint at least partially explains why that lineage lost a par-
ticular phalange first. In that case, once again the “structuralist” and the “functionalist” 
offer the same answer to a why-question, only this time they both accept a structuralist 
answer, on which the generation of variation is the key explanatory factor. Here, again, 
the functionalist could offer a selective explanation rather than an explanation in terms 
of developmental constraint. 
The structuralist and functionalist disagree only in their answers to W3 and W4. W3 
asks, over a range of cases, why evolution went in X direction rather than Y direction, 
while W4 asks why it went in X direction (rather than Y) in one set of cases and in Y 
direction (rather than X) in another. The structuralist, in both cases, gives an answer in 
terms of what variation was generated: variation in the X direction was generated, while 
variation in the Y direction was not. The functionalist, by contrast, assumes that variation 
was generated in both the X and Y directions, and lets selection do the work of determin-
ing which direction is followed. 
In this way, the structure/function dispute is localized to specific questions. So local-
ized, structuralist and functionalist answers can be precisely defined, in a way that is 
difficult when asking about “structuralism” and “functionalism” more generally. Note, 
also, that these local structure/function disputes have all the key features of such dis-
putes discussed in earlier sections. Both parties share an explanandum, namely structure 
(Section 5.2), though now the explanandum is contrastive. These explanations involve 
both inheritance (the normal amphibian digit pattern) and subsequent modification (digit 
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reduction) (Section 5.3). The disagreement is the product of disagreement over the nature 
of the variation that is generated (Section 5.5). This leads to disagreement about the causes 
of directional change (Section 5.5), where direction, too, is understood contrastively. This 
analysis of structuralism and functionalism in terms of structuralist and functionalist an-
swers to why-questions thus does justice to the conclusions of the foregoing sections. 
While this analysis makes clear what it means to give a structuralist or a functionalist 
answer to a why-question, it makes fuzzy what it means to be a structuralist or a func-
tionalist. Both the “structuralist” and the “functionalist” agree that functionalist answers 
are needed for some why-questions (W1, W2) and that structuralist answers are needed 
for others (W5). Both, that is, agree that both the generation of variation and the spread 
of variation contribute to determining the direction of evolutionary change. Both contrib-
ute to an explanation of digit reduction in amphibians. It is true that Alberch and Gale 
give structuralist answers to more why-questions than their hypothetical functionalist 
interlocutor, and in that sense are the “structuralists” in this particular structure/function 
dispute. But, in a dispute with someone who gave structuralist answers to W1 and W2, 
they would be on the functionalist side of a structure/function dispute.  
And this is only looking at one case. When we consider the full range of cases—that 
is, when we attempt to present a general evolutionary picture—we have to keep in mind 
Beatty’s (1995) point about evolutionary contingency. The developmental systems whose 
potentialities create biases in the generation of variation are themselves evolved. Differ-
ent lineages (and different traits within a given lineage) may experience more or less an-
isotropic variation. And even though physical forces are in a sense universal, what forces 
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are relevant to a particular lineage depend on that organism’s size and its environment 
(Thompson 1992). Microscopic aquatic bacteria, water surface-dwelling insects, large 
mammals, and birds all experience remarkably different physical forces. 
For these reasons, it is somewhat artificial to speak of “structuralists” and “function-
alists” generally. Anyone who accepts evolutionary theory is ipso facto committed to ex-
plaining evolutionary change in terms of both the generation and spread of variation. 
Anyone who rejects that variation is isotropic (that is, everyone) is committed to allowing 
that some why-questions will receive structuralist answers. The differences concern the 
particular why-questions to which one gives structuralist or functionalist answers. Some 
biologists will give structuralist answers more often. Some will give functionalist answers 
more often. But there is no specific set of why-questions to which one must give a struc-
turalist (functionalist) answer to count as a structuralist (functionalist). It is thus the local 
disputes that are primary. The rest is a relative significance dispute (Beatty 1995). High-
level structure/function disputes, that is, disputes that are not about the answers to par-
ticular why-questions, but instead concern the relative frequency with which structuralist 
or functionalist answers will be appropriate over some range of cases, are best under-
stood as inductions from known cases (potentially with the aid of general theoretical 
models) to unknown cases. 
There is also another, more interesting way to understand structuralism and function-
alism beyond the confines of particular why questions. I am thinking of views that might 
be called methodological structuralism and methodological functionalism. Much has 
been written about the latter under the heading “methodological adaptationism” (e.g. 
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Godfrey-Smith 2001). The basic premise is that, by seeing how selection has failed to op-
timize traits, we learn where to look for constraints on selection. In other words, one as-
sumes that most why-questions will receive functionalist answers in order to discover 
those cases that do not. 
Equally possible, though less discussed, is methodological structuralism. As we have 
seen, there is a trivial sense in which structure is prior to function: selection can only act 
on the variation provided to it. The generation of variation is thus prior to the spread of 
variation. Thus, by studying what variants a developmental system produces, we can 
better discover which why-questions will plausibly require functionalist answers. This 
approach is advocated by Alberch and Gale (1985, 18–19): 
However, there are some differences between expectations from ontogeny 
and the morphologies observed in nature that do imply functional (selec-
tive) constraints on design. [...] This highlighting of dissociations from the 
expected patterns is one of the important insights of the developmentalist 
approach. The problem for a functionally oriented evolutionist is, now, not 
to explain the repeated reduction of the first toe in anurans but rather the 
persistence of the fourth phalange in the fourth toe. 
 
Alberch and Gale found that experimental perturbations of anuran development fre-
quently caused the loss of a phalange in the fourth toe. Digit reduction in actual anuran 
lineages, however, always proceeded by loss of a phalange in the first toe. This suggests 
that there was a role for selection in favoring one pattern of digit reduction over the other. 
That is, by beginning with an understanding of the nature of variation generated by the 
anuran developmental system, Alberch and Gale were able to determine that a particular 
why-question likely required a functionalist answer. 
 185 
I take it as a virtue of my account that it makes clear what, exactly, methodological 
structuralism recommends, and how it contrasts with the recommendations of method-
ological adaptationism. This does not address, however, the value of methodological 
structuralism, which remains relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature, espe-
cially compared to the attention devoted to methodological functionalism. It is an area 
worthy of further study. 
 
 
 
5.7 STRUCTURALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM REVISITED 
 
I have argued that the key to understanding structuralism and functionalism lies in look-
ing at local structure/function disputes. These disputes are empirical disagreements 
about the answers to particular why-questions. Once this is understood, the need to char-
acterize structuralism and functionalism as high-level positions is lessened. The sub-
stance of my view is now on the table. It only remains to contrast my approach with 
another recent attempt to analyze structuralism and functionalism. 
Sandy Boucher (2015) has recently defended the view that structuralism and function-
alism should be understood as stances sensu van Fraassen (2002). It is not incompatible 
with my view that there should exist structuralist and functionalist stances of the sort 
Boucher describes. As such, our accounts are not in direct conflict. However, we disagree 
on what is most central to understanding structure/function disputes in biology: I take 
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local structure/function disputes to be most important and to be explicable inde-
pendently of stances, while Boucher sees structuralist and functionalist stances as driving 
the disputes. Moreover, Boucher’s defense of the stance view raises a serious objection to 
the account I have developed. As such, it is worth considering. 
A stance, according to Boucher (2015, 388), has five key properties. First, it is a cluster 
of attitudes and not a set of beliefs (nor is it reducible to a set of beliefs). Second, as a 
cluster of attitudes, a stance can be adopted but not believed. Third, because a stance is a 
cluster of attitudes, it is not propositional and therefore not truth-apt. Fourth, adoption 
of a stance is driven by one’s values (epistemic and non-epistemic). Fifth, adoption of a 
stance is justified pragmatically rather than epistemically. 
The appeal of thinking of structuralism and functionalism as stances stems from their 
persistence across radical theory change. It seems we can meaningfully identify both 
structuralists (Geoffroy, Owen, Thompson, Goldschmidt, Alberch, Newman) and func-
tionalists (Lamarck, Cuvier, Darwin, Minchin, Dobzhansky, Dennett, Carroll) across the 
last 200+ years of biological science. But our understanding of both structure and function 
has changed dramatically over this time. The worry is that any belief about the relation 
between structure and function that could survive the last 200 years of theory change in 
biology must be vague to the point of vacuity. If there is anything linking those biologists 
we call functionalists and those we call structuralists, then it must be something other 
than shared beliefs. And the best candidate seems to be a stance (Boucher 2015, 393). 
This argument against the possibility of finding any contentful beliefs that all struc-
turalists or all functionalists share casts doubt on my attempt in the foregoing to give a 
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general characterization of structure/function disputes. The fact that my analysis of local 
structure/function disputes involved taking on board aspects of contemporary evolu-
tionary theory only furthers this worry. It is clearly not applicable in the form developed 
above to the various structuralists and functionalists who were not transmutationists (i.e. 
who rejected the possibility of evolutionary change). 
These worries can be defused by separating out two projects I have been engaged in 
this chapter. One project is to clarify the nature of contemporary structure/function dis-
putes. Given that all serious biologists today accept evolutionary theory in some form, it 
is useful to understand the specific nature of the structure/function disputes in which 
they are engaged, even at the expense of losing some historical generality. 
At the same time (second project), I have attempted to capture what did remain con-
stant in structure/function disputes across the Darwinian revolution. This is the analysis 
given in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, where I showed that such disputes were not over the ex-
planatory priority of structure or function, but over the role of function in explaining 
structure. I already argued there that this question is substantive even in the absence of a 
shared background theory. Understanding structuralism and functionalism in terms of 
the distinction between structuralist and functionalist explanations eliminates the need 
to think of them in terms of stances. 
This leaves open the question of whether my claims about the priority of local struc-
ture/function disputes apply to pre-Darwinian structuralists and functionalists. Such bi-
ologists obviously did not have arguments over the relative roles of the generation of 
variation and the spread of variation in determining evolutionary direction. Nonetheless, 
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they did engage in local structure/function disputes. Consider the following two why-
questions: 
(W6) Why do the dugong’s fin, bat’s wing, and mole’s forelimb share the same 
underlying structure, rather than have different underlying structures? 
(W7) Why is the dugong’s forelimb a fin rather than a wing? 
Richard Owen would answer W6 by invoking the vertebrate archetype that all three 
organisms share, and he would answer W7 in terms of the dugong’s aquatic mode of life. 
Georges Cuvier, by contrast, would answer both questions in terms of the organisms’ 
modes of life (conditions of existence). While these answers are not in terms of the gen-
eration or spread of variation, they are nonetheless recognizably structuralist Owen’s an-
swer to W6) or functionalist (Owen’s answer to W7; Cuvier’s answers to W6 and W7) in 
a broader sense. 
In Section 5.2, the issue was raised that structuralists have, historically, offered quite 
different explanations of structure. These explanations were primarily unified in virtue 
of not being functional. In an evolutionary context, however, we can recognize a greater 
unity to structuralist explanations: they invoke properties of the generation of variation 
to explain evolutionary direction. More work is required to determine whether a similar 
unity can be found for pre-Darwinian structuralism—perhaps in terms of non-functional 
restrictions on possible form. I think the prospects are promising, but it is possible that it 
was only with the Darwinian revolution (and subsequent developments) that structural-
ist approaches came to be unified in this way. Deciding between these two possibilities 
would require deep historical analysis that is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 189 
 
 
 
5.8 RECAPITULATION 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to provide an analysis of structure/function disputes in 
biology that (a) accounts for the persistence of these disputes across 200+ years without 
rendering structuralism and functionalism vacuous and (b) explains the nature of con-
temporary structure/function disputes, which occur within the context of evolutionary 
theory. The key claims I have defended are: 
(1) Structuralism and functionalism are best characterized in terms of the role 
they ascribe of function in explaining structure. That is, they share the same 
explanandum, but differ over the explanans (Section 5.2). 
(2) As a consequence of (1), structuralism and functionalism should not be un-
derstood as disagreeing over the explanatory priority of structure or func-
tion (Section 5.2). 
(3) Darwin, though he substantially sophisticated the resources available to the 
functionalist and in doing so deprived structuralists of one of their strong-
est arguments, did not change the central issue identified in (1) (Section 5.3). 
(4) As a consequence of (3), structure/function disputes can be understood as 
persisting across the Darwinian revolution (Section 5.3). This does not re-
quire treating them as stances sensu van Fraassen (Section 5.7). 
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(5) In the context of evolutionary theory, structure/function disputes are gen-
erated when disagreements about the generation of variation lead to disa-
greements about the sources of directional evolutionary change (Section 
5.5). 
(6) In the context of evolutionary theory, local structure/function disputes take 
the form of divergent answers to contrastive why-questions. Functionalist 
answers to these why-questions invoke the spread of variation, while struc-
turalist answers invoke the generation of variation (Section 5.6). 
(7) These notions of functionalist and structuralist answers to particular con-
trastive why-questions are prior to understandings of structuralism and 
functionalism that transcend such local contexts, in the sense that the latter 
should be characterized in terms of the former (Section 5.6). It is an open 
question whether this point applies to pre-Darwinian structuralists and 
functionalists (Section 5.7). 
(8) One particularly interesting higher-level form of structuralism is methodo-
logical structuralism, which is a counterpart to methodological functional-
ism (adaptationism). Methodological structuralism is worthy of further 
philosophical investigation (Section 5.6). 
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6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
In the foregoing, I have made the case that, when the conceptual foundations of evo-devo 
are properly understood, the prospects for integrating evo-devo with the rest of evolu-
tionary theorizing look quite good. Viewed in light of my analysis, what appeared to be 
deep, intractable, non-empirical conflicts between evo-devo and synthesis-derived evo-
lutionary theorizing turn out to be a mix of merely empirical conflicts and complemen-
tary approaches to understanding evolutionary phenomena. I’ve made that case above; 
it does not need to be summarized again here. Instead, I’d like to end by drawing out a 
more general moral for understanding conflict and theory change in science. 
Baldly stated, the moral is that cases of theoretical conflict are best analyzed, not in 
terms of large, complex packages of views, but by trying to localize the conflict as much 
as possible. My approach, in other words, proceeds in the opposite direction from classic 
accounts of theory change in science, couched in terms of complex, multi-faceted para-
digms (Kuhn 1962; Hoyningen-Huene 1993) or research programmes (Lakatos 1970). 
Where those approaches sought to explain local conflicts in terms of large-scale back-
ground structures that give rise to them—in short, to see local conflicts as the product of 
higher-level conflicts—I prefer to see large-scale conflicts as the byproduct of local 
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conflicts. While paradigms or research programmes may be fruitful units of analysis for 
many purposes, my contention is that conflicts are best analyzed at smaller scales. 
Why favor the local approach? In each chapter, I’ve tried to show the merits of the 
local approach for the specific conflict at issue, but there are also two general reasons, 
which I’ll discuss here. One of these is ontological, the other pragmatic. The ontological 
reason for favoring the local approach stems from the complexity of paradigms and re-
search programs. Kuhnian paradigms contain exemplary explanatory successes, a set of 
theoretical resources for solving puzzles, shared epistemic standards, active intra-para-
digm disputes, and more. Lakatosian research programmes contain a hard core and an 
auxiliary belt, with positive and negative heuristics to guide the revision of the auxiliary 
belt. At the same time, paradigms and research programmes are supposed to confront 
(and possibly replace) their rivals as units. This is difficult to maintain, however: precisely 
because these large-scale constructs contain independently movable parts, those parts 
can and will interact with the parts of other paradigms or research programmes in a va-
riety of ways. Even if there is conflict at the higher level, there may be productive cross-
talk at the lower level, and this cross-talk gets washed out if the analysis only focuses on 
the large-scale conflict (cf. Sterner and Lidgard 2018).  
Relatedly, the internal diversity of paradigms or research programmes can also be 
washed out by excessive emphasis on the larger scale. As I noted in the introduction, 
identifying what is shared among all proponents of the modern synthesis (let alone what 
is shared among both them and all of their descendents) is an impossible task, and the 
same is true for evo-devo. Nearly every aspect of evolutionary theorizing important to 
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the synthesis (a) was disputed during the synthesis period and (b) has been revised in the 
half-century since. Evo-devo is younger, but it too has undergone near-constant revision 
(for instance, from an emphasis on master genes to an emphasis on networks and their 
topologies). As they have changed, their relations to one another have also changed, and 
they have changed in ways difficult to capture if one focuses only on what unites them 
as paradigms or research programmes. 
Moreover, continuing the ontological theme, because these large-scale constructs con-
tain multiple moving parts, there is the possibility that different ways of grouping these 
parts will lead to cross-cutting classifications of scientific conflict. Chapters three and five 
above furnish a clear example of this. The conflict between evo-devo and synthesis-de-
rived theorizing have been identified as the latest in a long line of conflicts between struc-
turalist and functionalist approaches to biology (Amundson 2005). In fact, however, func-
tionalism lumps together parts of evo-devo with synthesis-derived theorizing and sets 
both off against other parts of evo-devo. Such cross-cutting classifications can lead to al-
liances that seem strange (insofar as they appear to jumble separate paradigms), as when 
Stuart Newman and Ramray Bhat (2008) criticize the functionalist wing of evo-devo for 
being neo-neo-Darwinian. 
The pragmatic reason to favor a local approach to understanding theory change and 
theoretical conflict is that it makes it easier to see how theoretical conflicts can be empir-
ically tractable. For example, understanding structuralism and functionalism as stances 
(Boucher 2015) leaves us in a position where the merits of each stance are difficult to 
evaluate. Good work has been done on both sides—is biology then caught in an eternal, 
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irresolvable conflict between them? By contrast, understanding structuralism and func-
tionalism as explanatory strategies (chapter five) makes clear (a) why both strategies have 
proven and will continue to prove fruitful, (b) how the strategies can be integrated in 
unified explanations, (c) why local structure/function disputes may nonetheless be ex-
pected to regularly arise, and (d) how such local disputes can be rendered empirically 
tractable. This approach also allows us to recognize how distinct functionalist ap-
proaches—such as Darwinian and Cuvieran functionalism—may complement one an-
other, the one useful for explaining evolutionary change, the other for explaining evolu-
tionary stasis. 
The conflicts between evo-devo and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing are 
real. They show up in the biological literature with some regularity (a sampling: Alberch 
1989; Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996; Gilbert 2003a; Cracraft 2005; Jenner 2006; Davidson 
and Erwin 2006; Coyne 2006; Erwin and Davidson 2006; Hoekstra and Coyne 2007; 
Carroll 2008; Davidson 2011; Laland et al. 2014, 2015). But if we understand them as con-
flicts between evo-devo and synthesis-derived evolutionary theorizing, they come to 
seem greater than they are, and Amundson’s (2005) conclusion that the two research pro-
grams are incommensurable is difficult to avoid. On the other hand, if we break these 
programs down into their parts and localize their conflicts to the particular parts that give 
rise to them, we can mitigate the tensions and uncover the many fruitful possibilities for 
integrating evolutionary theory’s diverse explanatory resources. 
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